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INTRODUCTION 
 
When I took a decision or adapted an 
alternative, it was after studying every relevant and 
many irrelevant factors. Geography, tribal structures, 
religion, social customs, languages, appetites, 
standards, all were at my fingerprints. 
Lawrence of Arabia 
 
 
The Human Aspects of the Operational environment in Afghanistan 
Handbook was created as part of a broader project, “Human Aspects of the 
Operational Environment (HAOE)”, under the coordination of the Emerging 
Security Challenges Division / NATO HQ. The project aims to provide a 
comprehensive introduction to the human aspects in any theatre of operations 
and was conducted as a series of workshops spanning two years.    
There are many country books, studies and reports, within and outside 
NATO community, that provide basic/specific information about Afghanistan. This 
handbook fuses information from the most relevant ones, adding the unique 
perspective and experience of eight contributors with various Afghanistan 
backgrounds.   
The aim of this handbook is to present essential information concerning 
the Afghan population and patterns of life. The publication can help the NATO / 
ISAF community to better understand the Afghans and is recommended as part of 
the pre-deployment training. It is not a sociological study and does not intend to 
turn its readers into experts on Afghan society; instead it familiarizes them with 
those parts of the Afghan culture most likely to influence the operations on the 
ground. 
 This document provides direct support to the ISAF COIN strategy and is 
for official use only. 
 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
8 
 
 
Human Aspects in Afghanistan - Handbook 
 
9 
 
HISTORY 
 
Overview  
Afghanistan’s history, its political development, the foreign relations, and 
its very existence as an independent state have largely been determined by its 
geographic location. Afghanistan is located at the crossroads of Central, Western, 
and Southern Asia. Migrating groups have passed through the region over the 
centuries and have left behind a blend of ethnic and linguistic influences. 
Evidence of human habitation of Afghanistan dates back to 50,000 B.C. Artefacts 
indicate that the people were small farmers and herdsmen, as they are today, 
very probably grouped into tribes, with small local kingdoms rising and falling 
through the ages. Afghanistan has also seen its share of vast armies passing 
through and establishing temporary local control when necessary. 
Urban civilization on the Iranian plateau, which includes most of Iran and 
Afghanistan, may have begun as early as 3,000 to 2,000 B.C. However, little is 
known about the area before the middle of the first millennium B.C., when its 
history began to be recorded during the Achaemenid Empire. 
 
Early Conquests 
The first of the conquerors who marched into Afghanistan was Darius the 
Great, who in 500 B.C. expanded the Achaemenid/Persian Empire as far east as 
the Kabul-Jalalabad-Peshawar area. The Achaemenids were enlightened rulers 
who permitted some regional autonomy through the creation of 20 separate 
provinces throughout the empire. A 2,500 kilometres road linked the provinces 
and, using relays of mounted couriers, the most remote areas of the empire could 
be reached in fifteen days. 
Alexander the Great also marched through the territory of today’s 
Afghanistan in 329 B.C., extending his own empire to the northernmost and 
easternmost parts. Alexander had to fight against the local inhabitants for every 
bit of territory that he gained. 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
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The next major invasion of Afghanistan was in the 1st century B.C. The 
Kushans, a loose union of five central Asian nomadic tribes, took Afghanistan from 
the Greeks and held the power over the area for several centuries. At the same 
time, the Western world established cultural and economic ties with China, and 
many of the routes of the Silk Road ultimately ran through the Afghan area. The 
Silk Road carried Buddhism northward from India.  
Arabs first brought Islam into Afghanistan in the seventh century A.D. 
and within one hundred years from the Prophet Mohammed's death—in 632—
they had established a new Muslim empire that reached as far as Spain in the 
west and Central Asia and India in the east. Although, even the well-established 
Persians fell under the Muslim Arab influence, the Arab Empire borrowed much 
from the Persians, in the same way that the Roman Empire was influenced by the 
conquered Greeks. However, by the 10th century, the rule of the Arab Abbasid 
dynasty and its successor in Central Asia, the Samanid dynasty, had crumbled. The 
Ghaznavid dynasty, an offshoot of the Samanids, then became the first great 
Islamic dynasty to rule in Afghanistan. 
 
 
Figure 1: Persian Empire 
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Various Empires 
For the next several centuries, Afghanistan was under the power of one 
conqueror or another1. Genghis Khan marched through today’s Afghanistan in 
1220, conquering (and destroying) as he went. After his death, some local chiefs 
established independent principalities, while others remained under Mongol rule. 
This situation continued until the end of the 14th century, when Tamerlane (also 
known as Timur)2
In 1504, the region fell under a new empire, the Mughals
, a Central Asian Turk, conquered a large part of the country as 
part of the empire he established from India to the Mediterranean. Afghanistan 
remained fragmented until the 1380s, when Tamerlane consolidated his empire 
and since then it was ruled by his descendants until the early 16th century. 
3
Even while under the Mughals Empire, the native Afghan Pashtun tribes 
were beginning to gain power and exercise influence over increasing areas. In the 
18th century, one of these tribal confederations, the Durrani, was granted 
authority over their homelands around present-day Kandahar. In 1747, following 
the decline or collapse of those regional empires, Afghanistan reverted to a feudal 
structure under the military prowess of Ahmad Shah Durrani
 of northern 
India, who fought over Afghan territory with the Persian Safavi Dynasty over the 
next two centuries. In the 16th century, Babur, a descendant of Genghis Khan and 
Tamerlane, made Kabul the capital of an independent principality. He went on to 
capture Kandahar in 1522 and in 1526 he established the Mughals Empire, which 
lasted until the middle of the 19th century. The Mughals Empire included the 
entire eastern Afghanistan south of the Hindu Kush.  
4
                                                          
1 During this time, modern-day Afghan territories were merely peripheral parts of powerful regional 
empires centred in Persia, India, and Central Asia. These were either independent kingdom 
ungoverned by a central power, or locally autonomous principalities that paid tribute to a political 
centre. For example, Herat and the west of present-day Afghanistan were tied culturally and politically 
to Persia; Kandahar and the south shifted between Persia and India; Central Asia dominated Balkh and 
the north; and in the east, the Afghan capital rotated between Kabul, Afghanistan’s modern capital, 
and Peshawar, situated in present-day Pakistan. The Afghans eventually lost Peshawar to the Sikhs in 
1834. 
2 Tamerlane (1336 - 1405), his Turkic name is Timur, which means 'iron'. From 1370 till his death in 
1405, Timur built a powerful empire. 
3 Also know as Mogul (or Moghul) in traditional English usage 
. He formed a 
4 Ahmad Shah was born in 1722 to Muhammed Zaman Khan Abdali, a chief of the Abdalis and 
governor of Herat, and Zarghuna Alakozai. In 1729, after the invasion of Nader Shah, the young Ahmad 
Shah fled with his family south to Kandahar and took refuge with the Ghilzais. He and his brother, 
Zulfikar, were later imprisoned inside a fortress by Hussain Hotaki, the Ghilzai ruler of Kandahar. After 
conquering Kandahar in 1738, Ahmad Shah and his brother were freed by Nader Shah and provided 
with leading careers in his administration. The Ghilzais were expelled from Kandahar city. Ahmad Shah 
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Muslim empire in the mid-18th century that was the second in the area5
Ahmad Shah's grandson Zaman seized the throne after his father's death 
in 1793. Zaman was interested in re-establishing power in India, but the British, 
who were well established in India by this time, persuaded the Shah of Persia to 
divert Zaman's attention from India by threatening the western side of his empire. 
The Shah complied and Zaman hurried back to Afghanistan in 1800 to defend his 
land. Finally he was defeated by his own brother, who meanwhile has allied with 
the Shah. This kind of struggle for power – tribe against tribe, family against 
family, brother against brother – characterizes the intertribal relationships among 
the Afghans
 just 
behind the Turks' Ottoman Empire. After Ahmad Shah's death, the empire was 
beset by rebellions on the side of local tribal chiefs, causing Ahmad Shah's son 
Timur to move the capital from Kandahar to Kabul in 1776. 
6
                                                                                                                                      
became a commander of four thousand Abdali Pashtun soldiers. After the assasination of Nader Shah 
Afshar of Persia in June 1747, Abdali became the ruler of Khorasan. In October 1747, the chiefs of the 
Abdali tribes during Loya Jirga near Kandahar unanimously chose Ahmad Shah as leader. Ahmad Shah 
Durrani began his military conquest by capturing Ghazni from the Ghilzais and then wresting Kabul 
from the local ruler, and thus strengthened his hold over eastern Khorasan which is most of present-
day Afghanistan. In continuous battles he built an extensive empire from Delhi to the Arabian Sea by 
1760. Ahmad Shah’s empire fragmented after his death, but Dost Mohammad led the Pashtun 
Muhammadzai tribe and restored order in 1826. Although Ahmad Shah was able to earn the political 
allegiance of various tribes, his kingdom was more a constellation of independent fiefdoms than 
anything approaching a cohesive nation state. Ahmad Shah allowed his enemies to govern their 
territories like vassals, enabling them to maintain their local base of support. Consequently, remote 
provinces were never fully incorporated during his lifetime and they gradually withdrew after he died. 
Ahmad Shah was the first Durrani ruler and is known as the founder of the Afghan nation. He united 
the Pashtun tribes and began a period of Durrani rule in Afghanistan that lasted until 1978. 
5 Until Ahmad Shah death in 1772, his kingdom encompassed all of modern-day Afghanistan, extended 
to Baluchistan and Iranian Khorasan, and included the former Mughal territories of Sindh, Punjab, and 
Kashmir.  
6 Durrani’s son, Timur, lost control of the fragile kingdom after he failed to name an heir. After his 
death, the region was gripped by a series of fratricidal wars among patrilineal cousins (tarburwali): 
Zaman Shah came to power in 1793, until his brother, Shah Mahmud, blinded him and gained control. 
Shah Mahmud reigned to 1800, until another brother, Shah Shuja, deposed him in 1803. In 1809, the 
year Elphinstone arrived in Peshawar, Shah Mahmud, who had been deposed in 1803, and Fatih Khan, 
from the Barakzai tribal lineage, gained power. But the two eventually had a falling out, and in 1818, 
Shah Mahmud had Fatih Khan blinded and cut into pieces. Once again the region devolved into an 
intense competition that further fractured the empire. Amid the anarchy, Fatih Khan’s brother, Dost 
Mohammad, unseated Shah Mahmud and declared himself emir in 1826. 
, and continued as their territory became crucial to the interests of 
the great powers, most notably the Czarist Russia in the north and the British 
Empire in the south. A century-long contest for domination of Central Asia and 
Afghanistan began. Although, the Afghan rulers were able to maintain their 
independence, some compromises were necessary. In the First Anglo – Afghan 
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War (1839 – 1842)7, the British ousted Dost Mohammad, but later abandoned 
their Afghan garrisons in 1842 and Dost Mohammad became the ruler again8
When Dost Mohammad died in 1863, he left behind 27 sons and 25 
daughters born by 16 wives, setting the stage for yet another bloody competition 
to rule the empire. Dost, Mohammed’s third son from his favourite wife, Sher Ali, 
soon have taken power, but in 1866, Sher Ali’s brothers, Muhammad Afzal and 
Muhammad Azam, had joined their forces against him and Muhammad Afzal 
became emir. After his death a year later, Afzal was replaced by his brother, 
Muhammad Azam. Then, in 1868, after Sher Ali’s son, Muhammad Yaqub Khan, 
took Kandahar from Muhammad Azam’s son, Sher Ali returned to Kabul and ruled 
for the next ten years. In the following decades, the Russian forces approached 
the northern border of Afghanistan. In 1878, the British invaded and conquered 
the most part of Afghanistan in the Second Anglo-Afghan War
. 
However, the First Anglo – Afghan war had unintended consequences and 
influenced traditional standards of Afghan legitimacy. Before the war, Afghan 
rulers showered local chiefs with funds and land grants. This powerful patronage 
network was the glue that held the system together. The British viewed these 
arrangements as thoroughly corrupt and necessary to be reformed. They 
abolished the system of redistributive allowances, increased the power of the 
central government, and reduced the autonomy of local chiefs. Foreign subsidies 
to Afghan rulers and a banking system to pay for the occupation were combined 
to create a new set of winners and losers. This reorganization of the state and its 
finances altered the existing dynamic between the Afghan rulers and their society. 
9
In the beginning of 1880, finding the occupation of Afghanistan 
financially crippling and the supply lines continuously harassed by the local tribes, 
the British Empire opened negotiations with Sher Ali’s nephew, Abdur Rahman, 
who had recently returned to Afghanistan after a 12-year exile in Tashkent. Later 
. 
                                                          
7 The Russian empire pushed south through Central Asia. The British, who pushed north from the Indus 
Valley, sought to extend their influence into Afghanistan and to establish the country as a buffer state; 
however, that ostensibly passive approach produced an expansionist strategy. 
8 The British plan was to depose Dost Mohammad and replace him with Shah Shuja. But upon Shah 
Shuja’s return to Kabul in August of 1839, he was received without popular support. Even worse, 
Afghans began to view his government as a cloak for rule by foreign infidels. By 1840, locals thought 
the British presence overbearing. 
9 Renewed British concern over Russian advances in the east prompted the British to occupy Jalalabad 
in January 1879. But once again, the imposition of direct foreign rule provoked regional revolts, and 
much like the first Anglo-Afghan War, the British were outmanoeuvred. 
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on Abdur Rahman Khan10, declared himself Emir of Kabul11. During the next ten 
years, he engaged in a series of battles with the tribal leaders, gaining control 
over area after area until he controlled almost all of the modern Afghanistan12
He accomplished this partially by forcing movements of the rival 
Pashtuns to non-Pashtun areas north of the Hindu Kush, where their descendents 
still live
. 
Emir Abdur Rahman came to believe that a centralized state and a European-style 
military would better suppress the tribal uprisings that had driven the British from 
power. To avert similar attempts to unseat him, the emir ruthlessly eliminated 
autonomous regional leaders, their feudal clients, and tribal and ethnic 
opponents. 
13
                                                          
10 He was the third son of Mohammad Afzal Khan, and grandson of Dost Mohammad Khan. A Durrani 
Pashtun and a fine soldier he had learned military strategy from a British mentor. He became known 
as The Iron Emir. 
11 At the durbar (the Shah's noble court or a formal meeting where the Shah held all discussions 
regarding the state) on 22th July, 1880, Abdur Rahman was officially recognized as emir. 
 12 However, Ayub Khan, one of Sher Ali Khan's sons, marched upon that city from Herat, defeated 
Abdur Rahman's troops, and occupied the place in July 1880. This serious reverse roused the emir, 
who had not at first displayed much activity. He led a force from Kabul, met Ayub's army close to 
Kandahar, and the complete victory which he there won forced Ayub Khan to fly into Persia. From that 
time Abdur Rahman was fairly seated on the throne at Kabul, and in the course of the next few years 
he consolidated his dominion over all Afghanistan, suppressing insurrections by a sharp and relentless 
use of his despotic authority. The powerful Ghilzai tribe revolted against the severity of his measures 
several times. In that same year, Ayub Khan made a fruitless inroad from Persia. In 1888, the Emir's 
cousin, Ishak Khan, rebelled against him in the north; but these two enterprises came to nothing. 
13 In the late 1880s many of the Hazara tribes revolted against Abdur Rahman, the first ruler to bring 
the country of Afghanistan under a centralized Afghan government. In 1892 Abdur Rahman's 
succeeded in finally beating down the resistance of the Hazara people. Consequent on this 
unsuccessful revolt, numbers of Hazaras fled to Quetta in Baluchistan, in north-eastern Iran, Russia, 
Iraq, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, China and India. Most active in the revolt were the Uruzgani, 
the southernmost of the Hazara tribes. Following their defeat a considerable number of Uruzgani left 
the country, as did many Jaghori (is a major business centre and one of the main districts of Ghazni 
province in Afghanistan), their nearest neighbours to the northeast. Abdur Rahman could only succeed 
in subjugating Hazaras and conquering their land when he effectively utilized internal differences 
within the Hazara community, co-opting sold-out Hazara chiefs into his bureaucratic sales of the 
enslaved Hazara men, women and children in 1897, the Hazaras remained de facto slaves until King 
Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan's independence in 1919.  
During the period 1895-1896 Abdur Rahman directed the invasion of Kafiristan (is a historical region 
that covered present-day Nuristan Province) and the forcible conversion of its indigenous peoples to 
Islam. The region was subsequently renamed Nuristan. 
. Another of his strategies to divide the tribes was to establish provincial 
governorships with boundaries that did not coincide with tribal boundaries.  
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During Abdurrahman's reign the modern boundaries of Afghanistan were 
established. In 1891, after much sabre rattling, the Russians, the British, and 
Abdurrahman only as an observer, agreed that the Amu Darya, once known as the 
Oxus River, will become the boundary between Russia and the Afghan territory. 
The fertile agricultural area between the river and the mountains remained under 
Afghan control. 
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  In 1893, the Durand Line was drawn to establish the spheres of influence 
between Afghanistan and British India. The line was named for Sir Mortimer 
Durand, who used subtle threats to persuade Abdurrahman to agree with the 
proposed boundary. The Durand Line was not originally intended as a boundary 
between Afghanistan and India, but it ultimately became just that and now forms 
the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The Emir’s dependency on foreign patronage and his centralization of the 
Afghan state left behind a ruinous legacy for the country and its people. Funding a 
state administration and a national army required heavily extractive policies for 
tax collection. But raising revenue creates risks for rebellion and that reality 
encouraged Rahman and future Afghan rulers to rely on foreign revenue sources 
as a way to avoid political conflict with their own people, a dynamic that undercut 
Afghan sovereignty and the legitimacy of its rulers up to now. 
Abdur Rahman’s son Habibullah, who ruled from 1901 to 1919, 
continued his father’s administrative reforms and maintained Afghanistan’s 
neutrality in World War I. 
 
Recent History 
The Third Anglo-Afghan War (6th May 1919 – 8th August 1919) was part of 
a long term strategic British-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan and occurred as a 
consequence of Habibullah double dealing foreign policy towards Russia and 
Britain14
In 1921, the Afghans concluded a treaty of friendship with the new 
Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union. Afghanistan became one of the first nations 
that recognized the Soviet government, and a special relationship evolved 
between the two governments lasting until December 1979, when the Soviet 
Union invaded this country. 
. On 19th August 1919, Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Rawalpindi, 
ending the Third Anglo-Afghan War and gaining full independence. Between 
World Wars I and II, Afghanistan again was a balancing point between two world 
powers. Habibullah’s son, Amanullah that ruled from 1919 to 1929 had 
manipulated the new British-Soviet rivalry while establishing relations with other 
major countries. 
                                                          
14 The Great Game was a term for the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the 
Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia. The classic Great Game period is generally regarded as 
running approximately from the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 
1907. A less intensive phase followed the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.    
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Amanullah introduced his country’s first constitution in 1923. After King 
Amanullah returned from Europe in 1928, he brought many Western ideas, 
including social and cultural changes. His aim was to modernize rapidly the 
country. These ideas upset the ultra-conservative Shinwari tribe from eastern part 
of Afghanistan, who began calling for the banishment of Amanullah from 
Afghanistan. With support from fellow Tajik forces Habibullah Kalakani15
British India
 took 
advantage of the tribal revolt by the Shinwaris and others. A civil war led to 
Amanullah abdication on 14th January 1929 and he left into exile in at that time 
16 Inayatullah Khan. His brother  became the next king of Afghanistan 
for few days17 Habibullah Kalakani until  took over. However, Kalakani's18
Nadir Khan
 nine 
month’s rule was soon replaced by  on 13th October 1929. Zahir Khan 
was proclaimed King (Shah) on 8th November 1933 at the age of 19, after the 
assassination of his father Mohammed Nadir Shah19
In 1931, the government drew up a constitution, an amalgamation of 
Turkish, Iranian, and French constitutions overlaid with aspects of the Hanafi 
shari'a
. 
Over the next 40 years a series of cautious and moderate governments 
under the Afghan monarchy brought political stability to the country, and allowed 
it to make strides toward modernization and national unity. Always, however, 
there was resistance to any attempts at social change from the conservative 
religious elements of the society.  
20. The constitution established a loya jirga21
                                                          
15 Kalakani, also known as Bache Saqaw, a Kohistani Tajik, was born in the 1890s in the village of 
Kalakan, north of Kabul. 
16 Amanullah Khan attempted to return to Afghanistan, but he had little support from the people. 
From British India, the ex-king traveled to Europe and settled in Italy, and later in Switzerland. 
Meanwhile, Nadir Khan made sure his return to Afghanistan was impossible by engaging in a 
propaganda war. Nadir Khan accused Amanullah Khan of misbeliever (kufir) with his pro western 
policies 
17 In the middle of the night, on 14th January 1929, Amanullah Khan handed over his Kingdom to his 
brother Emir Inayatullah Khan and escaped from Kabul towards Kandahar in the south. Two days later, 
on 16 January 1929, Kalakani wrote a letter to King Inayatullah Khan to either surrender or prepare to 
fight. Inayatullah Khan's response was that he had never sought nor wished to be king and agreed to 
abdicate and proclaim Kalakani as the King on 17th January 
18 Kalakani was executed by hanging on 1st November 1929 along with his brother and ten other rebel 
leaders 
19 During a graduation ceremony at Kabul high school on 8th November 1933 Nadir Khan was shot to 
death by Abdul Khaliq during.  Abdul Khaliq Hazara was a Hazara student, after the incident was 
immediately apprehended and later executed after being tortured. 
20 The Hanafi School is one of the four Madhhabs (schools of law) in jurisprudence (Fiqh) within Sunni 
Islam. Among the four established Sunni schools of legal thought in Islam, the Hanafi School is one of 
the oldest and by far, the largest in parts of the world (South Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the 
Balkans and Turkey). 
, a term used today in 
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discussions of future governments in Afghanistan. The constitution left the power 
in the hands of monarchy, gave judiciary power to religious leaders, and created 
an economic framework that allowed free enterprise. A national economy had 
started to develop in the 1930s under the leadership of several entrepreneurs 
who began small-scale industrial projects. 
World War II brought about a slowdown in the development process. 
During the war, Afghanistan maintained its traditional neutrality. 
For the first thirty years King Zahir Khan did not effectively rule, ceding 
power to his paternal uncles, Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan22 and Sardar Shah 
Mahmud Khan23. Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan sanctioned free elections and a 
relatively free press. Lieutenant-General Mohammad Daoud Khan24
                                                                                                                                      
21 ‘Grand Assembly’ or, in modern terms, parliament. 
22 Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan (1885-1953) was the elder brother of Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan 
and Sardar Shah Wali Khan. He governed Afghanistan as Royal Prime Minister from 14th November 
1929 until May 1946. 
23 Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan was the Prime Minister of Afghanistan from May 1946 to 7th September 
1953 and head of the Liberal Parliament. He was the uncle of Zahir Shah, the King of Afghanistan, from 
1933 to 1973, and uncle of President Mohammed Daoud Khan. 
24 HRH Prince Mohammed Daoud was the eldest son of the diplomat HRH Prince Mohammed Aziz 
Khan (1877 – 1933) (an older half-brother of King Mohammed Nadir Shah). He lost his father to an 
assassination in Berlin in 1933, while his father was serving as the Afghan Ambassador to Germany. 
 was 
appointed as Prime Minister in September 1953 in an intra-family transfer of 
power that involved no violence and became prime minister for the next ten 
years. 
The long-standing division of the Pashtun tribes caused tension with 
Pakistan upon the creation of that state in 1947. Much of the difficulty can be 
traced to the Durand Line, which unnaturally divides a number of the eastern 
Afghan Pashtun tribes. In response, Afghanistan shifted its foreign policy toward 
the Soviet Union. In keeping with the agreement of 1921, Daoud Khan turned to 
the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. The Soviets ultimately 
became Afghanistan's major aid and trade partner, but shared the stage with the 
United States. The competition between the superpowers in aid of non-aligned 
Afghanistan benefited Afghanistan's infrastructure: Its roads and hydroelectric 
dam systems were in turn funded and directed by the Soviets and Americans. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets also aided Afghanistan in developing ports on 
the Afghan side of the Amu Darya, opposite railheads on the Soviet side. Goods to 
and from Afghanistan were transported across the river by steamers and barges 
pulled by tugboats. 
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Daoud Khan successfully introduced women into the labour force by 
allowing them to go unveiled if they wished and by abolishing the practice of 
secluding them from public view. When religious leaders protested, he challenged 
them to cite a single verse of the Qur’an specifically mandating veiling. When they 
continued to resist, he jailed them for a week. 
Daoud supported a nationalistic and one-sided reunification of the 
Pashtun people with Afghanistan, but this would have involved taking a 
considerable amount of territory from the new nation of Pakistan and was in 
direct antagonism to an older plan of the 1950s whereby a confederation 
between the two countries was proposed. The move further worried the non-
Pashtun populations of Afghanistan such as the minority Tajik and Uzbek who 
suspected Daoud Khan's intention was to increase the Pashtun's disproportionate 
hold on political power25
In 1961, as a result of Daoud's antagonistic policies and support to 
militias in areas along the Durand Line, Pakistan closed its borders with 
Afghanistan on 6th September 1961, causing an economic crisis and greater 
dependence on the USSR
.  
26
                                                          
25 During that time, the Pashtuns (or Afghans) represented over 80% of the government and held all 
important ministries, such as the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, Defence 
and even most of the banks. 
26 The USSR became Afghanistan's principal trading partner. Within a few months, the USSR had sent 
jet airplanes, tanks, heavy and light artillery for a heavily discounted price tag of US$25 million. 
. In 1962, Daoud sent troops across the international 
border into the Bajaur region of Pakistan in an attempt to manipulate events in 
that area and to press the Pashtunistan issue, but the Afghan military forces were 
routed by Pakistani military. During this period, the propaganda war from 
Afghanistan, carried on by radio, was relentless. 
By 1963, it became clear that neither Daoud Khan nor Ayub Khan, the 
ruler of Pakistan at that time, would yield; to settle the issue one of them would 
have to be removed from power. Despite growing criticism of Ayub in Pakistan, 
his position was generally strong, whereas Afghanistan's economy was suffering. 
The crisis was finally resolved with the forced resignation of Daoud Khan in March 
1963 and the re-opening of the border in May. Pakistan has continued to remain 
suspicious of Afghan intentions and Daoud's policy has left a negative impression 
in the eyes of many Tajik tribesmen who felt they were being disenfranchised for 
the sake of Pashtun nationalism. Muhammad Yousuf, a non-Pashtun, German-
educated technocrat who had been minister of mines and industries became 
prime minister. 
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Two weeks after Daoud Khan's resignation, the king appointed a 
commission to draft a new constitution. In the spring of 1964, he ordered the 
convening of a loya jirga. Although the assemblage of 452 persons was composed 
primarily of officials who would support the royal line, the loya jirga also included 
members elected from around the entire nation. The new constitution should 
have liberalized the constitutional monarchy27
In the war that followed, groups of Afghan mujahideen
; however King Zahir's "New 
Democracy" promised much but delivered little. Daoud Khan seized power again 
in 1973 in a virtually bloodless coup. His comeback was seen as a welcome return 
to strongman rule. Leftist military officers assisted in the overthrow. Daoud Khan 
abolished the 1964 constitution and established the Republic of Afghanistan, with 
himself as chairman of the Central Committee of the Republic and prime minister. 
King Zahir Shah left into exile in Rome. 
The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was formed in 1977, and 
seized control of the government in 1978 with Daoud Khan’s assassination. Their 
Marxist reform programs sparked major rebellions in the country side. In 1979, 
80,000 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan to quell the threat of an insurgency.  
28
Although peace agreements were in place, differences between the 
Afghan government and the mujahideen were never resolved, which caused 
Afghanistan to descend into a civil war by 1992. Ahmad Shah Massoud, an ethnic 
 were able to 
mount a successful guerrilla resistance. The mujahideen were comprised mostly 
of Pashtuns. The struggle also attracted conservative Muslims to the Afghan 
cause. The United States supported the Afghan rebels, pouring supplies and 
weapons into the country via Pakistan. The guerrillas kept control of most of the 
countryside, and the Soviet troops held the cities and those areas near local 
garrisons. Millions of Afghan civilians fled into Pakistan and Iran to escape the 
destructive Soviet military campaigns against the insurgency. The Soviet Union 
agreed to create a neutral Afghan state in 1988 after peace accords were signed 
between Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Pakistan. After 
years of futile effort, the Soviet Union withdrew its 100,000 troops from 
Afghanistan from May 1988 to February 1989. After the Soviets had left the 
country, the United States withdrew as well, leaving Afghanistan to its own 
devices.  
                                                          
27 The new constitution for the first time excluded all members of the royal family from the council of 
ministers. 
28 The struggle against the Soviets, which was styled a jihad, or religious war, was fought by the 
mujahideen, or freedom fighters. 
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Tajik; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun; and Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek, led 
the main groups that participated in the civil war. In April 1992, several rebel 
factions succeeded in capturing Kabul, overthrowing the communist government, 
and establishing a provisional Islamic republic headed by the Tajik northerner 
Bernahuddin Rabbani. A period of anarchy ensued, during which the government 
was powerless, and the rival groups seized everything of value in the country to 
pay and supply the troops with which they jockeyed for power. The economy was 
in a shambles, and the situation became so bad in the cities that it was dangerous 
to venture out into the streets, particularly for women. 
Despite several temporary alliances, struggles among the armed groups 
continued until an Islamic fundamentalist group, the Taliban29 emerged. The 
Taliban developed in religious schools in Pakistan. They were mostly young, 
poorly educated Pashtuns, many of whom lost their fathers and uncles in the 
struggle against the Soviets. The Taliban gained control of most of the country in 
199630
Under the Taliban rule, the Arab terrorist organization Al Qaeda had 
been allowed to use Afghanistan as its operating base. Al Qaeda carried out a 
series of international terrorist acts that culminated with the 11th September 2001 
attacks against the United States. International pressure was exacted on the 
Taliban to surrender Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. The Taliban government 
collapsed after the United States and its allies attacked it in autumn 2001
. Their success was largely due to their ability to restore civil order after the 
chaos of the preceding war years. 
The Taliban restored order by imposing extreme interpretations of 
Islamic law, with severe restrictions on the activities of women. Measures were 
enforced with public floggings and stoning. Their extreme measures alienated 
most of the world. Only Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia 
recognized the Taliban government, while the rest of the world continued to 
recognize the Rabbani government, although by then it controlled little of the 
country. The economy did not improve, and most government services ceased to 
function. 
31
                                                          
29 Talib is the Arabic/Persian/Pashto word for ‘student’; and Taliban is the Dari/Pashto plural. 
30 They fought off rival mujahideen and other warlords, and went on to take the city of Kandahar, 
beginning a successful campaign that ended with their capture of Kabul in September 1996. 
31 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 of 12th September 2001, states that the Council “expresses its 
readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the September 11 attacks.” This 
was widely interpreted as a UN authorization for military action in response to the attacks, but it did 
not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the Resolution 
specifically reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to threats to 
international peace and security. 
, 
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though many of the Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders escaped capture32
In early 2004, a new constitution was ratified by Loya Jirga
. An 
International Security Assistance Force was established in Afghanistan (for details 
see International community role and involvement in recent history). 
In 2001, Afghan leaders returning to power signed the Bonn Agreement, 
which laid the groundwork for the formation of an interim government, the 
Afghan Interim Administration, under the leadership of Pashtun moderate Hamid 
Karzai. Karzai was appointed president of the Transitional Islamic State of 
Afghanistan in 2002. 
33. In October 
2004, Hamid Karzai was elected president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
by an overwhelming popular vote34. Large areas of Afghanistan were still under 
the control of regional warlords. Parliamentary elections in September 2005 gave 
regional warlords substantial power in the National Assembly and further 
jeopardized Karzai’s ability to unite the country35
                                                          
32 Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on 7th October 2001. It 
consisted primarily of air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The purpose of these operations was 
to help the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces by providing information to direct air 
strikes against Taliban positions. In October - December 2001 combat units moved into Afghanistan to 
pressure the Taliban. The Taliban regime unravelled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on 9th 
November 2001. Northern Alliance forces enter Kabul on 12th November 2001. The Taliban 
subsequently lost the south and east of Afghanistan. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated 
as 9th December 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Umar fled the city, leaving 
it under Pashtun tribal law. 
33 Nowdays a Loya Jirga or Grand Council is known as a constituent assembly of regional leaders 
usually prepared for major events such as choosing a new king, adoption of a constitution, or 
discussing important national political or emergency matters as well as disputes. The latest Loya Jirga  
took place in Kabul from 2nd to 4th June 2010 in which around 1,600 delegates of all ethnic groups 
attended for a peace talks with the Taliban. 
34 On 9th October 2004, Afghanistan held its first national democratic presidential election. More than 
8 million Afghans voted, 41% of who were women. Hamid Karzai was announced as the official winner 
on November 3 and inaugurated on December 7 for a 5-year term as Afghanistan's first democratically 
elected president. 
35 An election was held on 18th September 2005 for the "Wolesi Jirga" (lower house) of Afghanistan's 
new bicameral National Assembly and for the country's 34 provincial councils. Turnout for the election 
was about 53% of the 12.5 million registered voters. The Afghan constitution provides for indirect 
election of the National Assembly's "Meshrano Jirga" (upper house) by the provincial councils and by 
reserved presidential appointments. The first democratically elected National Assembly since 1969 
was inaugurated on 19th December 2005. Younus Qanooni and Sigbatullah Mojadeddi were elected 
Speakers of the Wolesi Jirga and Meshrano Jirga, respectively. 
. After the 2005 elections the 
Bonn Agreement was replaced by the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006. The 
Afghanistan Compact outlined goals for international assistance in economic 
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development, protection of human rights, security, and the fight against 
corruption and drug trafficking through 2010. 
The second national democratic presidential and provincial council 
elections were held in August 2009, while National Assembly elections were 
scheduled for September 2010. Hamid Karzai's main competitor, Abdullah 
Abdullah, forced a run-off to be scheduled, but then withdrew. On 2nd November 
2009, officials of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) declared Hamid 
Karzai President of Afghanistan for another 5-year term. Unlike previous election 
cycles, the elections were coordinated by the IEC, with assistance from the UN. 
NATO officials announced in March 2009 that 15.6 million voters had registered 
to vote, roughly half of the country's population, and that 35% to 38% of 
registered voters were women. The third presidential election is planned to be 
held on 5th April 2014. 
While the 2009 Presidential Election was significantly undermined by the 
widespread fraud and corruption, there were high expectations from the 
government of Afghanistan to ensure a transparent, credible and inclusive 
parliamentary election for 2010. The Afghan parliamentary election 2010 to elect 
members of the Wolesi Jirga took place on 18th September 201036
On 22nd June 2010, the full list of candidates was announced; 2,577 
candidates filed to run, 406 of them women. Campaigning began on 23rd June 
2010
. 
37 Independent Election Commission. On 18th August, Afghanistan’s  (IEC) 
announced it would open 5,89738
Voter registration was conducted from 12th June to 12th August. 
According to the IEC, over 375,000 new voters were registered, and the number 
of eligible voters was about 11.3 million. On Election Day, about 5.6 million votes 
 polling centres for the 2010 Wolesi Jirga 
elections. On Election Day, a total of 5,355 centres opened, 304 of those slated to 
open did not, and for 157 centres there was no information available.  
                                                          
36 On 2nd January 2010, the Independent Election Commission (IEC - established in accordance with the 
article 156 of the Constitution of Afghanistan for the purpose of organizing and supervising all 
elections in the country) had initially set National Assembly elections for 22nd May 2010. IEC view was 
that this date was in line with a constitutional requirement for a new election to be held well prior to 
the expiry of the current Assembly’s term. The international community pressed for a delay of all of 
these elections until August 2010 or, according to some donors, mid-2011. On 24th January 2010, the 
IEC announced that the parliamentary elections would be postponed until 18th September 2010. 
37 At least three candidates and 13 candidate supporters were killed by insurgent violence. 
38 This is 938 less than the original plan to have 6,835 centres opened, because the Afghan security 
forces say they would only be able to secure 5,897 of the planned 6,835 polling centres. 
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were cast out of about 11.3 million eligible voters. Turnout was therefore about 
50%. A major issue was security. 
However, regardless of consistent efforts of the international community 
particularly the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the 
2010 Parliamentary Election took far longer than expected due to the widespread 
electoral fraud and corruption, the same as the fraud-tarnished 2009 Presidential 
Election. Preliminary results were announced on 20th October 2010, and final, 
certified results were to be announced by 30th October 2010, but were delayed 
until 24th November 2010, due to investigation of fraud complaints. Consequently 
the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) invalidated about 1.3 million of the 
5.6 million votes to further disqualified 24 winners after receiving more than 
5,000 complaints of fraud across nationwide polls. About 1,100 election workers 
have been questioned, and 413 candidates have been referred by the ECC to the 
Attorney General for having allegedly committed election fraud. 
The final results of the 2010 Parliamentary Election particularly indicate 
that the government of Afghanistan has failed to have a majority of pro-
government members in the new Parliament. The incoming lower house will have 
approximately 50% new membership, meaning that many incumbents apparently 
have lost their seats. 
However, the new Parliament is significantly varied from that of the 
previous one due to the ethnic representation of Afghanistan. For instance, there 
were 45–48% Pashtun members, 24–27% Tajik members, 11–13% Hazara 
members, 8–9% Uzbek members, and 4–5% other ethnic groups’ members in the 
previous Parliament of 200539. However, the Pashto-speaking majority in the new 
Parliament has now disappeared and Pashtun candidates have won only 88 seats 
out of 249 seats which accounts for 35% of the representatives in the new Afghan 
Parliament40. Not only has the Pashto-speaking majority disappeared from the 
new parliament but Tajiks have reportedly won nearly the same number of seats 
as Pashtuns41
President Karzai inaugurated the new lower house on 26th January 2011, 
six days after planned date. A special tribunal was set up to investigate the 
election results and on  23rd June 2011 it was ruled that 62 results were altered, 
prompting a backlash from those who might be deprived of seats resulting from 
. Based on the significant changes in the ethnic representation, the 
new Parliament is no longer dominated by a specific ethnic group.  
                                                          
39 Sultanpoor, 2005 
40 GGS-News, 2010 
41 RFERL-News, 2010 
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this and threats of impeaching president Karzai. The crisis eased on 11th August 
2011, when president Karzai disbanded the special tribunal and announced that 
only the election bodies have standing to overturn results. The Independent 
Election Commission announced on 21st August 2011 that nine lower house 
winners would be unseated for fraud. They were sworn in 4th September 2011; 
but a broad lower house boycott rendered it non-functional until 9th October 
2011. For the upper house, 68 council seats are appointed to four-year terms by 
the elected provincial councils in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and remain 
in office. Karzai made his 34 appointments on 19th February 2011. 
The stabilization process of Afghan society revealed the necessity of 
reintegration of and reconciliation with insurgents. The reintegration and 
reconciliation received at least some attention since 2002 in Afghan society. The 
whole process is an Afghan-lead initiative. A “Program for Strengthening Peace 
and Reconciliation” operating in 2003 – 2008 by Afghan National Security Council 
was substituted by a more conceptual plan called “Afghanistan Peace and 
Reintegration Program” prepared by the Afghan government and endorsed by a 
“peace loya jirga” on 2nd – 4th June 2010. Reintegration efforts had marginal 
success so far and had little impact on the tenacity or strength of the insurgency. 
Negotiations with militant leaders as part of reconciliation have proceeded 
sporadically since early 2010 and a formal negotiation process stalled in early 
2012. However, informal discussions have continued and, by the end of 2012, 
began to evolve into discussions of specific proposals to settle the conflict (for 
details see chapter on Reintegration and Reconciliation with Insurgents).  
During the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon42
                                                          
42 19th – 20th November 2010 
 it was agreed that the 
transition to Afghan leadership would begin in 2011 and would be completed by 
the end of 2014. Key to the transition to Afghan lead is the effectiveness of the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), consisting primarily of the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) (for details see chapter on 
ANSF). 
The conclusion of virtually every Administration and outside assessment 
has been that the Afghan central governmental capacity and effectiveness has 
increased, but that local governance remains weak and all levels of government 
are plagued particularly by governmental corruption. The deficiencies in 
governance could jeopardize stability after the 2014 transition. The Afghan 
government ability to deliver necessary social services will remain largely 
dependent on funds donated from the international community.  
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Role of the International Community in Afghan recent history 
 
United Nations 
The United Nations has been extensively involved in Afghan governance 
and national building from the beginning, primarily in the areas of factional 
conflict resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator 
of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)43. UNAMA 
has always been involved in local disputes resolution and disarmament of local 
militias, and is also playing a growing role in engaging regional actors in Afghan 
stability44
                                                          
43 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of 20th March 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to 
strengthen cooperation between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the 
Afghan government. UNAMA is to open offices in as many of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces as financially 
and logistically permissible. The mandate of UNAMA, was renewed for another year on 22nd March 
2011, by Resolution 1974. As did Resolution 1917 the previous year, Resolution 1974 largely restated 
UNAMA’s coordinating role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan and election support 
role, while referring to UNAMA’s role in facilitating the coming transition to Afghan leadership. As part 
of the expansion of its mandate, UNAMA is playing a role in reintegration of surrendering insurgent 
fighters through a “Salaam (Peace) Support Group” that coordinates with Afghanistan’s High Peace 
Council (that is promoting reconciliation and reintegration). 
44 It was a co-convener of the 28th January 2010 and 20th July 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, 
respectively. Along with Turkey, UNAMA chairs a “Regional Working Group” to enlist regional support 
for Afghan integration. 
. 
UNAMA co-chairs the joint Afghan-international community coordination 
body called the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping 
implement Afghanistan’s development strategy based on Afghanistan’s “National 
Strategy for Development,” presented on 12th June 2008, in Paris. However, 
UNAMA’s donor coordination role did not materialize because of the large 
numbers and size of donor-run projects in Afghanistan. The difficulties in 
coordinating U.N. with NATO efforts were evident in a 2007 proposal to create a 
new position of “super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the 
European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan. On 7th February 2010, in line with 
2007 effort to improve civilian coordination between the NATO countries and the 
Afghan government, the NATO “Senior Civilian Representative” office was 
established. This office works with representatives of the embassies of partner 
countries and with UNAMA.  
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The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in 2001 by 
the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 138645, initially limited 
to Kabul. UN Security Council Resolution 151046  endorsed ISAF expansion and 
NATO took over command of ISAF. During 2001 to mid-2006, coalition forces and 
Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent violence with focused 
combat operations against Taliban concentrations in the south and east. Toward 
the end of this period, it appeared that the insurgency had been mostly defeated. 
Anticipating further stabilization, NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for 
security in all of Afghanistan during 2005 – 2006. In 2004, NATO/ISAF took over 
the security responsibility for northern and western Afghanistan47. The transition 
process continued in 2006, with the handover of the security responsibility in 
southern Afghanistan48 and eastern Afghanistan49
NATO counter-offensives during 2006 – 2008 focused on the Pashtun-
dominated areas cleared key districts but did not prevent subsequent re-
infiltration because Afghan governance was not established in cleared areas. 
NATO/ISAF also tried pre-emptive combat and increased development work, 
without durable success. In September 2008, NATO and partners began strategy 
reviews which resulted in newly defined goals
. Whole process was completed 
on 5th October 2006.  
The optimistic assessments proved misplaced when violence increased 
significantly in mid-2006, particularly in the east and the south, where ethnic 
Pashtuns predominate. Reasons for the deterioration included popular unrest 
over the ineffectiveness and corruption in the Afghan government; the absence of 
governance or security forces in many rural areas; the safe haven enjoyed by 
militants in Pakistan; the reticence of some NATO contributors to actively combat 
insurgents; a popular backlash against civilian casualties caused by military 
operations; and unrealized expectations of economic development. 
50 and strategy,51
                                                          
45 20th December 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution 
46 14th October 2003 
47 Stage 1 - 2004, Regional Command (RC) North, and Stage 2 - 2005, Regional Command West 
48 Stage 3 – RC South 
49 Stage 4 – RC East 
50 To prevent terrorist networks in the region from again taking root in Afghanistan. 
51 To build capable and transparent Afghan security and governing institutions and move to a support 
role in spring 2013, with transfer of full responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014. 
 including a short 
term increase of deployed troops for a surge leading to a troop’s drawdown and 
the transition to Afghan security. The ISAF mission was renewed by U.N. Security 
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Council Resolution 201152 on 13th October 2012, which reiterated previous 
resolutions’ support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Resolution 
206953 renewed the mandate for another full year. In July 2011, the results of the 
surge were considered sufficient to permit the transition to Afghan security 
leadership to begin, as planned. The transition is being conducted in five 
“tranches”54. By the end of 2013; the completion of transition in the third tranche 
would put 75% of the population under the security lead of Afghan forces, up 
from 50% covered in the first and second tranches55
During the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago
. In each area of transition, 
the process of completing the transition to Afghan responsibility takes 12 - 18 
months. 
56 it was agreed that the 
security mission would change from combat leadership to a mentoring and “over-
watch”57
                                                          
52 12th October 2011 
53 10th October 2012 
54 The first was announced by Karzai in March 2011, the second in November 2011, and the third in 
May 2012. 
55 Tranche 3 (began transition in June 2012): Territory that includes 122 districts, bringing the total 
districts undergoing transition to 260 (out of 364) in all 34 provinces. All provincial capitals will be 
under Afghan security lead after this tranche is completed, and this tranche includes some of the most 
restive areas of Afghanistan—providing an opportunity to test the capabilities of the Afghan 
government. 
Tranche 4. Locations to be announced later in February 2013, and, when completed, would put nearly 
90% of the population under Afghan security lead. 
Tranche 5. To be announced in conjunction with U.S. transition to supporting role in spring 2013, 
according to statements by President Obama following the meeting with President Karzai on 11th 
January 2013. 
56 20th -  21st May 2012 
57 combat against high-value targets as well as training for the Afghanistan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) 
 role and that the NATO security strategy in place since 2001 will remain 
intact until the end of the transition in 2014. The coalition countries are gradually 
reducing military involvement in Afghanistan as the end of the formal 
international security mission approaches by the end of 2014. International 
troop’s reduction goes along with local population fears that the Taliban and 
other insurgents will achieve success against Afghan forces once international 
troops leave Afghanistan. Some Afghan factions warn of civil war after 2014 and 
are preparing for that by rearming and recruiting militiamen; additionally, some 
Afghan elites are moving their businesses and funds out of Afghanistan out of fear 
of chaos and war after international forces end the ISAF mission. 
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Figure 3: ISAF Military assessment of situation – Kinetic events 2007 - 2009 
 
Recent International Community Concerns 
The International Community (IC) remains concerned that Afghan 
stability after 2014 is at risk because of a weak and corrupt Afghan governance 
and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. Among other efforts to promote effective 
and transparent Afghan governance, IC officials are pushing for substantial 
election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 
2014, will not experience the fraud of the elections in 2009 and 2010. An 
unexpected potential benefit to stability could come from a negotiated 
settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent 
groups.  
Still, fearing instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction 
leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces should the international 
drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power. Afghanistan’s minorities 
and women’s groups worry about a potential settlement, fearing it might produce 
compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power sharing. 
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Figure 4: Surge assessment 
 
Afghan history timeline 
 
100,000 - 2,000 B.C. Stone Age 
5,000 - 1,000 B.C. Bronze Age trading with Mesopotamia and Indus Valley 
1,500 B.C. Aryans warriors invade North Afghanistan 
500 B.C. Persians invade rise of Zoroastrianism 
330 B.C. Alexander the Great creates Afghan kingdom 
250 B.C. Buddhist Emperor Ashoka edicts carved in stone 
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300 B.C. – 50 A.D. Bactrian Greeks rule North Afghanistan 
50 – 300  Kushan Empire. Rise of Silk Route 
100 – 700  Flourishing of Buddhism and Gandhara art 
650 – 850  Arabs spread Islam through west and north 
1000 – 1100  Ghazni and Bost flourish under Sultan Mahmud 
1150 Ghorid dynasty flourishes under Alauddin. Minaret of Jam 
built 
1220 Genghis Khan devastates much of west and north 
Afghanistan 
1369 – 1530  Timurid empire, centred on Herat, lasts from Tamerlane to 
Babur 
1749 Ahmed Shah Durrani, a Pashtun, begins creation of modern 
Afghanistan 
1839 – 1842  British occupy then disastrously retreat from Kabul 
1878 Second British invasion, as part of the ‘Great Game’ 
1880 – 1901  More nation-building under Emir Abdur Rahman Khan 
1893 Durand Line plotted, dividing Afghanistan from British India 
1901 – 1919  Habibulah son of Emir Abdur Rahman Khan becomes Emir. 
Afghanistan neutrality during WWI 
1919 Third Anglo-Afghan war ends, and Afghanistan gains  
independence 
1919 – 1929  Amanullah Khan becomes king, but his progressive reforms 
backfire 
1929 Kalaki resistance 
1929 – 1933  Mohammed Nadir Shah period 
1932 Kabul University established 
1933 – 1973  Zahir Shah rules as a king. Rise of Soviet influence 
1953 – 1963  Gen Mohammed Daoud becomes prime minister 
1964 Creation of constitutional monarchy 
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1973 Daoud overthrows the king and establishes Republic 
1978 Saur Revolution. Afghan communists assassinate Daoud. 
Their reforms backfire 
1979 – 1980  Soviets invade Afghanistan and install Babrak Karmal as 
leader 
1980 – 1985  Mujahideen supported by US, Pakistan, China, Iran, and 
Saudi Arabia fight Soviets 
1985 Mujahideen form alliance against Soviets, based in 
Peshawar 
1986 US supply mujahideen with Stinger missiles. Najibullah 
replaces Karmal 
1980 – 1989  Six million Afghan refugees flee as Soviet forces target 
civilians 
1988 – 1989  Peace accord. Soviet troops pull out. Mujahideen fight 
Najibullah 
1992 Mujahideen forces, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, 
overthrow Najibullah regime 
1993 Najibullah replaced by Tajik mujahideen leader, 
Burhanuddin Rabbani 
1992 – 1994  Devastating civil war between mujahideen factions 
1994 Rise of Talibans, who take Kandahar and Herat 
1996 Talibans capture Kabul, execute Najibullah, exile Rabbani, 
offer refuge to Osama Bin Laden and impose strict Islam. 
Northern Alliance formed to fight Talibans 
1997 Talibans recognised by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. 
Fierce fighting for control of Mazar-e-Sharif, which Talibans 
capture in 1999 
1998 Two major earthquakes kill thousands. US fires missiles at 
suspected Bin Laden camps in retaliation for bombing of US 
embassies in East Africa 
1999-2001 UN imposes sanctions in failed attempt to force Talibans to 
hand over Bin Laden 
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2001 Talibans destroy Bamiyan Buddhas. Massoud assassinated. 
Talibans ousted by coalition forces and Northern Alliance. 
Bonn Agreement signed 
2002 5,000 peacekeepers arrive in Kabul. Hamid Karzai elected 
leader by Loya Jirga. Vice President Hajji Qadir assassinated. 
3 million children go back to school 
2003 Security deteriorates as Coalition forces hunt Talibans/Al 
Qaeda remnants. Third of country off-limits to international 
aid workers. New Constitution drafted and debated 
2004 Karzai is elected as President in first free and fair 
nationwide elections in October. New Constitution ratified. 
Insecurity continues in east 
2005 NATO agrees in February to expand ISAF to the whole of the 
country by the end of 2006. Parliamentary elections 
postponed till September 
2006 ISAF expansion process completed. The Bonn Agreement 
replaced by the Afghanistan Compact. Revival of insurgency 
2007 Continuous increase of insurgents activities 
2008 “National Strategy for Development,” presented at Paris 
conference. Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
established. NATO strategy reviews 
2009 The second presidential and provincial council elections. 
Hamid Karzai re-elected for another 5-year term 
2010 The second parliamentary election. Afghanistan Peace and 
Reintegration Program endorsed by a “peace loya jirga”. 
London and Kabul Conferences. NATO “Senior Civilian 
Representative” office was established. ISAF “surge” phase. 
Kabul bank scandal 
2011 End of ISAF “surge” phase and beginning of transition phase 
(until 2014) 
2012 NATO summit in Chicago, changing role of ISAF 
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Afghan general perspective / view on importance of history 
Afghans view history to be of great importance. Afghan identity relies heavily 
on its history and because of this; traditions and rituals are stronger in 
Afghanistan than in many Western societies. The collective Afghan memory 
keeps the defeat of the Arabs, the British, and the Russians fresh in its minds’ 
eye (for example, children are named after heroes of war, keeping the stories 
of Afghan victory alive). As a result of their very dramatic history, many 
Afghans are given to a longer view of history and time in general (case-in-
point: many Afghans consider insurgents to be merely biding their time rather 
than retreating; common sentiment is that the international forces have 
clocks and the insurgents have the time). The deep sense of community and 
nationalism important to Afghans is enforced by the importance placed on 
history. 
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POPULATION 
 
Population Patterns 
Afghanistan’s population is estimated at 28 million people58. Population 
patterns in Afghanistan have been unstable for decades due to domestic and 
international conflicts. In 1978, millions lost their homes due to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. An estimated 6 million people became refugees, most of 
who fled to Pakistan or Iran59
Afghanistan has made some progress in developing its economy in the 
last few years. However, until basic needs such as security, reliable electricity, and 
infrastructure are met, substantial economic improvement and sustainability 
remain questionable. Afghanistan must also develop economic institutions and 
laws that enable firms to engage industrial sectors. Lack of security in Afghanistan 
is the most significant obstacle to economic growth. Afghanistan will remain 
dependent on foreign aid and security forces. Opium production is also a major 
. Others were internally displaced or migrated to 
Australia, various European countries, and the United States. After the Soviet 
withdrawal, the displacement of people continued due to civil conflict in the 
1990s and the NATO intervention in 2001. Economic hardship and natural 
disasters, such as extreme drought, have also forced people to leave their homes. 
In 2001, there were about 4 million Afghan refugees. More than 5.7 million 
refugees have voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan in the last ten years, of 
whom more than 4.6 million were assisted by UNHCR. Nonetheless, some 2.7 
million Afghans continue to live in exile in neighbouring countries. While 
displaced, refugees’ families grew, and the number of “returnees” may eventually 
exceed the numbers of Afghans who departed Afghanistan as refugees. Domestic 
and international programs have been established to rebuild the war torn 
country. The government is unable to measure the population of some regions. 
                                                          
58 The estimates of Afghan populations are diverse starting from 23.8 million (UNICEF, 2003), through 
27.2 million (World Bank, 2003), up to 30.5 million (CIA July 2012 est.). 
59 According to the UN-affiliated Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), at least five million 
Afghans had crossed into Pakistan as refugees at some point between 1979 and 2001. Similarly, 
according to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the number of Afghans residing in Iran reached 
nearly 2.5 million by November 2010. 
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impediment to economic development, and eradication of the crop is not likely in 
the near future. Agriculture remains an important but underdeveloped sector, 
and earnings remain dependent on the climate and weather conditions. 
Afghanistan is preparing to exploit its oil and natural gas resources and also serve 
as a transit point for regional trade. A large portion of the Afghan population is 
unemployed60
Ethnicity and Tribes 
, many of whom have moved to urban areas. Basic services are 
rudimentary or non-existent. These factors may directly contribute to crime and 
lawlessness.  
Only about 6% to 7% of Afghanistan’s land area lies within the electrical 
power network. Even the areas of the country that have access to electricity have 
unreliable service. Fewer than 20% of people in Afghanistan have access to safe 
drinking water. The infant mortality rate in Afghanistan is among the highest in 
the world. More than 20% of children in Afghanistan die before reaching 5 years 
of age. The average life expectancy in Afghanistan is 49.72 years. About 77% of 
the Afghanistan population lives in rural areas. Half of the urban population live in 
Kabul city. 
 
In Afghanistan, ethnic and tribal identity often transcends national 
identity, and underlies the culture of warlords that permeates the country, 
explaining much of the low level factional fighting. Afghanistan’s various ethnic 
groups extend beyond its borders. The largest ethnic group in Afghanistan is the 
Pashtuns, which comprises 42% to 44% of the population. The Tajiks comprise the 
second largest ethnic group at 25% to 27%, followed by the Hazaras (9% to 10%), 
the Uzbeks (8% to 9%), the Aimak (4%), the Turkmens (3%), and the Baluchi (2%). 
A number of smaller ethnic groups make up the remaining 4% of the population. 
The Pashtuns dominate the south of the country and extend into the 
western regions of Pakistan, along the Durrand Line. Ethnic minorities, mainly 
Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras are located in the north, with occasional pockets of 
detribalized Pashtuns. Ethnic groups other than Pashtun historically have had to 
learn to live with the larger Pashtun group and on Pashtun terms. 
 
                                                          
60 Unemployment rate – 40%. 
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Figure 5: Map of Afghan Ethnicities 
 
Main Ethnic Groups 
 
The Pashtuns 
• Population: With an estimated population of more than 12 million (out 
of an estimated 28 million), the Pashtun ethnic group is the largest ethnic 
group in Afghanistan, which makes up 42% to 44% of the population. The 
Pashtuns consist of more than 60 tribes.  
• Location: The Pashtuns are largely located in the south and east part of 
Afghanistan. There are pockets of Pashtuns located around the country, 
but these are mostly the result of forced migration. There are an 
additional 14 million Pashtuns in Pakistan, mainly in Pakistan’s northwest 
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provinces. Many ethnic Pashtuns believe they have a historic right to a 
national homeland called Pashtunnistan61
• Language: The Pashtuns speak several mutually intelligible dialects of 
Pashto. Many also speak Dari (the Afghan form of Farsi), especially in the 
area of Kabul. 
. 
• Physical Appearance: Pashtuns are of Mediterranean and Caucasian 
ancestry. The Pashtuns are usually fairly light-skinned, with a variety of 
eye colours, and high cheek bones. Most men have beards, per the 
requirements of Islam, but some are starting to shave them. The Pashtun 
ethnic group consists of numerous tribes that centre on common 
genealogies and geographic areas. The two major Pashtun tribal 
confederations include the Durrani (3.3 million), and Ghilzai (4.4 million). 
• Religion: The Pashtuns are mainly Sunni Muslims with the exception of 
the Turi and part of the Bangash and Orakzai tribes in Pakistan, which are 
Shiites. 
• Politics: The Pashtuns have dominated Afghan politics since the founding 
of the modern Afghan state in the 18th century. After the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the continuation of the civil war 
between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance was largely a contest for 
control of Afghanistan between the major Pashtuns and the other large 
ethnic groups. The political parties supported mainly by Pashtuns are The 
Afghan Social Democratic Party, or Afghan Nation (Afghan Mellat), the 
Afghanistan’s Islamic Mission Organization (Tanzim-e Dahwat-e Islami-ye 
Afghanistan) and The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Mahaz-e 
Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan). 
• Tribal Structure: Historically, Pashtuns have led a tribal, agrarian 
lifestyle. The Pashtun tribes are organized in a non-hierarchical fashion. 
This tends to cause a diffusion of power but also makes political 
organisation extremely difficult. Pashtuns are divided into tribes, kaum 
or qabili, and sub-divided into sub-tribes or clans. Pashtun tribes and 
clans are nominally led by a Khan or Malik, but his rule is not absolute. 
The title of Khan is usually ascribed to the leader of a tribe, while Malik 
indicates leadership of a clan. All male members of the tribe have a vote 
in the tribal meeting known as a jirga (council of elders). 
Tribes usually join a tribal confederation, and a significant number are 
named after a legendary ancestor, to which the suffix khel (kin) or zai 
                                                          
61 In 1893, the British divided Pakistan and Afghanistan with the Durand Line, a 2,450 kilometres 
(1,522.4 miles) demarcation. Afghanistan supports Pashtun nationalism, which has caused a territorial 
dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan since Pakistan does not support these claims. 
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(son) is attached. Tribal history says that Qays Abd’ al-Rashid is the 
ancestor of all Pashtuns. They also claim lineage from King Saul (first King 
of Israel). The three sons of al-Rashid are Sarban, Bitan, and Ghurghusht. 
Sarban’s eldest son was Sharkhbun and his descendents are found in 
southern Afghanistan. Sarban’s other son, Kharshbun, has descendants 
in the Peshawar valley. The Pashtuns of west Afghanistan are called the 
Durranis and are descended from Sharkhbun’s son Abdalis. The Pashtuns 
in Pakistan are descended from Kharshbun’s son Yusufzay, and his 
descendents live north of Peshawar. The Shinwaris, Pashtuns in the 
Jalalabad vicinity, are descended from Kharshbun’s son Kasi. Bitan had a 
daughter, Bibi Mato who married a foreigner named Husayn Ghur. She 
conceived an illegitimate son before they were wed and the Ghilzai tribe 
are descended from them. This accounts for the lower status of the 
Ghilzai among the Pashtun tribes. Qays Abdul Al-Rashid Pathan’s third 
son was Ghurghusht and two tribes are descended from him; the Kakars 
and the Safis. 
The two main tribal confederations in Afghanistan are the Durranis and 
the Ghilzai, while a third, the Mohmand confederation, spans both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The fourth branches of the Pashtuns are found throughout western 
Pakistan. They are descendants of Karran, who was either Pathan’s 
fourth son, or was adopted by Pathan. The tribes claiming Karran as an 
ancestor are the Afridis, Bangash (Shiites), Khataks, Mahsuds, Mangals, 
and the Waziris. 
The Durrani or Durrani Tareen are the most powerful and influential 
tribal confederation in Afghanistan. The King of Afghanistan has always 
been a Durrani. However, the first to attain historical prominence were 
the Ghilzai, who destroyed the Safavi Empire. The Durrani are divided 
into two branches; the Zirak and the Panjpai or Panjpao. Tribes within 
the Zirak branch include the Popolzai (east of Kandahar and west of the 
Helmand River), the Alkozai (east of Kandahar and north of Helmand), 
the Barakzai (southwest of Kandahar in the Arghestan River Valley), and 
the Achakzai (Zamindawar region and along the Kohdaman Ridge). Tribes 
within the Panjpai branch include the Noorzai (southwest and western 
Afghanistan), the Alizai (Zamindawar and Helmand), and the Ishaqzai or 
Sakzai (west of Kandahar, Farah region, and in Seistan) Khokani, and 
Maku. According to a saying, Ghilzai have the sword, Durrani have the 
state. The split comes from their different political ecology. Durrani live 
in the irrigated southern plains, they inherit valuable land, and so their 
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politics are based around hierarchy and patronage, and they are risk 
averse. Ghilzai on the other hand, live in the eastern mountains, practice 
subsistence agriculture and have a more egalitarian political structure, 
exemplified by the jirga council. The Ghilzai tribal confederation has 
strong cultural predispositions toward equality that made it difficult for a 
leader to consolidate political power, hence in times of anarchy, Ghilzai 
do well. They value individual achievement, and aggressive leadership. 
Najibullah, Hekmatyar, Haqqani, and Mullah Omar all were/are Ghilzai. 
However, the skills that make good warlords do not necessarily make 
good peace time leaders. This is proved by history when from 1747 until 
1978 the Durrani tribal confederation was to rule Afghanistan after 
defeating and expelling the Ghilzai ruler from Kandahar (1738).  Ghilzai 
are also known historically as Ghiljies, Ghaljis, and possibly Gharzais. The 
Ghilzai confederacy is divided into two groups, the Turan (western) and 
the Burhan (eastern). The Turan include the Nasir, Kharaoci, Hotaki, and 
Tokhi (Qalat-I Ghilzai) tribes. The Burhan includes the Sulaymen Khel 
(southeast of Kabul to Jalalabad), the Ali Khel (Mukur region), and the 
Tarakkis (Mukur) tribes. In the 18th century, the Ghilzai led a series of 
revolts against the Persian Safavi Empire. 
 
King Saul
Al-Rashid Pathan
descendant of
Sarban Bitan Ghurghusht Karran
son of son of son of adopted son of
Husayn GhurBibi Mato
Sharkhbun Kharshbun
Shinwaris
Kasis
Ketrans
Durranis
Yusufzay
Bastard
Ghilzai
Kakars
Safis
Afridis
Bangash
Khataks
Mahsuds
Mangals
Waziris
 
Figure 6: Pashtun’s genealogy. 
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• Rule of Law: Tribal laws and customs vary from tribe to tribe, but one 
widely followed is the codes of The Pashtunwali (for more details see 
section on interpersonal relations) and Isakhel.  The Pashtunwali is often 
in contradiction with the Islamic code of law, the Sharia. The differences 
between the Pashtunwali and the Sharia do not trouble the Pashtuns. 
They tend to view their identity as both Pashtun and Muslim by nature 
and do not feel compelled to reconcile the differences between the two 
codes of behaviour. The traditional notion of “rule of law” is less clear 
among the Pashtuns as they tend to obey civil law only if they believe 
that the law has been implemented and is enforced by a legitimate 
government. The legitimacy of a government depends on the extent to 
which Pashtuns control the government and to the extent in which the 
government recognize the authority of both the Pashtunwali and Sharia. 
Isakhel establishes the penalties for murder, assault, kidnapping of 
women, property damage, theft, and other transgressions. Murder is 
paid for in blood money known as khun62 and is based upon the victim’s 
standing. Khun for elders and soldiers is the highest. If a man beats his 
wife to death her father can take up her case and revenge the woman as 
he would a murder. Dishonouring a murdered person is doubled. It is 
also customary to return the victim’s weapon when paying the khun. 
Besides paying the khun in currency some tribes accept women and 
female babies as two-thirds of the khun. Failure to pay the khun could 
result in tribal warfare based on badal63
In the case of adultery the husband can kill both his wife and her lover if 
he catches them in the act. Relatives of the deceased are denied revenge 
and khun. If a man kidnaps another’s wife he must pay seven-fold khun. 
For rape, the ear or nose of the rapist is cut off. For arson, the arsonist 
may pay for the lost property and pay a fine for dishonouring the 
, but if the money is not available 
and the tribes do not want to go to war, a marriage will be arranged with 
the murderer.  
For assault, the khun depends on whether the person is maimed and 
whether the maimed part of the body is visible or not. If a girl is forcibly 
kidnapped, the compensations are one and one-half khun. If the 
kidnapped girl consents to marry her kidnapper the khun is then 
doubled. However, the bride-to-be must obtain her father’s permission; 
otherwise he has the right to kill her. 
                                                          
62 Khun means blood 
63 To seek justice or take revenge against the wrongdoer (for details see chapter on interpersonal 
relations) 
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household. The burning of a nomad’s tent is treated more harshly than 
the burning of a house. The theft of livestock requires khun nine-fold. 
The destruction of farmland requires four times the value of the field. 
The illegal diversion of water is also subject to a fine. 
• Conflict Resolution: Revenge may be taken on any member of an 
offending tribe, although liability is usually greater for those most closely 
related to the accused. The essentially decentralize independent 
communities within tribal subsections conduct both internal and external 
affairs according to previsions of the codes Pashtunwali. Both internal as 
well as inter-group conflicts are most often rooted in matters of honour 
and personal enmities, rather than in intrinsic attitudes of ethnic 
discrimination.  
• Role of State vs. Role of Ethnic Group: Among Pashtuns, the Afghan 
state and the Pashtun nation often become blurred. Pashtuns have 
dominated the modern Afghan state history since 18th century with 
various Pashtun tribes providing its central leadership. Local Pashtun 
tribal leaders still have significant independent authority over much of 
the south and east Afghanistan.   
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Figure 7: ISAF RC-S Pashtuns tribal structure’s link analyses 
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The Tajiks 
• Population: Tajiks, Afghanistan’s second largest ethnic group, make up 
25% to 27% of the population. There are an estimated 7 million Tajiks in 
Afghanistan. 
• Location: Many Tajiks in Afghanistan live in settled, permanent 
communities in the north-eastern part of Afghanistan. Some Tajiks live in 
the mountains and valleys of the extreme northeast maintaining limited 
nomadic patterns of behaviour. The Tajik populations are concentrated 
in the northeast, in the regions of Badakhshan, Parham, Takham, 
Baghlan, and in the Panjshir Valley. There are also significant populations 
of Tajiks in the west of Afghanistan, in the Central Highlands and north of 
the country. A sizable Tajik population lives in and around Kabul, where 
they have, to a large degree, assimilated with the urban and other ethnic 
population.    
• Language: Afghan Tajiks are primarily Dari speakers.  
• Physical Appearance: Tajiks are of Mediterranean ancestry and they are 
a Caucasoid people. They are described as slender, above average height, 
light skinned, and as having aquiline (long and curving) noses and usually 
black hair. 
• Religion: Most Afghan Tajiks are Sunni Muslims.  
• Politics: Except for the short rule of the Tajik known as Bacha Saqqao in 
1928, the Tajik have not dominated politically. Since 1978, however, 
several Tajik military leaders have gained substantial recognition, the 
most renowned being Ahmad Shah Masood from the Panjsher Valley. 
Burhanuddin Rabbani who served as President of The Islamic State of 
Afghanistan from 1992 – 1996 is a Tajik from Badakhshan. The ethnic 
Tajiks are the opposition to Pashtuns for political power and prestige in 
Afghanistan. Historically, Tajiks played a role of political opposition to 
Pashtuns, and as a result a key division of political power in Afghanistan 
is divided between the Pashtun-dominated south and the Tajik- and 
Uzbek-dominated north. The political parties supported mainly by Tajiks 
are Islamic Society (Jamiat-e Islami), Revolutionary Organisation of the 
Toilers of Afghanistan (Zazman-i Inqilabi Zahmatkishanan-i Afghanistan), 
The National Movement of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Nuhzhat-e-Mili 
Afghanistan) and The New Afghanistan Party (Hizb-e Afghanistan-e 
Nawin). Tajik ethnicity is supported by Tajikistan. 
• Tribal Structure: The tribal organization has essentially disappeared. It 
has been replaced by village and family ties, and a strong sense of 
community loyalty. While Afghan Tajiks identify themselves as an ethnic 
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group and while Afghan Tajiks do generally share a common set of 
cultural and ethnic characteristics, Tajiks do not have a strong ethnic or 
tribal identity. They are not organized by tribe, but by geography and 
usually identify themselves with the village or valley in which they live. 
The Panjshir Valley is seen as a “spiritual home” for Afghan Tajiks and 
many of the most influential of the Tajik leaders within the Northern 
Alliance are originally from there. Tajiks are spread across much of 
Afghanistan’s north and west, and can be very roughly divided into three 
categories: mountain Tajik, urban and plain dwelling Tajik, and western 
Tajiks. Mountain Tajiks are the most widely dispersed Afghan Tajiks. They 
are concentrated in the north-eastern sector of the country, but are 
found throughout the entire northern part of the country. Nearly all 
mountain Tajiks live in settled communities. The urban dwelling Tajiks, 
particularly those in Kabul, are generally financially better off than the 
mountain Tajiks. These city Tajiks tend to be well placed and are often 
assimilated into a broader urban culture. The third group of Tajiks is the 
western Tajiks that dominate the area in and around Herat, near the 
Afghan border with Iran. These Tajiks bear a strong resemblance to their 
Persian neighbours in Iran. They also feel a much closer cultural bond 
with the Iranians and Persian culture than do the Tajiks of the north, 
northeast and those around Kabul. These Tajiks predominately speak 
Iranian Farsi, which makes them even closer to the Iranian Persians. 
Often these western Tajiks are referred to as “Farsiwan”, which means 
“Farsi speaker”. The major regional names indicating a common place of 
origin are the Wakhani, the Ishkashimi, the Shunguns, the Munjani, and 
the Sarghulami. The Wahani are located within both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan they are Ismaili Shiites. The majority of the Ishkashimi live in the 
Pamir on the upper reaches of the River Pyandzh in the Province of 
Badakhshan in northern Afghanistan. In many instances, especially in 
Kabul and the central plains, Tajiks have adopted the social and cultural 
patterns of their neighbours. Urban Tajiks are the more educated group 
in Afghanistan and hold many government and business positions. Most 
Tajiks are Sunni Muslims. The term “Tajik” is often used loosely by other 
Afghan groups to refer to “de-tribalized” Afghans living in northern 
Afghanistan.  
• Rule of Law:  Most Tajiks in the Northern Alliance are devout and 
traditional Muslims who favour the use of some form of Sharia, although 
in a much less restrictive form than other groups. Over the past decade, 
there has been little civil law in the Tajik areas of northern Afghanistan. 
The rule of Masoud and the Northern Alliance was arbitrary and ruthless.  
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• Conflict Resolution: Because of their relatively fragmented ethnic make-
up and their lack of tribal affiliations, the Tajiks do not have a specific 
method for conflict resolution. Tajik military and political leaders and 
warlords have not displayed a consistent method for conflict resolution 
throughout the twenty-plus years of war in Afghanistan. Negotiations are 
commonly used and can be successful as means of resolving conflicts. If 
negotiations fail, Tajiks, like all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, have also 
proven quite capable of attempting to intimidate or brutalize a perceived 
opponent into submission.  
• Role of State vs. Role of Ethnic Group: The political situation of the 
Tajiks changed radically in 2001, when the United States led a coalition in 
overthrowing the Pashtun-dominated Taliban government. Although led 
by a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, the interim government set in place by 2002 
was dominated by ethnic Tajiks. Tajiks are unlikely to rebel against the 
central state so long as they maintain representation. However, Tajiks 
continue to be involved in inter-communal conflict, primarily with 
Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. Until the central government is strong 
enough to contain warlordism, such clashes are likely to continue. Tajiks 
desire greater involvement in the central government and also greater 
control over Tajik-majority regions of the country. They also desire 
greater economic opportunities. 
• Relations with the Pashtuns: Relations between the Tajiks and Pashtuns 
are tense and confrontational. The rivalry between Tajiks and Pashtuns, 
and the inability of these two groups to share power has been a strong 
and driving force in the domestic politics and conflicts of Afghanistan. 
The Tajiks have resisted the “Pashtunnization” of Afghanistan. 
 
The Hazaras 
• Population: Hazaras are the third most populous ethnic group at an 
estimated 9% to 10% of the Afghan population. There are an estimated 
2.5 – 3 million Hazaras in Afghanistan.  
• Location: The Hazaras are concentrated in a mountainous area in central 
Afghanistan called Hazarajat64
                                                          
64 “Land of the Hazara” 
 (centred on / around Bamiyan province). 
Significant population of Hazara are also found in Kabul. They represent 
up to 30 percent of the city’s population. 
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• Language: They speak a Dari dialect called Hazaragi, which has minor 
influences from Turkish and Mongolian languages. 
• Physical Appearance: They are of Mongolian descent and arrived in the 
13th and 14th centuries65
• Religion: The majority of Hazaras are Shia Muslims, although some are 
Sunni. The Hazaras are culturally and religiously linked to Iran.  
. The Hazaras are distinguished by Mongoloid 
(Asian) features. These features include broad faces, high and prominent 
cheekbones, slanted eyes and sparse beards. European and Iran-Afghan 
facial features may also be found among the Hazaras. As with all ethnic 
groups in Afghanistan, however, physical appearance alone is not always 
a conclusive and accurate indicator of an individual’s ethnic identity. 
• Politics: The Hazaras joined the Tajik and Uzbek dominated Northern 
Alliance in its struggle against the Taliban. The Shia sect of Islam has not 
itself been an engine of Hazara political activity but reinforces the 
Hazaras’ status as a minority. It is the Hazaras’ distinct identity, which is 
a result of religious distinctions that motivates Hazara political activity 
and social organization. The political parties mainly supported by 
Hazaras and Shia Muslims are The Islamic People’s Movement of 
Afghanistan (Harakat-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan), The Islamic 
Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan) and 
The Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e 
Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan). Iran provides support for Hazaras and 
severally presents concerns for the Shiite minority in Afghanistan. 
• Tribal Structure: Like the other peoples of Afghanistan, the Hazaras are 
organized into tribes and clans and have traditionally been independent 
of the central government. The Hazaras also have a feudal social 
organization. The top social class is the landlords who rent land out and 
collect rent in the form of a share of the harvest. They are the richest 
people within Hazara society. The middle class are the family farmers 
who own their own land. The lowest social class are the Hazaras who 
rent land from the land owners. Hazara tribes are led by a Malik. The 
Malik is hereditary in some tribes and selected by consensus in others, 
but is always a wealthier land owner. The territory of the tribe consists 
on average of one to three villages, but larger tribes can be comprised of 
up to five villages. The Malik has also served in the past as a government 
official as well as a tribal official. The Malik’s official duties include tax 
                                                          
65 It is believed that Hazara are descendant of Genghis Khan who left 1,000 soldiers from his troops in 
Afghanistan. Hazara means thousand.    
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collection and implementation of government decrees. The Hazara are 
divided among eleven tribal groups, each with varying number of 
subgroups. The eleven tribal groups are the following: Dai Kundi, Dai 
Zangi, Behsud, Dai Mirdad, Ghazni Hazara, Jaghui, Polada, Uruzgani, 
Shaikh Ali, Walang and Kala Nau Hazara. 
• Rule of Law: The Sunni and Shia sect have different interpretation of the 
Sharia, and the adherents of one sect do not recognize certain legal 
tenets of the other, and vice versa. The conflict between the versions of 
Sharia complicates the application of a single legal code throughout the 
country. The Hazaras are resentful that they are forced to adhere to the 
legal tenets of an Islamic sect they do not follow.  
• Conflict Resolution: Conflicts are resolved at the local level, usually 
without resorting to appeals to government officials. As a rule, local 
populations try to prevent government intrusion in the affairs of the area 
because the population will then be subject to taxation and 
administrative regulations. Conflicts are resolved by local community 
leaders.  
• Role of State vs. Role of Ethnic Group: The Hazara population in general 
feels a stronger affiliation to their ethnic group and the tribe, sub-tribe 
and family unit they belong to, than to the state. The Hazara have 
developed a strong self-perception that they are a subjugated minority 
that has been repressed and marginalized by the state.  Hazara leaders 
have consistently been more influential than government officials within 
the Hazara community. The central government has always faced 
challenges from the Hazaras in its attempts to control the Hazara 
territory. The Hazaras are similar to the other ethnic groups of 
Afghanistan in that the greatest loyalty is felt for social and familial unit 
in the local area where the individual lives. However, the Hazaras have a 
strong ethnic identity than other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, with the 
exception of Pashtuns. The result is a greater ethnic consciousness 
among the Hazaras. Nevertheless, ethnic consciousness is not sufficiently 
strong to fully overcome tribal and local loyalties.  
• Relations with Other Ethnic Groups: The Hazaras have experienced 
discrimination throughout the history of modern Afghanistan. Hazaras 
have been denounced by Sunni leaders as not being real Muslims due to 
their faith, and as agent of Iranian imperialism in Afghanistan. 
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The Uzbeks 
• Population: Uzbeks are the fourth largest ethnic group in Afghanistan 
comprising approximately 8% of the Afghan population, or an estimated 
2 – 2.5 million people. 
• Location: Uzbeks used to be traditionally nomadic, but are now largely 
settled in the towns and villages, in the north. A small minority of Uzbeks 
continue to pursue a semi-nomadic life. Geographically, Uzbeks live in 
Afghanistan’s northern region, the most ethnically diverse region in the 
country. The Uzbek cultural and political centre in Afghanistan is the 
strategic crossroads town of Mazar-e-Sharif. 
• Language: Uzbeks speak a Turkic language dialect called Uzbek. A large 
minority of Uzbeks are also fully literate in Dari. 
• Physical Appearance: Uzbeks migrated from Central Asia to Afghanistan 
centuries ago. They are mongoloid in appearance and have broad, flat 
faces and lighter skin than Pashtuns.  
• Religion: Afghan Uzbeks are Sunni Muslim with the added influence of 
traditional beliefs. They are not generally strict Muslims. Many 
traditional secular beliefs have been woven into their Islamic practices. 
The Islamic faith, however, remains an important part of Uzbek cultural 
identity.  
• Politics: Religion does not play a decisive role in the political life of 
Afghan Uzbeks. The Uzbek focus on cultural tradition and were 
influenced by the atheist Soviets over the past thirty years. Afghan 
Uzbeks are politically cohesive in Afghanistan and are represented by the 
Junbishi Mili-yi Islami (National Islamic Movement or National Islamic 
Front). Uzbekistan provides support for Uzbeks in Afghanistan.  
• Tribal Structure: There are at least two main components to the Uzbek 
cultural identity in Afghanistan: sedentary Turkic peoples living in settled 
communities without tribal divisions and groups of semi-nomadic 
farmers and herders that have kept the name and sometimes the 
subdivisions of their tribe. Throughout Central Asia and Afghanistan 
settled Uzbeks without tribal divisions are also sometimes referred to as 
Sarts. The differences between the settled sart population and the semi-
nomadic farmers and herders are primarily historical and cultural66
                                                          
66 The ethnic designation ‘Uzbek’ comes from one of the most powerful rulers of the Golden Horde 
named Ghiyaty ad-Din Mahammad Uzbek Khan (who ruled 1312 – 1341). Uzbeks also claim to descend 
from Tamerlane conqueror of today Afghanistan in the 14th and 15th centuries. It was during the 16th 
century that many of the Uzbeks of the Golden Horde living in the plains north of the Caspian Sea 
.  
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Uzbek cultural identity is rooted in geography, either in the valley or 
village where an Uzbek lives, or the town in Central Asia where an 
Uzbek’s family is origin from. Some Uzbeks are rural and work in 
agriculture, but many live in cities as traders or goldsmiths, 
leatherworkers, and rug makers. Extended families with strict patriarchal 
authority play an important role in the organisation of Afghan Uzbek 
societies. Major Uzbek families are Kataghan (Kunduz), Sarai (Mazar-I-
Sharif & Balkh), Ming (Mazar-I-Sharif & Balkh), Kungrat (Kunduz & Mazar-
ISharif), Durmen (Hazret Imam Sahib) and Chagatai. 
• Rule of Law: At a cultural level, Uzbeks are a very traditional people who 
adhere more closely to cultural values and traditions, than to either 
Muslim law or civil law. Afghan Uzbek forms of justice are rough; they 
focus on retribution and are not rooted in religious principles.  
• Conflict Resolution: Same rules as for Tajiks are applicable.  
• Role of State vs. Role of Ethnic Group: Afghan Uzbeks are suspicious of 
any Afghan central government. Much of this suspicion is rooted in the 
long history of Pashtun rule over Afghanistan and their use of power to 
advance Pashtun economic, social and political well being, often to the 
perceived detriment of other ethnic groups. Uzbeks have never held the 
position of highest authority in the central government of Afghanistan.  
• Relations with the Pashtuns: Uzbeks feel a considerable amount of 
resentment towards the Pashtuns.  Most of this is rooted in the long 
history of Pashtun domination of Afghanistan, and the perception that 
Pashtuns have used their power to aid other ethnic Pashtuns at the 
expense of the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. This antagonism towards 
Pashtuns is seen and felt at several levels among the Uzbeks. While 
Uzbeks prefer to marry with their own ethnic groups, Uzbeks will 
intermarry with Tajiks. However Uzbeks will rarely intermarry with 
Pashtuns.  
• Relations with the Tajiks: The relationship between the Uzbeks and the 
Tajiks is marked by a series of conflict and alliances. The relationship 
between these two ethnic groups is generally not, however, as 
confrontational as the between the Uzbeks and the Pashtuns.   
 
                                                                                                                                      
migrated to Central Asia and to northern Afghanistan. These Golden Horde Uzbeks then mixed with 
the Uzbeks that had already settled in Afghanistan and Central Asia. 
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Some Other Ethnic Groups 
 
Aimak 
The Aimaks (Chahar Aimak) are another minority ethnic group of mixed 
Iranian and Mongolian descent who live primarily in north-western Afghanistan 
(Badghis, Farah, Faryab, Jowzjan, Ghor, Herat and Sar-e Pol provinces). The term 
Aimak derives from the Mongolian term for tribe (Aimag), meaning tribe in 
Turkish and is not an ethnic classification, but differentiates semi nomadic herders 
and agricultural tribal groups of various ethnic origins, including the Turkic Hazara 
and Baluch that were formed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They 
also speak a Dari dialect and are mostly Sunni Muslim. The Aimak continue to 
identify themselves through tribal ties and lead an agrarian or pastoral lifestyle. 
Population estimates vary widely, between 250,000 and 2 million. They are Sunni 
Muslims, in contrast to the Hazara, who are Shiahs. The best estimates of the 
Aimak population in Afghanistan hover around 1-2 million. A group of about 
120,000 lives in the Iranian Khorasan. The tally is made difficult since, as a 
consequence of centuries of oppression of the Hazara people in Afghanistan, 
some Aimagh Hazaras are classified by the state as Tajik, or Persian instead of 
Aimaks.  
The main Aimak tribes are Firozkohi, Jamshidi, Taimani and Timuri all 
being subdivided into more than 250 sub-tribes. 
 
Arab 
Large groups of Sunni Arabs living in the vicinity of Bokhara in Central 
Asia fled to north-eastern Afghanistan following Russian conquests in the 19th 
century. By the 1880s they were, with the Uzbek with whom they established 
close ties, the second most populous ethnic group in present day Kunduz, Takhar, 
and Baghlan provinces. Smaller groups settled in scattered communities as far 
west as Maimana, Faryab Province. 
The Arabs are pastoralists who raise sheep and grow cotton and wheat. 
Some among the eastern groups make summer migrations of up to 300 
kilometres to reach the lush high pastures in Badakhshan. Government 
development schemes, especially those which brought large numbers of Pashtuns 
to the area in the 1940s, relegated the Arabs to a small proportion of the 
population and the Arabs ceased to hold a monopoly on long distance migration. 
Bilingual in Dari and Uzbek, but speaking no Arabic, they continue to identify 
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themselves as Arab although they have had no contact with the Arabs of the 
Middle East since the late 14th century. 
 
Baluchi 
The Baluch are another Iranian ethnic group that numbers around 
100,000 in Afghanistan (making up 0.3% of the population). The homeland of the 
Sunni Baluch in south-western Afghanistan is in the sparsely settled deserts and 
semi-deserts of Helmand Province, although Baluch enclaves are also found in 
north-western Faryab Province. The main Baluch areas are located in Baluchistan 
province in Pakistan and Sistan and Baluchistan province of Iran. There are 
approximately 5 – 6 million Baluch living in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.  
The Baluch language offers evidence that the Baluch originated from the 
Caspian region, and reached the region sometime between 1000 and 1300 B.C. 
These semi-sedentary and semi-nomadic populations are famed for camel 
breeding; they are mainly pastoral and desert dwellers. The Baluch are Sunni 
Muslim. The Baluch speak Baluchi, an Iranian branch in the Indo-European 
language family; most speak Dari and Pashto as well. Baluch society is tribal, 
highly segmented and centrally organized under powerful chieftains known as 
sardars. 
 
Brahui 
The Sunni Brahui is another distinctive group settled in the desert areas 
of south-western Afghanistan. They numbered less than 200,000 in Afghanistan. 
The basic Brahui physical type is Veddoid of South India, and they speak Brahui 
which is allied to Dravidian, a major language of South India, with a heavy mixture 
of Balulchi and Pashto. Brahui used to work as tenant farmers or hired herders for 
Baluch or Pashtun Khans. Larger communities of Brahui reside in Pakistan's 
Baluchistan Province. 
 
Farsiwan 
The Farsiwans are primarily a linguistic group that has developed an 
historical identity. The Farsiwan are Persian-speaking Afghans of the Tajik and 
Pashtun ethnic groups. Farsiwans are Farsi or Dari-speaking village agriculturalists 
of Mediterranean sub-stock that live in the west near the Afghan-Iranian border 
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or in districts of Herat, Kandahar and Ghazni provinces. Estimates for 1995 vary 
from 600,000 to 830,000. Most are Imami Shia; in urban centres some are Sunni. 
 
Gujjar 
So very little about the Gujjars is known that the mere mention of them 
sends one scrambling for dust-covered manuscripts of the British Raj. It is thought 
they were initially encountered by Alexander during his thrust into India, although 
this and every theory about the Gujjars remains in dispute. They speak a tongue 
wholly unrelated to any Indo-European language, although many have by now 
learned local languages for commercial purposes. They roam with their herds, 
usually of cows, from the high Himalayas in India to the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan 
(although rarely are they seen in Afghanistan anymore, as Pakistan has hindered 
their passage through its territory and most preferred to stay within India). Some 
in India remain Hindu, although further west many are Muslim. Often they can be 
recognized by their avoidance of others, and their brightly hennaed beards. They 
are proud, fierce, and loyal. Their traditions are millennia old, and they have 
preserved them well in the face of great adversity. They are somewhat related to 
Nuristanis, although exactly how is a subject of conjecture. Similar to Nuristanis, 
some genetic root gives many Gujjars a distinctly European appearance, up to and 
including blond hair and blue eyes. 
 
Jat 
There are other small marginal communities of occupational specialists 
based in eastern Afghanistan in provinces such as Laghman. They are commonly 
referred to as Jat which is a generic term indiscriminately applied by others with 
derogatory connotations implying low descent and low occupations. The groups 
reject the term and refer to themselves by specific names. Of Mediterranean-
Indian type physically, speaking Indo-Aryan dialects in addition to Pashto and 
Dari, they are primarily gypsy-like itinerant petty traders, bangle sellers, fortune-
tellers, musicians, jugglers, snake-charmers and performers with animals such as 
bears and monkeys. Some are specialized craftsmen, working as weavers, potters, 
sieve makers, knife-makers, and leather-workers. Some hire out as seasonal 
itinerant farm labourers. They rank lowest on the social scale and are stigmatized 
by many in the society. 
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Kabuli 
Kabuli is an ambiguous term which provides a sense of identity for 
Afghanistan's largest heterogeneous urban population without designating 
distinct ethnic associations. The city of Kabul has drawn members of all ethnic 
groups in growing numbers since 1776 when it was declared the capital in favour 
of Kandahar; generations of intermarriages have also taken place. Nevertheless, 
ethnic roots and regional links have always also remained important. This is 
reflected in the spatial layout of the city which, before two-thirds of the city was 
reduced to rubble after 1992, consisted of ethnic, geographic or religious-oriented 
wards and suburbs. Social stratification along occupational lines was also clear 
although over the past few decades lines tended to blur significantly. 
A typical Kabuli speaks Dari in addition to his mother tongue and, 
whether male or female, is urbane, favours European fashions, is secularly 
educated, and most probably works as a bureaucrat, shopkeeper/owner or in the 
service sector. Many have had professional education or experience abroad, live 
in apartments or single-family dwellings, are Western-oriented in outlook and 
enjoy cosmopolitan lifestyles. It is this image which conservatives, especially those 
such as the rural Taliban find unpalatable, a symbol of moral degradation which 
must be eradicated if a truly Islamic state is to be established in Afghanistan. 
Many Kabuli who remained in Kabul during the Soviet-Afghan War have 
since left because they find the attitudes of the new leadership incompatible. 
They are now displaced in cities inside Afghanistan, living as refugees in Pakistan 
or resettled abroad. Their absence will severely hinder the reestablishment of 
viable administrative and economic systems necessary for the reconstruction and 
development of Afghanistan. 
 
Kirghiz 
The Kirghiz are a Sunni Mongoloid group speaking Kirghiz, a Turkic 
language written in Arabic script. The Kirghiz are geographically isolated from the 
rest of Afghan society. This isolation has a significant impact on the Kirghiz culture 
and lifestyle. About 3,000 lived in the Pamir Mountains east of the Wakhan 
Corridor67
                                                          
67 The Wakhan Corridor is one of the more inaccessible regions in the world where relatively flat 
valleys suitable for habitation lie at altitudes over 3,000 meters above sea level between ranges rising 
over 5,000 meters. 
. Only a small group remains. A majority moved to Pakistan in 1978 
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after Soviet and Afghan troops occupied the Wakhan; later, in 1983, resettled in 
Turkey. 
The Kirghiz lived in yurts called oey (pronounced oowee), tended large 
flocks of sheep and herded yak which are found only in this area of Afghanistan. 
There are four levels of Kirghiz social organization. Kirghiz identify with 
the oey, the primary social and economic unit of Kirghiz society, first and 
foremost. The unit of the oey is composed of a nuclear or an extended family that 
shares in the duties of herding and raising livestock with other oey units. Each oey 
has a leader called an oey bashi or “head of the household”. Several oey 
encamped together compose an aiel or qorow. The terms are used to designate 
groups that live in the same camp and herd their animals together. Each camp is 
represented by a camp elder, called be. The kechek oruq is roughly equivalent to a 
sub-tribe; it is the level of social organization directly below the four zor oruq, 
which is roughly equivalent to a tribe. The kechek oruq acts as a political unit and 
is led by an aqsaqal. The highest level of social organization in Kirghiz society is 
the zor oruq. The zor oruq is led by a khan. Each Kirghiz of Afghanistan is a 
member of one of four zor oruq68
 
. Each zor oruq traces its descent to one of four 
ancestors - Teyet, Kesak, Qepchak (Kipchak) and Naiman (who were supposedly 
brothers). The Teyet oruq is the largest of the four zor oruq, with about 1,000 
members. The Kesak oruq is the next largest, with about 500 hundred persons, 
followed by the Maiman and Qepchak. The Teyet oruq lived in the Little Pamir 
area, but left Afghanistan in 1978. The Kesak oruq remains in the Great Pamir. A 
few Qepchak and Naiman Kirghiz inhabit the Afghan Pamir, but most live in the 
ranges of the Pamir Mountains in China and Tajikistan. 
The Kirghiz have Mongoloid (Asian) features. These features include 
broad faces, high and prominent cheekbones, slanted eyes and sparse beards. 
Kuchi 
Kuchis69
                                                          
68 Lineage is of particular importance among the Kirghiz, who trace ancestry back seven generations as 
proof of identity and membership in a particular oruq. 
 are Afghan nomadic pastoralists, primarily from the Ghilzai tribal 
confederacy. Some of the most notable Ghilzai Kuchi tribes include the Kharoti, 
69 ‘Kuchi’, an Afghan Persian word meaning ‘those who go on migrations’, is the common generic term, 
used by both Afghans and International community, for the nomads of Afghanistan, as it has been for 
many decades. Most if not all the nomads, and indeed many long-settled former nomads, now 
acknowledge this name. In fact it is a term that can cause confusion, since it refers to both a lifestyle 
(migratory), a production mode (livestock dependent), and a cultural identity. 
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Andar and Ahmadzai. Sometimes Durrani tribes can be found among the Kuchi. 
Although a large majority of nomads are Pashtun and nomadic pastoralists are 
also found among the Aimak, Baluch, Arabs, Kirghiz, Turkmen and Uzbeks and 
occasionally there may also be some Baluch people among them that live a 
pastoral nomadic lifestyle. 
There are estimated to be around three million Kuchi (nomads) in 
Afghanistan, with at least 60% remaining fully nomadic. 
They mostly keep sheep and goats and the produce of the animals (meat, 
dairy products, hair and wool) is exchanged or sold in order to purchase grain, 
vegetables, fruit and other products of settled life. In this way an extensive 
network of exchange has developed along the main routes annually followed by 
the nomads. They have a very high illiteracy rate. 
Nomads were also favoured by the Kings of Afghanistan, themselves of 
Pashtun origin, since the late 1880s. They were awarded "firman", or royal 
proclamations, granting them use of summer pastures all over Afghanistan. 
Partially settled by socialist governments, they were supporters of the Taliban, 
both ideologically and pragmatically, as they came into possession of many 
Hazara lands thanks to the repression of the Shiite Hazaras by the Taliban. As a 
result, the northern ethnic groups (Hazara, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens) have a 
distrust of the Pashtun nomads. This political dispute has been deepened over the 
decades of Pashtun nomads’ seasonal migrations, whereby some Pashtun nomads 
became absentee landlords in their summer areas in the north through customary 
seizure procedures to attach debtors' land. However, the Pashtun nomads 
themselves see the northern minority groups as a non-Afghan race, and claim that 
the Pashtun nomads were natives of the northern Afghan region, and that during 
many years of invasion such as those of Genghis Khan and Timur, they escaped 
south.  
In recent decades, seasonal migrations still continue inside Afghanistan. 
In Pakistan, some Afghan nomads are found in Karachi in Sindh. Dispersed and 
well-travelled, they often receive news from distant relations in far-away 
provinces relatively quickly. 
The Afghan government has taken some positive steps, for example by 
ensuring nomad political participation, both in elections and through 
representation in parliament70
                                                          
70 Afghanistan's constitution grants ten elected seats for Kuchis and ten in the lower house of 
parliament, three of them for women. 
 and local councils.  Nomad affairs are the explicit 
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responsibility of the Ministry of Frontier and Tribal Affairs, but they also concern 
several other departments, such as the Ministry of Agriculture.  
The nomadic groups have been identified by UNAMA as one of the 
vulnerable groups in the country because of an increasing number of conflicts 
with locally settled population. As Afghanistan's population grows, competing 
claims over summer pastures, both for random cultivation and for grazing of the 
settled communities' livestock, have created conflict over land across central and 
northern Afghanistan. Paying head-count fees for each animal crossing someone 
else's property is exacting a harsh economic toll on the Kuchi way of life, one that 
already has to contend with recurrent droughts that are now occurring with 
increasing frequency. 
The Afghan nomads are increasingly pragmatic and in the current 
situation acknowledging the name ‘Kuchi’ may bring access to resources offered 
by Afghan government and NGOs. 
 
Nuristani 
The Nuristani are an Indo-Iranian people, who live in isolated regions of 
north-eastern Afghanistan (in the mountains of the Hindu Kush east of Kabul) as 
well as across the border in the district of Chitral in Pakistan. The Nuristani reside 
throughout an 8,000 square kilometres area in the east bordering Pakistan that is 
heavily forested and so rugged that much of it is accessible only by foot trails. The 
Nuristani designate themselves by the local geographical names of the five major 
north-south valleys and 30 east-west lateral valleys leading into the major valleys 
where they live. In 1990 the province of Nuristan was created from parts of the 
provinces of Laghman and Kunar. The population in the 1990s was estimated at 
125,000 by some; the Nuristani prefer a figure of 300,00071
Physically, the Nuristani are of the Mediterranean physical type with 
mixtures from Indian stocks on the fringes. The Nuristanis have two primary 
myths about their origins. One version of their cultural history links the Nuristanis 
to the occupying Greek forces of Alexander the Great, who invaded the region in 
327 B.C. Another version of their cultural history identifies the Nuristani tribes 
. 
                                                          
71 Better known historically as the Kafirs of what was once known as Kafiristan (land of pagans). They 
were forcibly converted to Sunni Islam in 1895 during the reign of Emir Abdur Rahman but retain many 
unique features in their material culture. Their country was renamed "Nuristan", meaning "Land of 
Light" (as in the light of Islam). A small unconquered portion of Kafiristan inhabited by the Kalash tribe 
who still practice their pre-Islamic religion still exists across the border in highlands of Chitral, 
northwestern Pakistan.  
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with the original Qureish, the tribe of Mohammed the Prophet72
Pashai 
. However there 
is a lack of genetic evidence for these myths. For centuries the Nuristanis were 
known as “kafirs,” or infidels (this is still a pejorative term for them).  This has 
changed as most converted to Islam at the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th.  They are largely Sunni Muslims.  
There are fifteen Nuristani tribes with numerous sub-groups.  Five 
languages and numerous dialects are spoken by the Nuristani; including Nuristani 
and its dialects and Dardic.  
They do not have overly positive relations with other Afghans or 
Pakistanis and a strong animosity toward Arabs. Between two of the largest 
tribes, the Kamozi (or Kam) and the Kushtaz, there was a series of conflicts since 
the fall of the Taliban. Additionally, for over two decades foreign-funded Wahhabi 
preachers have been working to convert the tribes to their more hard-line 
interpretation of Islam. Nuristanis, however, remain protective of their distinctive 
culture.  
The Nuristani are mountaineer herders, dairymen and farmers. They hold 
a respected place in the social order and many have raised to high government 
positions, particularly in the army. 
 
There is very little useful data on the Pashai, outside of some intense 
research on their language.  They inhabit Nuristan, parts of Laghman, and 
northern Nangarhar, seemingly between the Pashtun and Nuristanis.  Many 
consider themselves Pashtun.  They speak a Dardic language referred to as 
Pashai.  Often they are associated with or referred to as Kohistani.  The majority 
of Pashai in Laghman rely on the livestock and timber business. 
 
Qizilbash 
The Qizilbash of Mediterranean sub-stock speak Dari, are Imami Shiites, 
and scattered throughout Afghanistan, primarily in urban centres. There are 
perhaps 50,000 Qizilbash living in Afghanistan although it is difficult to say for 
some claim to be Sunni Tajik since Shia Islam permits the practice of taqiya or 
                                                          
72 According to this legend, when Islam was established in Mecca, a group of the Qureish left present-
day Saudi Arabia and traveled to Afghanistan to preserve their old religion. This group is believed by 
some Nuristanis to have led to the formation of the Nuristani tribes. 
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dissimulation to avoid religious discrimination. The Qizilbash form one of the 
more literate groups in Afghanistan; they hold important administrative and 
professional positions73
 
. In order to play a role in government and society, the 
Qizilbash, like other Imami Shiites, publicly portrayed themselves as Sunnis or 
Pashtuns while they privately maintained their Shia faith.   
Sayyid (Sadat)  
Claiming descent from the family of the Prophet Mohammad, the Sayyids hold a 
revered place in Afghanistan. The majority, centred in Balkh and Kunduz in the 
North and Nangarhar in the East, are Sunni Muslims, but interestingly there are 
some in Bamiyan Province and elsewhere that adhere to Shia Islam. These are 
often referred to as Sadat, a word that traditionally referred to the descendants 
of Hasan and Hussein, grandsons of the Prophet Mohammad. “74
 
. 
Tatar 
The first Central Asian Muslims to come under the Russian yoke, Tatars 
still retain their own republic within the Russian Federation. During the colonial 
era they were often used as spies and guides for Russian and later Soviet efforts, 
and are renowned for their commercial prowess. The Tatars settled in 
Afghanistan after either trying to escape the Russians, or came to Afghanistan as 
traders. 
 
Turkmen 
The Turkmen ethnic group in Afghanistan numbers an estimated 
200,000. Turkmens live in Badghis, Balkh, Faryab, Herat, and Jowzjan provinces, 
mostly in rural areas along the north-western border with Turkmenistan, though 
                                                          
73 The Qizilbash are traditionally considered to be the descendants of Persian Shi’a mercenaries and 
administrators left behind by Nadir Shah Afshar (1736 – 1747) to govern the Afghan provinces. Under 
Ahmad Shah Durrani, who served in Nadir Shah's bodyguard, and his successors, the Qizilbash 
acquired power and influence at court out of proportion to their numbers. This created resentment 
among the dominant Pashtun which hardened over the years, especially after the Qizilbash openly 
allied themselves with the British during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838 – 1842). Emir Abdur 
Rahman accused the Qizilbash of being partisan of the enemy during his campaigns against the Shi'a 
Hazara in 1891-1893, declared them enemies of the state, confiscated their property and persecuted 
them. 
74 The first Shiite martyrs, sons of Ali and Grandsons of Mohammad 
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there is a concentration of Turkmens in the city of Herat and other small towns of 
the region. The Turkmens are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School. The Hanafi 
sharia, or law, coexists with a tribal law known as the Dab or Dap.  Turkmens 
speak Turkmen, a Turkic language closely related to Turkish and Azerbaijani, and 
more distantly to Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Uzbek. Most Afghan Turkmens are bilingual 
in Dari.  Turkmen are descended from tribes that moved to Afghanistan from east 
of the Caspian Sea at various periods, particularly after the end of the nineteenth 
century when the Russians moved into their territory. Turkmen tribes, of which 
there are twelve major groups in Afghanistan, base their structure on genealogies 
traced through the male line. The most important of these are the Ersari, the 
Tekke, and the Yamud. Other major tribes are the Chakra, Lakai, Mawri, Saroq, 
and Tariq75. Senior members wield considerable authority76
Wakhi 
. Formerly a nomadic 
and warlike people feared for their lightening raids on caravans, Turkmen in 
Afghanistan are farmer-herdsmen and important contributors to the economy. 
They brought karakul sheep to Afghanistan and are also renowned makers of 
carpets, which, with karakul pelts, are major hard currency export commodities. 
Turkmen jewellery is also highly prized. Because the Turkmen population in 
Afghanistan is so small, Turkmens have often aligned themselves politically with 
the Uzbeks, who speak a similar language and have similar cultural traditions. 
 
The neighbouring Wakhi, along with several thousand other Mountain 
Tajik who are physically of the Mediterranean sub-stock with Mongoloid 
admixture, speak Dari and various eastern Iranian dialects. They live in small, 
remote villages located at lower altitudes in the Wakhan Corridor and upper 
Badakhshan. They are often Ismaili Shiites, but some are Imami Shiites and Sunni. 
 
Non-Muslims 
Hindus and Sikhs have traditionally been prominent among Afghanistan’s 
mercantile community. Many Sikhs are known for their craftsmanship, and many 
Hindus for their money lending. Although persecuted under the Taliban and 
                                                          
75 Each tribe has its own carpet pattern and subtle distinctions in the way clothing and headgear are 
worn distinguish members of clans and tribes from one another. 
76 Turkmen society has traditionally had no leaders. Although iashulys, or elders, do help guide 
decision making, in the end all adult males in the group must consent to any decision made by a 
family, clan, or tribe. 
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forced to wear identifying badges, Sikhs and Hindus have returned to Afghanistan 
in significant numbers. Some Hindu and Sikh families have been in Afghanistan for 
generations. Hindus and Sikhs live mostly in urban centres throughout 
Afghanistan77
Interethnic Relations 
.  
The Jewish community of Kabul is totally depleted. One family remained 
in 1996 to care for the synagogue which partially remains in an area otherwise 
pulverized. 
 
Afghanistan's ethnic mosaic has no precise boundaries; nor is its national 
culture uniform. Few of its ethnic groups are indigenous; few maintaining racial 
homogeneity. Many zones overlap and interactions broadened as the economic 
infrastructure improved and educational opportunities widened. 
Resentment rising out of wars and conquests remains long after the 
power of conquerors dissipates. This is true with regard to the Uzbeks. The 
distrust and discrimination between Hazara and Pashtun set during late 19th 
century confrontations is still abundantly present. The causes of prejudice against 
the Qizilbash go back to the 18th century. 
There were significant effects of successful land reclamation projects, 
beginning in the 1930s, which offered attractive incentives to new settlers. These 
invariably favoured the Pashtun over local populations. The land settlement 
schemes in Helmand in the southwest, begun in 1910 and massively extended 
after 1946, were similarly disruptive. Settlers from all parts of Afghanistan were 
recruited into this predominantly Pashtun and Baluch area, creating new tensions 
not only among the new disparate groups, but also among new and old Pashtun 
groups. 
There have always been tensions between groups, from petty squabbles 
to feuds lasting for generations, rising from a variety of causes but rarely from 
intrinsic attitudes of ethnic discrimination. Considering the disparate and volatile 
ingredients that exist, Afghanistan's history records remarkably few internal 
explosions that are specifically focussed on ethnicity. 
During the Soviet-Afghan War, the shared goals of the mujahideen were 
reminiscent to familial, tribal, and ethnic group construction. As such, the appeal 
                                                          
77 In 1978 they numbered about 30,000. Many left in 1992, but are slowly returning to such cities as 
Ghazni and Jalalabad. 
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of the mujahideen was a strong and familiar rallying cry and source of solidarity 
for Afghans in their struggle for national liberation. 
Afghan ethnic identities emerged more clearly during the Soviet-Afghan 
War. Five groups could be easily distinguished: Tajik, including all Sunni Dari 
speakers; Hazara; Uzbek; Durrani Pashtun; Ghilzai Pashtun and Eastern Pashtun. 
Fighting among Afghans in the years following the fall of Najibullah's government 
in 1992 exceeded levels of violence experienced even during the wars of Emir 
Abdur Rahman against the Hazara and the Nuristani between 1891 and 1896. 
Some would say that these conflicts are evidence that Afghan society must now 
be fragmented between groups identified by religious, ethnic, or regional labels. 
There is no doubt that the Soviet-Afghan War severely disturbed the delicate 
social infrastructure constructed over many centuries, yet according to many 
Afghans the present turmoil is driven more by political greed and external 
interference than by ethnic, religious or regional considerations. While traditional 
structures were not equitable for all Afghan citizens, they did permit extended 
periods of civic stability. Even in the mid-1990s, there was ample evidence in a 
number of areas outside the present arenas of conflict to suggest that a return to 
the old order could occur. 
Elements of material culture are used by all ethnic groups to build pride 
and a sense of social superiority, particularly in mixed ethnic zones. Each group 
uses folktales to reinforce the uniqueness and superiority of the one over the 
other, as well as to describe their individual ideals. 
Ethnic identities fade in importance when Afghans sense that they are 
confronted with a common enemy who seek to control Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s 
ethnic diversity does not mean that the members of the different ethnic groups 
do not interact. There is a substantial amount of intermarriage between the 
ethnic groups. This intermarriage tends to blur lines of loyalty between different 
ethnic groups78
Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity is also complicated by the fact that the 
Afghan notion of ethnicity is different than the view commonly held in the West. 
Ethnicity or identity, known as qawm in Afghanistan, is not only defined by a 
common cultural or genetic group, but also by tribes, families, and geographic 
. 
                                                          
78 For example, the main Tajik commander around Mazar-e-Sharif, Atta Mohammed, is married to a 
Pashtun and owes his life to his in-laws who were able to smuggle him out of the area when the 
Taliban took over. Similarly, Dr. Abdullah had a Pashtun father from Kandahar while his mother was a 
Tajik from the Panjshir valley. One of the former deputy defense ministers, Zabet Saleh Registani, has 
a Hazara mother and a Tajik father. Yunus Qanuni is married to a Pashtun, and the former Tajik 
President, Burhanuddin Rabbani, has a Pashtun daughter-in-law. 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
62 
 
regions, or even occupations. In fact, in many instances an Afghan will not 
primarily define himself as a “Pashtun” or a “Tajik,” but as a member of the 
“Zadran” tribe or an inhabitant of the “Panjshir” valley. These types of identifiers 
include a sense of loyalty to a group that is providing the individual with things 
that are essential to live. These types of identifiers are not traditionally what 
westerners view as ethnic characteristics, but are relevant in understanding how 
an individual will react in a given situation. This makes it difficult to understand 
Afghan ethnicity and the relationship of ethnicity to politics and security. While 
the larger ethnic identities of Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, etc., do exist, and 
while they are important at a general level in understanding Afghan society, 
politics, economics, and security, these categories are only general descriptions of 
how Afghans view themselves and one another. 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on Afghan society 
Many Afghans are of the opinion that ethnic differences have been exploited by 
foreign conquering armies to divide the country or that ethnic differences have 
been used in a reductionist way to analyze a very complex nation and this 
results in exacerbating any existing ethnic differences.  Following the Russian 
occupation of Afghanistan and the subsequent power vacuum, the infighting 
trigged by religious and ethnic based groups loyal to neighbouring countries 
resulted in very strong ethnic clashes. This was the first time in Afghanistan’s 
history that ethnic groups fought each other. Since that time, there has been a 
strong effort to overcome ethnic differences, especially under the banner of 
Islam. The ethnic diversity of Afghanistan has been strength rather than a 
weakness and for centuries, the different ethnic groups lived side by side and 
intermarried.  Although the older generation experienced ethnic differences in 
the 1990s infighting, the newer generation of Afghans consider this ethnic 
fighting as bitter history best forgotten. 
 
Religion 
About 99% of the people of Afghanistan are Muslims. Apart from a few 
very small minority groups (1% - Sikhs, Hindus and Christian), Afghans are either 
Sunni Muslims (84%) or Shiite Muslims (15%).The divide between Sunni and Shia 
Islam is deep-rooted and has been a source of considerable tension in the past, 
particularly under the Taliban. 
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Muslims follow the Qur’an, which they believe contains the will of Allah. 
Muslims are expected to live by the five pillars of Islam: make one pilgrimage to 
Mecca, Saudi Arabia (holy city) during one’s lifetime; pray five times a day; give to 
the poor; acknowledge that there is one god, Allah, and that Muhammad is his 
prophet; and fast during the month of Ramadan (For more details see section on 
Ramadan). Muslims consider Friday a holy day. (For more details see section on 
Interpersonal relations, Sharia). 
One of the main differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims is that 
Shiites follows religious leaders called imams. Imams are considered 
Mohammed’s successors and intermediaries between Allah and Muslims. 
In Afghanistan, traditional beliefs are commonly mixed with those of 
Islam. Many people hold traditional family beliefs to a higher regard than those of 
the religious scholars, such as the Pashtuns, who combine Pashtunwali with 
Islamic values. 
The madrassa, religious schools attached to Mosques, are the primary 
means of education for many youths, especially in the south. The Ulema (Muslim 
clerics), as opposed to the media, are thus the most important means of 
transmitting information on national and world events. 
Religious leaders79
                                                          
79 The Ulema Council consists of a network of 3,000 clerics throughout Afghanistan. Each cleric in the 
council is paid about US$100 per month by Afghan government and, in return, is expected to promote 
the government line. However, in August 2010, 350 members of the Council voted to demand that 
Islamic law (Sharia) be implemented.  
 and networks have always played a prominent role as 
civil society forces in Afghanistan. In times of crisis, Islamic networks have taken 
on key functions either in the form of legitimizing resistance, or through forming 
the backbone of resistance. 
Each community has one or two mullahs, who are responsible for 
teaching the Qur’an, leading group prayers, and performing weddings, funerals, 
and other ceremonies. There are fewer mullahs in the countryside; mullahs often 
have other jobs such as farming. Mullahs are chosen by the government, which 
consults with each community. Being chosen a mullah is a great honour. Other 
important people in the Muslim community are the muezzin, who calls people to 
prayer from a mosque’s minarets; the qazi, who is a religious judge responsible 
for administering the Sharria; and the khadim, who maintains and cleans the 
mosque.  
Religious and spiritual leaders can be further divided to: 
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• Talib - knowledge seeker but in Afghanistan refer to student who 
study religion. 
• Mullah – leaders of the prayer in mosque who has very basic 
knowledge of religion. 
• Maulavi – Religious scholar who finished higher religious education. 
• Maulana – Religious Scholar who has highest knowledge of religion. 
• Mufti – The one who has higher religious authority of interpretation 
of religious matters. 
• Pir or Sufis – Spiritual leader to his disciples and followers 
• Murid – Followers of Pir or Sufis 
• Khalifa – Disciples of Pir or Sufi (for reading purpose, you can read 
“Heroes of the Age” and “Before Taliban, Genealogy of Afghan 
Jihad” by Prof. David Edwards. 
• Ulema – Plural of religious scholars 
• Hajutul Islam – given to middle ranking Shia clerics 
• Ayatullah – literally, “Sign of Allah”, one of the highest ranks for a 
Shia Muslim cleric, an expert in Islamic studies  
 
Shia personal status law 
The Shia community constitutes approximately 10% of the country’s total 
population, predominately of the Hazara ethnic group. 
Article 131 of the 2004 Afghan Constitution recognises that Shia laws 
governing personal matters may differ from the country’s main legal system, 
which is based on civil law principles shared with the religious laws of the majority 
Sunni community. 
According to Article 131, Shia law should be applied by Afghan Courts “in 
cases dealing with personal matters involving the followers of [the] Shia Sect in 
accordance with the provisions of law”. Also is stated that “in other cases “if no 
clarification by this constitution and other laws exist and both sides of the case 
are followers of the Shia Sect, courts will resolve the matter according to laws of 
this Sect”. 
The law consists of 249 articles in total, of which only 10% are currently 
available in English translation. The Afghan Ministry of Justice has said the full text 
of the law will be available after all various and unidentified technical problems 
have been resolved. 
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No Peace without Justice is an international non-profit organization that 
works for the protection and promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of 
law and international justice. This organization made an analysis of Afghanistan’s 
Shia Personal Status Law, based on the 26 Articles which were considered by 
analysts at the USAID Afghanistan Rule of Law Assistance Project to be of greatest 
concern as discriminatory toward women and in violation of human rights norms. 
The main points of the analysis are as follows: 
The Shia Personal Status Law violates the rights of women by:  
• Severely limiting women’s guardianship rights.  
• Giving men control over the behaviour of their female relatives.  
• Requiring women to seek permission to marry.  
• Allowing forced marriage.  
• Permitting men to have multiple wives.  
• Restricting women’s freedom to leave home.  
• Treating women as property.  
• Failing to recognise rape inside or outside marriage as a crime 
against a person.  
• Legalising marital rape.  
• Obliging a woman to have sex with her husband at least every 
four nights.  
• Making a woman’s subsistence dependent on her having sex with 
her husband.  
• Allowing a woman’s husband or guardian to deny her permission 
to work.  
The Shia Personal Status Law violates the rights of children by:  
• Determining that a girl can be married at 16 and a boy at 18.  
• Allowing marriage to or between minors.  
• Legalising intercourse with a minor, including rape, both within 
and outside of marriage.  
• Treating a child as property and failing to recognize that rape of a 
minor is a serious crime.  
The Shia laws to be applied in the personal matters cases had not been 
incorporated into Afghanistan’s national law, having traditionally been defined 
only within the customs of the Shia sect. In order to make it legal, the Shia 
Personal Status Law was introduced in the Afghan Parliament in 2007. When the 
Parliament referred the Bill to the Supreme Court in February 2009, it requested 
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that the Court take into account Article 131 of the Constitution when considering 
the constitutionality of the law. The Bill was approved by the House of 
Representatives on 3rd February 2009, after a debate among 249 members 
including 68 women. It passed to the House of Elders on 7th February 2009, where 
it was later passed and referred to the Supreme Court for approval. The Court 
approved the law in late February 2009.  
The law applies only to Afghanistan’s Shia community and it is widely 
considered as a concession made by President Hamid Karzai to Hazara leaders in 
order to gain the support of this ethnic group, who always has been a shifting 
voting bloc, in Afghanistan’s elections. Shia Personal Status Law has strong 
support among many Hazara leaders. 
 
Rites of passage 
Many important rites of passage in Afghan society are derived from 
Islam. When a baby is born, the father whispers the call to prayer and command 
to worship in the baby’s ear. Sugar or a piece of date is then placed in the baby’s 
mouth so that the first thing the baby tastes is sweet. The baby’s head is shaved 
on the seventh day to symbolize service to Allah. The family weighs the hair and 
donates an equal amount of gold or silver to charity. Boys are also circumcised 
within a week of birth. On the seventh day, a name is given to the child and 
aqiqah (feast) is held to give thanks. Halal meat is prepared for the feast and 
some food is given to the poor. Children begin reading the Qur’an in Arabic at an 
early age and hold bismillah (recital) at the age of four.  
Although Afghan children typically follow Muslim rituals such as fasting 
before adolescence, they are required to join rituals after reaching sexual 
maturity. Boys wear turbans, and women must cover their hair and spend less 
time outdoors. Dating is not permitted, due to the separation of men and women. 
Marriages are commonly arranged when men and women are in their teens. The 
government is attempting to curb forced marriage of young women. 
Families usually consider tribe and status when arranging marriages and 
prefer to choose cousins. The families negotiate a bride price and dowry before 
the marriage. The bride-price is given to the family of the bride, which provides 
financial security to the bride in case of divorce, and the dowry is a gift to the 
groom from the family of the bride. Since marriage is a social and economic 
relationship, both families decide publicly. The marriage is complete after the 
signing of a contract and a reading from the Qur’an. Wedding festivities called 
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walima can last for up to 3 days at the family homes of the bride and groom. Men 
are permitted to have up to four wives, but rarely have more than one.  
Before a Muslim dies, the call to prayer is whispered in the person’s ear, 
as it was at birth. Immediately after death, the body is washed and rubbed with 
perfumes and spices. It is then wrapped in white cloth and buried without a 
casket, facing Mecca. The family of the deceased gathers for memorial dinners 
several times during the year following the death. 
 
Ramadan 
The sacred month of Ramadan80
The Significance of Ramadan 
 is a period where Muslims fast, pray and 
feast. The purpose is to teach Muslims about patience, humility and spirituality. 
Ramadan is the 4th of the 5th pillars of Islam. During Ramadan, Muslims refrain 
from smoking, eating, and drinking from sunrise to sunset.  According to Islam 
there is no limit on the amount of hours of work during the month of Ramadan, 
however the Afghan government decree specifies the working hours from 7 a.m. 
to 1 p.m. Non-Muslims are expected to recognize Ramadan and act accordingly 
while in public, but can do as they wish in private. 
• Month in which the Qur’an was revealed. 
• Special month of: Fasting, Repentance, Increased prayer, 
Increased charity. 
• Ends with the festival of Eid-ul-Fitr: Day of celebration and 
gratitude. 
 
Figure 8: Phases of Ramadan 
                                                          
80 Ramadan is an Arabic word; its root “Ar-Ramad” means “dryness / heat.” Ramadan is the ninth 
month of the Hijri (lunar calendar) calendar. The Lunar calendar is 11-12 days shorter than Gregorian 
calendar; therefore, Ramadan is 10-11 days earlier every year. 
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Fasting 
By fasting Muslim can attain taqwa (God consciousness/ self-
discipline)81
• Helps Muslims draw closer to God through increased recitation 
and reflection of the Qur’an and additional prayers/worship. 
. A fasting person experiences some of the hardships of the poor and 
hungry. Physiological effects include lowering of blood sugar, cholesterol and 
systolic blood pressure. It improves strength, endurance and self-discipline 
through physical abstentions. 
Spiritual objectives/benefits of Ramadan are: 
• Aids in increase of iman (faith) and ihsan (sincerity and 
righteousness) and removal of riyya’ (showing off). 
• Aids in purification of the heart/soul and helps to improve one’s 
character. 
• Trains the person to do praiseworthy acts e.g. charity, kindness, 
generosity, patience and forgiveness. 
Fasting begins at the break of dawn and ends at sunset. Physical aspect 
of fasting is to refrain from food, drink and intimacy during fasting hours. 
Depending on location and season, it can vary from 12 hrs to 17 hrs. Spiritual 
aspect of fasting is to refrain from blameworthy thoughts and acts e.g. foul 
language, vain talk, hurtful behaviour, during all hours. Fasting is mandatory for 
all Muslims except children, unhealthy adults (mentally or physically), adults 
travelling long distances, and women who are menstruating, in post-childbirth 
care, pregnant or breast-feeding.  
The typical activities of Ramadan 
• Sahoor: Meal before dawn and the first prayer of the day. 
• Iftar: breaking of the fast at Sunset (coincides with the 4th daily 
prayer). 
• Ziarat: Social gatherings e.g. visiting relatives, sharing food with 
neighbours, friends, and the poor.  
• Tarawih: Optional Prayers at early night 
• Qiraat: Reading of the Qur’an during free time. 
• Qiam: Optional late-night prayers in the last 10 days. 
 
                                                          
81 Taqwa is an Arabic word that comes from the root “wiqaya” which means prevention/protection 
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Lailat-ul Qadr 
This blessed night is also called the night of Power. It is the particular 
night in the month of Ramadan when the Holy Koran first began to be revealed.  
 
Eid-ul-Fitr: Marking the End of Ramadan 
• Eid-ul Fitr: Eid al-Fitr often abbreviated to Eid and holds a 
significant importance and is celebrated widely for three days that 
marks the end of the Ramadan.  
• Zakat-ul Fitr: A prescribed amount of money obligatory for every 
Muslim to pay, calculated to feed one poor person in his region 
for one day.  
• Eid activities include: 
 Eid prayer in the early morning. 
 Visiting family, friends, neighbours, the sick, elderly etc.   
 Enjoying festive meals.  
 Modest gift-giving especially to children.  
 The greeting on that day is:  Eid Mubarak 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on religion 
There exists in Afghanistan almost a two-tiered sense of religion; a highly 
conservative and sometimes radical sense, sometimes sincerely practiced and 
other times merely outwardly practiced for the sake of protection, and a 
more moderate form of Islam. Islam and Afghan identity have been 
inseparably tied to one another for hundreds of years. Historically, 
Afghanistan was Zoroastrian but following the Arab conquest it became 
Islamic and has remained so up to the present time.  
Religion is the most unifying dynamic among the varied ethnic and linguistic 
tribes that comprise Afghanistan. To be Afghan is to be Muslim.  However, in 
the 1970s and 80s, in the context of the Russian presence, patriotism 
emerged as an additional, and significant unifying factor. During the 
Mujahideen and Taliban rule and the subsequent large-scale fleeing and 
expatriation of many (especially well-educated and urban) Afghans, religion 
reasserted itself as the main unifying factor. This is in large part because many 
Afghans spent some 10 – 15 years as refugees in the neighbouring countries, 
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particularly Pakistan and Iran. There, they found that Islam was a point of 
connection and validation. Particularly for the Afghans who fled Afghanistan 
as children and returned as adults, this connection to  neighbouring countries 
weakened the nationalistic feelings of the previous generation and increased 
a sense of Islamic brotherhood over nationalism. Some of the Afghan 
refugees were further exposed to local, radical Islamic elements and began to 
adopt these beliefs. The Afghans remaining in Afghanistan at this time 
became outwardly, and in some cases, genuinely more conservative and 
radical in their beliefs due to the Mujahideen and Taliban rule.  
  What remains is an Afghanistan that identifies itself by its religion. 
There remains, especially in the urban areas, a fear of any movement away 
from Islam, especially in relation to the effect such a change would make on 
relationships with the Taliban shadow government and strong men. This 
being said, the temporary, though extended presence of foreign troops has 
found many Afghans holding their breath in a sense, waiting to see whether 
radical Islam will return as the dominating dynamic. There does exist a small, 
but growing sense of discontent with Islam in general, as many young 
Afghans, exposed to the internet, the foreign aid and military community 
wonder if there is another way of life, a new way to be Afghan, preserving the 
Afghan spirit but without the harshness and control of radicalism. 
 
Languages 
Of the 32 languages and dialects spoken in Afghanistan, the official 
languages are Pashto or Pashtun (35%), and Dari (50%), with minority languages 
acting as third languages in the regions where they predominate. Turkic languages 
(primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) are spoken by 11% and 30 minor languages 
(primarily Baluchi and Pashai) by 4%. 
Pashto, which is spoken by Pashtuns, has two major variants and many 
dialects. Pashto was designated a national language of Afghanistan by the 
Pashtuns in the various constitutions. During the period of modernization, all non-
Pashto-speaking government workers were required to learn the language. 
Pashto was also required as a subject in elementary schools where instruction 
was in Dari. The Pashto language also served as a national symbol because it is 
commonly associated with Afghanistan, despite the fact that around half its 
speakers live in Pakistan. Even so, Pashto has never had the status of Dari, which 
has a vast cultural and literary tradition. 
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Dari is similar to Farsi spoken in Iran. Dari is very much an urban 
language, and is the language in which business is most frequently conducted. 
Dari has always been the prestige language in Afghanistan. It is the language used 
when speakers of different languages need to conduct business or otherwise 
communicate. In Afghanistan, all education above primary school is conducted in 
Dari, except specific Pashto language study. Pashto speakers are frequently 
bilingual in Dari, but Dari speakers rarely learn more than a few words of Pashto. 
Speakers of other languages in Afghanistan frequently pick up Dari as a matter of 
course, except in the totally Pashtun areas of the south. Most educated Afghans 
can use both Dari and Pashto as they are related. 
Both Dari and Pashto are written using the Arabic alphabet. Although 
they are different languages, they share common roots in the Iranian family of 
languages. Dari and Pashto are similar in written form, but are not similar in 
speech. As such, they share common letters and some words, and their word 
order and verb systems are similar. 
Both languages have a basic word order in which the direct object comes 
before the verb. They also have verb systems that resemble the English verb 
system in basic ways. Dari nouns have no grammatical gender, but are marked for 
person and number (singular and plural). Verbs agree with the subject in person 
and number. Pashto is more complex than Dari in terms of word formation. It has 
several classes of masculine and feminine nouns and adjectives and is highly 
inflected. It also has complex sets of weak and strong pronouns. 
Dari and Pashto have many words in common. This overlapping 
vocabulary is a result of the ancestral words they both share as members of the 
Iranian language family, as well as the fact that they have been spoken side by 
side for centuries. Both languages have a number of words borrowed from Arabic, 
as do all the languages spoken by Islamic peoples. Also, as is true of all languages, 
the dialects of Dari and Pashto spoken in areas adjacent to other languages are 
likely to have more borrowed words from those languages. 
As both languages are written in the Arabic alphabet, they are read from 
right to left and connect letters in cursive style, except for numbers. Dari has four 
extra letters to represent sounds that don't occur in Arabic. Pashto has the four 
extra letters that occur in Dari, plus an additional eight letters. Because the Arabic 
alphabet does not use symbols to represent vowels (except in the Qur’an), it is 
impossible to transliterate from Dari or Pashto to English letter by letter, and 
there are a number of ways to spell the vowels. 
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Figure 9: Diagram of languages used in Afghanistan 
 
Historically, Afghans have an extremely strong aptitude for language 
learning.   Many Afghans speak multiple languages depending on their region, and 
English, German or Russian are commonly used. 
 
Education and Literacy 
Afghanistan has gone through wars and internal conflicts more than 
three decades. As a result of war, the education system collapsed and several 
generations of Afghans became illiterate. Fewer than 10% of Afghans attended 
school during times of war. The Taliban shut down secular schools and prohibited 
women older than 12 from going to school. Many teachers fled Afghanistan. 
At the end of the 1990s, only 5% of girls attended school compared to 60% of 
boys. Afghanistan has the lowest literacy rate in the region and one of the lowest 
in the world. It is estimated that 51% of men and 21% of women are literate82
                                                          
82 Estimated literacy rate in 2012 was 28% of population over 15 years of age; 43% of males and 12.6% 
of females 
. 
Human Aspects in Afghanistan - Handbook 
 
73 
 
Since the fall of the Taliban, domestic and international initiatives have been 
established to provide education for all Afghans. In February 2002, more than a 
thousand women took entrance exams for university enrolment. That same year, 
the Back-to-School campaign began and has resulted in more than 3 million 
children, and 70,000 teachers attending school. A major achievement was 
bringing the literacy rate from 12% in 2002 to 30% in 2010 (women literacy rate 
raised to 18% from 5% in 2002). Women make up 30% of the student population, 
which is much higher than in previous years.  
However, as many as half the children are still not attending school. In 
some rural provinces, more than 80% of girls are not enrolled in school and as few 
as 5% are literate. Of the rural provinces surveyed, more than 70% of households 
claim that a lack of schools was the main reason for girls not attending.  
According to a study on literacy and adult education in Afghanistan83, still 
10.5 million people aged 15 and above are illiterate while the current capacity of 
the government and its partners in literacy program covering 600,000 learners 
per year. About five million school-age children (7-18) are currently out of school. 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on languages and education 
Both Pashto and Dari (historically, used almost interchangeably with Dari 
Farsi) have rich literary histories. Both languages are spoken on either side 
of the Afghan borders, with Farsi spoken in Iran and Pashto spoken in 
Pakistan, especially along the border with Afghanistan. More and more, 
younger, educated Afghans refer to their language as Dari, rather than Farsi, 
in a telling indication of the increasingly resentful feelings towards Iran.  
Conversely, Pashto is not significantly different than Pakistani Pashto. Many 
Pashtuns feel that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (The 
Durrand line) is a very careless and illogical mistake of the British Raj, as it is 
unwise to divide a tribe not only in half but also into two countries merely 
for political gain. 
 
                                                          
83 Literacy and adult education in Afghanistan, The Asia-Pacific Cultural Centre for UNESCO (ACCU), 
2010 
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SOCIAL ASPECTS 
 
Society 
Afghanistan is located at the crossroads of several civilizations, and its 
people reflect a diverse culture. Islamic traditions provide a common framework 
for many different ethnic groups in Afghan society. Nearly all Afghans are Muslim 
and live their lives accordingly. 
Daily life in many rural areas is semi-nomadic and affected by tribal 
heritage84
                                                          
84 Afghanistan has a substantial number of nomadic people, often estimated at 10% of the country’s 
total population. 
. While some of the ethnic groups retain strong tribal affiliations, many 
primarily identify themselves as Afghans. Some Afghans have moved to cities, but 
many remain in rural areas. Decades of international and civil war have disrupted 
social, educational, health, and economic opportunity, but Afghans have begun to 
rebuild as a united people. 
Afghans have a rich tradition in the arts. Although wars and strict Taliban 
censorship temporarily prevented many people from engaging the arts, song and 
dance and other indigenous traditional arts have re-emerged. Each ethnic group 
and region has traditional songs and music. Live music usually consists of song, 
drums, and stringed instruments similar to banjos and lutes. Dancing is popular, 
but men and women dance separately. Also, female musicians entertain women 
and male musicians entertain men. Storytelling and poetry are developed over 
generations. Religion, love, and war are common themes in songs and stories. 
Afghan buildings are decorated with beautiful and complex flourishes 
and calligraphy.  Afghan handicrafts are highly valued. Woven materials decorated 
with intricate embroidery add colour and vibrancy to clothing and accessories. 
Persian carpets are world renowned, and a source of pride among many Afghans. 
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Interpersonal Relations 
Interpersonal relations among Afghans are largely ruled by the code of 
honour called Pashtunwalli which is a national heritage. Pashtunwali (Pakhtunwali 
or Pathanwali) means "the way of the Pashtuns" and refers to the pre-Islamic 
religion, honour code and traditional lifestyle of the Pashtun people. Other non-
Pashtun Afghans have also adopted many of its laws. Pashtunwali is socially 
practiced by the majority and followed by almost all Afghans.  Pashtunwalli is an 
ancient code of life or unwritten codes of ethics belonging to the Pashtun 
ethnicity. Pashtunwali promotes self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, 
love, forgiveness, revenge and tolerance toward all (especially to strangers or 
guests). It is considered a personal responsibility of every Pashtun to discover and 
rediscover Pashtunwali's essence and meaning. Though Pashtunwali is believed to 
date back to the pre-Islamic period, its usage or practice does not contravene 
basic Islamic principles. There are nine main principles of Pashtunwali: 
• Melmatia (hospitality) - Showing hospitality and profound respect 
to all visitors, regardless of distinctions of race, religion, national 
affiliation as well as economic status and doing so without any 
hope of remuneration or favour. Pashtuns are widely considered 
to be the most hospitable people in the world and a Pashtun will 
go to great extents to show his hospitality. 
• Nanawati (asylum) - Derived from the verb meaning to go in, this 
is used for protection given to a person who requests protection 
against his/her enemies. The people are protected at all costs; in 
many cases even people running from the law must be given 
refuge until the situation is clarified. It can also be used when the 
vanquished party is prepared to go in to the house of the victors 
and ask for their forgiveness85
• Badal (justice) - To seek justice or take revenge against the 
wrongdoer. This applies to injustices committed yesterday or 1000 
years ago if the wrongdoer still exists. Justice in Pashtun lore 
needs elaborating: even a mere taunt (or "Paighor") is regarded as 
an insult - which can only usually be redressed by shedding of the 
taunter's blood (and if he isn't available, then his next closest male 
. 
                                                          
85 To refuse a person shelter, or sanctuary, is unthinkable to an Afghan. Even if the person seeking 
hospitality is a bitter enemy he cannot be refused. While in that man's house he is absolutely safe; his 
host would fight to protect him, give him the choicest food, and treat him as a member of his close 
family.  A stranger, particularly a foreigner, sitting down to eat with a group of Afghans from the large 
communal pot will get the meatiest portions handed to him without hesitation. 
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relation). This in turn leads to a blood feud that can last 
generations and involve whole tribes with the loss of hundreds of 
lives. Normally blood feuds in this all male dominated setup are 
then settled in a number of ways86
• Tureh (bravery) - A Pashtun must defend his land/property, family 
and women from incursions wherever he or she might reside. A 
Pashtun should always stand brave against tyranny and he should 
always be able to defend his property, family, women and the 
honour of his name. Death can follow if anyone mistreats these 
traits. 
. 
• Sabat (loyalty) - Loyalty must be paid to one's family, friends, and 
tribe members. Loyalty is a must and a Pashtun can never become 
disloyal as this would be utterly shameful towards themselves and 
their families. 
• Imamdari (righteousness) - A Pashtun must always strive towards 
thinking good thoughts, speaking good words and doing other 
good deeds. Pashtuns must behave respectfully towards all 
creations including people, animals and the environment around 
them. Pollution of the environment or its destruction is against 
the Pashtunwali. 
• Isteqamat (persistence) – Trust in God. The notion of trusting in 
the one Creator generally comports to Islamic idea of belief in 
only one God (tawheed). 
• Ghayrat (self honour or dignity) - Pashtuns must maintain their 
human dignity. Honour has great importance in Pashtun society 
and most other codes of life are aimed towards the preservation 
of one's honour or pride. They must respect themselves and 
others in order to be able to do so, especially those they do not 
know. Respect begins at home, among family members and 
relatives. 
• Namus (Honour of women) - A Pashtun must defend the honour 
of Pashtun women at all costs and must protect them from vocal 
and physical harm. 
                                                          
86 The Afghan will never turn the other cheek, a killing must be avenged by a killing, and so it goes on 
from generation to generation. A family will never forget a debt of honour. Revenge may not be swift, 
the injured party may bide his time for years if need be, until at the right moment he strikes. A son 
must kill his father's murderer. In many instances his mother will insist he does so, otherwise she will 
disown him and he will be disgraced. If the murderer himself is dead, then his son, or his brother, or 
his uncle, must die. 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
78 
 
Other principles or concepts of Pashtunwalli are: 
• Freedom and independence - the belief that freedom in physical, 
mental, religious, spiritual, political and economic realms is for all 
to pursue, male and female, so long as it is done without bringing 
harm to others. The free have nothing to gain of freedom without 
discipline. 
• Justice and forgiveness - If one intentionally wrongs another, the 
victim has the right, even an obligation, to avenge this injustice in 
equal proportion. If one has intentionally wronged you, and you 
did not seek justice nor did the wrongdoer ask you for his/her 
forgiveness, then a debt, is owed to you by him/her, which can 
only be fulfilled once justice (through an act of revenge or the 
decision of the Jirga council) has been provided to recompense 
the wrong done. Furthermore, justice and forgiveness extends to 
pardon any wrong, except for murder, when asked to do so by a 
woman, the wrongdoer’s family, a sayyid (an Afghan who claims 
Arab descent), or a mullah; and to spare the life of anyone who 
takes refuge in a mosque or anyone in battle who begs for mercy. 
• Honesty and promise - A Pashtun is known for keeping their 
promises and being honest at all situations and times. A true 
Pashtun will never break his/her promise. 
• Unity and equality - above the languages they speak, above the 
blood they keep, above the amount of money they make, 
Pashtunwali unites the Pashtuns as one people across the world. 
Where there is true unity, every effort to disunite them will only 
serve to strengthen the unity they have. What happens to one - 
happens to all. Every man is equal. It is this concept which has 
necessitated the development amongst Pashtuns of a Jirga 
system, whereby decision making takes place with the 
participation of all members of the Pashtun society. Every man 
wants a say in his future and he will fight for his right to have his 
opinions heard. All people must therefore deal with each other, 
with the proper civility or respect and no one may impose their 
will on to another. 
• Family and trust - the belief that fellow Pashtun brothers or sisters 
should be trusted and assisted to the greatest extent possible. The 
family must be glorified under a sacred conviction of responsibility 
and duty with respect for wives, daughters, elders, parents, sons, 
and husbands. Fellow Pashtuns must be cared for. There may be 
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hundreds of tribes, but they have one destiny in union with each 
other. 
• Compassion and cooperation - The poor and the weak must be 
supported. 
• Knowledge and history - Pashtuns seek objective knowledge in 
life, art, science, and culture, which are considered fruits granted 
by God. Great value is placed in Pashtun history, with all its depth 
and pluralism, tragedies and victories. It teaches Pashtuns "to 
keep the mind open, to continue the search for the truth, much of 
which has vanished under history itself". 
• Fight evil - Evil is at constant war with good. Evil must be fought 
and good must prevail over evil. It is a Pashtun's duty to fight evil 
when he/she comes face to face with it. 
• Hewad (nation) - Love for one's nation in Pashtun culture isn't just 
important, it's essential. A Pashtun is always indebted to their 
nation and must strive to perfect and improve it. A Pashtun 
considers it his obligation to defend his country Pakhtara 
("Pakhtun-khwa" in modern colloquial Pashto) against any type of 
foreign incursion. Defence of nation means defence of honour, 
values, culture, tradition, countrymen and self. 
• Dod-pasbani (Protecting Pashtun culture) - It is obligatory for a 
Pashtun to protect Pashtun culture from dilution and 
disintegration. Pashtunwali advises that in order to successfully 
accomplish this, a Pashtun must retain the Pashto language since 
Pashto is the prime source of Pashtun culture. 
• Tokham-Pashbanni (Protecting the Pashtun Race) – Pashtuns must 
marry Pashtuns. This stems from the idea that “half-Pashtuns” do 
not retain the Pashtun language, culture and physical features. 
• Lashkar (The tribal army) - It implements the decisions of the 
jirga. 
• Jirga or Loya Jirga (assembly or grand assembly) - an assembly of 
tribal elders called for various purposes whether waging war or 
composing peace, tribal or inter-tribal. 
• Tsalweshti - derived from the word for forty, this refers to the 
tribal force that would implement the decision of a jirga. Every 
fortieth man of the tribe would be a member. A shalgoon is a 
force derived from the number twenty. 
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• Badragga - a tribal escort composed of members of that tribe 
through which the travellers are passing. If a badragga is violated 
a tribal feud will follow. 
• Hamsaya - a non-Pashtun dependent group who attaches 
themselves to a Pashtun group, usually for protection. The 
Pashtun protector group is called a naik. Any attack on a hamsaya 
is considered an attack on the protector. 
• Mlatar - literally, tying the back or "support". This refers to those 
members of the tribe who will actually fight on behalf of their 
leaders. 
• Nagha - a tribal fine decided by the council of elders and imposed 
upon the wrongdoer. 
• Rogha - settlement of a dispute between warring factions. 
• Hujra - a common sitting or sleeping place for males in the village. 
Visitors and unmarried young men sleep in the hujra. 
• Lokhay Warkawal - Literally means 'giving of pot'. The idea that 
the tribe will do everything to protect an individual from an 
enemy. 
In addition to Pashtunwalli most Afghans also follow the Islamic code of 
law, the Sharia. Sharia is the sacred law of Islam. All Muslims believe Sharia is 
God's law, but they have differences among themselves as to exactly what it 
entails. Modernists, traditionalists and fundamentalists all hold different views of 
Sharia, as do adherents to different schools of Islamic thought and scholarship. 
Different countries and cultures have varying interpretations of Sharia as well. 
Sharia is a comprehensive code of behaviour that embraces both private and 
public activities. The Sharia encompasses and governs every sphere of human 
activity including the spiritual, moral, social, economic and political aspects of life. 
The Sharia protects and defends life, property, honour, religion and intellect. 
Muslims believe all Sharia is derived from two primary sources, the 
divine revelations set forth in the Qur'an, and the sayings and example set by the 
Islamic Prophet Muhammad in the Sunnah. Fiqh, or "jurisprudence," interprets 
and extends the application of Sharia to questions not directly addressed in the 
primary sources, by including secondary sources. These secondary sources usually 
include the consensus of the religious scholars embodied in ijma87
                                                          
87 In addition to the "Basic Code" of the Qur'an and Sunnah, traditional Sunni Muslims also add the 
consensus (ijma) of Muhammad's companions (sahaba) and Islamic jurists (ulema) on certain issues. In 
situations where no concrete rule exists in the sources, law scholars use qiyas — various forms of 
reasoning, including analogy, to derive law from the essence of divine principles and preceding rulings. 
, and analogy 
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from the Qur'an and Sunnah through qiyas. Shia88
• Ibadah (ritual worship) - In terms of Islam, ibadah is the ultimate 
obedience, the ultimate submission, and the ultimate humility to 
Allah (God) along with the ultimate love for Him. Muslims believe 
that ibadah is the reason for the existence of all humanity. That is, 
Muslims believe that all people exist only to worship Allah. Ibadah 
consequently means following Islamic beliefs and practices – its 
commands, prohibitions, the halal, and the haraam. For Muslims, 
ibadah is also something that comes from the heart, or sincerity, 
as a result of belief in Islam. Therefore, ibadah is something that 
cannot be forced upon another person. The acts of ibadah 
(worship), like we find it in Classic Islamic law, includes:  
 jurists replace qiyas analogy 
with 'aql, or "reason". Where it enjoys official status, Sharia is applied by Islamic 
judges, or qadis. The imam has varying responsibilities depending on the 
interpretation of Sharia. While the term is commonly used to refer to the leader 
of communal prayers, the imam may also be a scholar, religious leader or political 
leader. Sharia deals with many topics addressed by secular law, including crime, 
politics and economics, as well as personal matters such as sexuality, hygiene, 
diet, prayer, and fasting. The practices called Sharia today, however, also have 
roots in comparative law and local customs (urf). The Afghan legal system is 
strongly influenced by Sharia, but also cedes ultimate authority to their 
constitutions and the rule of law. 
Sharia can be divided into five main branches: 
 Wudu (Ritual Purification) - Purification is both a spiritual 
and a physical matter for Muslims.  
                                                                                                                                      
The consensus of the community, public interest, and other sources are used as an adjunct to Sharia 
where the primary and secondary sources allow. This description can be applied to the major schools 
of Sunni fiqh, which include the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali. 
88 Shia Muslims also extend the "Basic Code" with fiqh, but strongly reject analogy (qiyas) as an easy 
way to innovations (bid'ah), and reject consensus (ijma) as not having any particular value in its own. 
During the period that the Sunni scholars developed those two tools, the Shi'a Imams were alive, and 
Shi'a view them as an extension of the Sunnah, so they view themselves as deriving their laws (fiqh) 
only from the Qur'an and Sunnah. A recurring theme in Shi'a jurisprudence is logic (mantiq), 
something most Shi'a believe they mention, employ and value to a higher degree than most Sunnis do. 
They do not view logic as a third source for laws, rather a way to see if the derived work is compatible 
with the Qur'an and Sunnah. In Imami-Shi'i law, the sources of law (usul al-fiqh) are the Qur'an, 
anecdotes of Muhammad's practices and those of The Twelve Imams, and the intellect ('aql). Most 
Shi’a Muslims followed the Ja'fari school of thought.  
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 Salah (Prayers) - Muslims are enjoined to pray five times 
each day, with certain exceptions.  
 Ramadan and Sawm (Fasts) - During the Islamic month of 
Ramadan, Muslims abstain from food, drink, sex and 
tobacco between dawn and sunset. Exceptions to this 
obligation are made for the young, the infirm, and women 
during their periods of menstruation or pregnancy. During 
Ramadan, the daylight hours will often begin and end with 
a large meal.  
 Zakat (Charities) - All Muslims who live above the 
subsistence level must pay an annual poor tax, known as 
zakat.  
 Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca) - At least once in each Muslim's 
lifetime, they must attempt a visit to the Holy Places of 
Islam located in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.  
 Mu'amalat (Human interaction, transactions and contracts) 
- Mu'amalat are basic rules that Muslim has to follow in 
human interaction and during conducting business. It 
covers following areas: 
 Financial transactions / Trade – Islamic law recognizes 
private and community property, as well as overlapping 
forms of entitlement for charitable purposes, known as 
waqf or trusts. Classic Islamic law details the manner of 
contracting, the types of transactions, the assignment of 
liability and reward, and the responsibilities of the parties 
in Islamic trade. 
 Laws of inheritance - The rules of inheritance under Sharia 
law are intricate, and a female's portion is generally half 
the amount a male would receive under the same 
circumstances. Up to one third of a person's property may 
be distributed as bequests, or wasiyya, upon their death. 
After debts are settled, the remainder of the estate will be 
divided among the family of the deceased according to the 
rules of inheritance, or irth. Classic Islamic law details the 
division of property, the shares family members are 
entitled to, adjustments and redistributions in the shares, 
orders of precedence among inheritors, and substitution 
among inheritors. 
Marriage - The laws governing Islamic marriage vary 
substantially between sects, schools, states and cultures.  
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Requirements for Islamic Marriages: 
o The man who is not currently a fornicator may marry only a 
woman who is not currently a fornicatress or a chaste 
woman from the people of the Book.  
o The woman who is not currently a fornicatress may marry 
only a man who is not currently a fornicator.  
o The fornicator may marry only a fornicatress.  
o The Muslim woman may marry only a Muslim man.  
o Permission for a virgin female to marry must be given by 
her guardian, usually her father.  
o The father, or in some cases the paternal grandfather, may 
choose a suitable partner for a virgin girl. No other person 
designated as a girl's guardian may compel her marriage.  
o The guardian may not marry the divorced woman or the 
widow if she did not ask to be married.  
o It is obligatory for a man to give bride wealth (gifts) to the 
woman he marries. 
 
 Polygamy - In Sharia law, a Muslim man is permitted up to 
four wives under the rules for nikah. All wives are entitled 
to separate living quarters at the behest of the husband 
and if possible. All should receive equal attention, support, 
treatment and inheritance. In modern practice, it is 
uncommon for a Muslim man to have more than one wife; 
if he does so, it is often due to the infertility of his first 
wife. The practice of polygamy has been regulated or 
abolished in some Muslim states. 
 Divorce - The laws governing divorce vary substantially 
between sects, schools, states and cultures.  
 Foods and drinks - Islamic law does not present a 
comprehensive list of pure foods and drinks. However, it 
prohibits: 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
84 
 
o Swine, blood, meat of dead animals and animals 
slaughtered in the name of someone other than 
God89
o Slaughtering an animal in any other way except in the 
prescribed manner of tazkiyah (cleansing) by taking 
God's name, which involves cutting the throat of the 
animal and draining the blood. Causing the animal un-
necessary pain, slaughtering with a blunt blade or 
physically ripping out the esophagus is strictly 
forbidden. Modern methods of slaughter like the 
captive bolt stunning and electrocuting are also 
prohibited. 
.  
o Intoxicants. 
o Liquor and gambling are expressly prohibited in the 
Qur'an, and Sharia law. 
 Judicial matters (including witnesses and forms of 
evidence) - Sharia judicial proceedings have significant 
differences with other legal traditions, including those in 
both common law and civil law. Sharia courts do not 
generally employ lawyers; plaintiffs and defendants 
represent themselves. Non-Muslim minorities, however, 
could and did use Sharia courts, even amongst themselves. 
• Adab (morals and manners) - Adab, in the context of behaviour, 
refers to prescribed Islamic etiquette: "refinement, good 
manners, morals, decorum, decency, humaneness". Islam has 
rules of etiquette and an ethical code involving every aspect of 
life. Muslims refer to Adab as good manners, courtesy, respect, 
and appropriateness, covering acts such as entering or exiting a 
washroom, posture when sitting, and cleansing oneself. 
Practitioners of Islam are generally taught to follow some specific 
customs in their daily lives. It includes customs like: 
 Saying Bismillah (in the name of God) before eating and 
drinking.  
                                                          
89 The prohibition of dead meat is not applicable to fish and locusts. Also hadith literature prohibits 
beasts having sharp canine teeth, birds having claws and talons in their feet, Jallalah (animals whose 
meat carries a stink in it because they feed on filth), tamed donkeys, and any piece cut from a living 
animal. 
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 Using the right hand for drinking and eating.  
 Saying "As-Salamu Alaykum" (peace be upon you) when 
meeting someone and answering with "Wa 'alaikumus 
salam" (and peace be upon you).  
 Saying "Alhamdulillah" (all gratitude is for only God) when 
sneezing and responding with "Yarhamukallah" (God have 
mercy on you).  
 Saying the "Adhan" (prayer call) in the right ear of a 
newborn and the Iqama in its left.  
 In the sphere of hygiene, it includes:  
o Clipping the moustache  
o Cutting nails  
o Circumcising the male offspring  
o Cleaning the nostrils, the mouth, and the teeth and  
o Cleaning the body after urination and defecation  
 Abstention from sexual relations during the menstrual 
cycle and the puerperal discharge, and ceremonial bath 
after the menstrual cycle, and Janabah (seminal/ovular 
discharge or sexual intercourse).  
 Burial rituals include funeral prayer of bathed and 
enshrouded body in coffin cloth and burying it in a grave.  
• I'tiqadat (beliefs) – Muslims enumerate their creed to include the 
six articles of belief. There is a consensus on the elements of this 
creed across all spectrums as they are clearly articulated in the 
Qur’an. Sectarian differences between Shiites and Sunnis are 
often expressed in differences in braches or elaboration of creedal 
beliefs as opposed to the core creed (aqidah).  
The six articles of belief are: 
 Belief in God (Allah) the one and only one worthy of all 
worship (tawhid). 
 Belief in the Angels (mala’ika). 
 Belief in the Books (katab) sent by Allah (including the 
Qur’an). 
 Belief in all Messengers (rusul) sent by Allah. 
 Belief in the Day of Judgement (qiyama) and in the 
resurrection (life after death). 
 Belief in Destiny (qadar). 
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In Sunni and Shia view, having an Imam literally means to have 
belief in this six articles. Islam explicitly asserts that belief should 
be maintained in that which cause proven using faculties of 
perception and conception. 
 
• 'Uqubat (punishments) - the Islamic penal system is just one of 
many branches of Sharia. In an Islamic state, punishment follows a 
long series of prohibitory and reformatory steps where all efforts 
are made to engender attitudes of contempt for crime and 
eliminate all the root 'causes'. Islam, being cognizant of human 
conditions, provides for this when it divides its penal penalties in 
three categories: 
 hudood (singular haad) meaning a thing which restrains or 
prevents since a punishment "prevents a man from doing 
crimes". However, it is a strictly defined penalty which is 
mentioned in the Qur'an or the Hadith and it includes 
adultery, fornication, false imputation of unchastity 
(qadhf), drunkenness, armed robbery, sedition and 
apostasy, though there are some disagreements on 
whether one or two are technically described as 'hudood'. 
Because of "the decisive nature of haad, its severity and its 
exactness and its strictness in the rules of evidence", it has 
"considerably limited the severest penalties".  
 qisas (equitable retribution), is inflicted for deliberate 
killing or wounding of a person. Unlike haad, the penalty 
could be waived by the victim or his heir in lieu of blood-
money (diya), but for unintentional homicide or wounding 
there is no retribution and only compensation is paid.  
 ta'zeer (discretionary punishment) and it is "a sentence or 
punishment whose measure is not fixed by the Sharia 
neither as to the offence nor the penalty. It helps to meet 
varying circumstances (e.g. if a definitional element is short 
in a haad offence) and the punishment that was generally 
inflicted in the past was whipping, though other 
alternatives such as a warning, fines and imprisonment 
could be given, but the quantum of punishment for ta'zeer 
is generally much below that of haad (e.g. ten lashes). 
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Sharia recognizes 3 types of punishment: 
 Lashing - Among the hudood punishments, the offences of 
fornication, slander and drunkenness carry the penalty of 
lashing and it could also be prescribed for a number of 
ta'zeer offences. Even with respect to lashing at the time of 
sentencing, certain conditions and restrictions are 
imposed; the punishment should not be inflicted by vicious 
executioners and it should not be carried out in severe hot 
or cold weather. It is also prescribed that the whip be of 
medium size, the lashing is done with average intensity and 
it should not be inflicted on the naked body nor on the 
head, face and private parts and the lashing should not 
cause any wound and it should be distributed evenly in 
various parts of the body and not only on the same parts. 
 Stoning - This is the most severe of all the punishments 
that exist in Islamic law. Islamic law aims to ensure the 
stability of society from its very base - the family - which is 
the 'nucleus' of society that breeds society's values and 
holds together the various institutions in society. Chastity is 
highly esteemed as a supreme virtue in Islamic societies 
and zina, the unlawful sexual union between a man and a 
woman who are not married to each other, is 
unacceptable.  Zina is the most deadly of all social crimes. 
For fornication between unmarried couples the penalty is 
100 lashes and for adultery between married couples the 
penalty is stoning to death (rajm).  
 Mutilating - In Islamic law, its application is only confined 
to the hudood punishments for armed robbery and theft, 
except of course that it might be applicable to the 
retributive punishments of qisas. However, under Islamic 
law, the type of theft (sariqah) that invokes the haad 
punishment is very restrictive in scope and is more akin to 
'burglary. Even with that restrictive definition of theft, "all 
elements of the crime must be committed by one person" 
and all the definitional elements of theft must be there 
such as the following:  
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1. it is committed intentionally by a sane and mature 
person who is not driven by force of circumstances (e.g. 
poverty); 
2. the property must lawfully belong to another and have 
some value, that the value of the stolen property 
reaches a minimum value of 3 or 10 dirhams and the 
property must have been taken from a sufficiently 'safe' 
place or proximity suitable for the safety of the object; 
3. the act of stealing must be attested by at least two 
witnesses who physically saw the crime being 
committed. 
Several of these severe penalties were administered under the 
rule of the Taliban – but very often in a total unjustified extent – 
therefore these punishments are not generally accepted anymore 
by the moderate Afghans. 
Based on Qur'anic verses, classic Sharia distinguishes between Muslims, 
pagans, and the followers of other monotheistic religions90. Jews and Christians 
have been afforded a special status known as dhimmi, derived from a theoretical 
contract - "dhimma" or "residence in return for taxes". There are parallels for this 
in Roman and Jewish law. Hindus were originally considered pagans and given the 
choice between conversion to Islam and death (or slavery)91. By the middle Ages, 
the Hindus of India had come to be considered dhimmis by their Muslim rulers. 
Eventually, the largest school of Islamic scholarship applied this term to all non-
Muslims living in Islamic lands outside the sacred area surrounding Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia. Sharia attributes different legal rights to different groups; in practice, this 
consists of less right for non-Muslims.  
 
Afghan general perspective / view on interpersonal relationship 
Interpersonal relationships are of the utmost importance in Afghanistan and 
accomplish a great deal in any business or political transaction. Collective 
history and mutual understanding are mandatory for effective interpersonal 
relationships.  Loyalty is very important while insults (in any form) to 
character or family are far more offensive than to property or possessions. 
                                                          
90 Often referred to as "people of The Book”. 
91 Pagans are not afforded the rights and protections of the dhimma contract. 
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At the same time, because of the numbers of refugees who fled the country 
and spent many years in neighbouring countries with different value 
systems, followed by an influx of foreigners and western media to 
Afghanistan there has been  somewhat of a loss of traditional Afghan values 
and culture, leaving many Afghans negotiating a new Afghan identity. 
 
Family 
Although variations may exist between ethnic groups and those 
practicing different modes of subsistence, the family remains the single most 
important institution in Afghan society. Characteristically, the Afghan family is 
endogamous (with parallel and cross-cousin marriages preferred), patriarchal 
(authority vested in male elders), patrilineal (inheritance through the male line), 
and patrilocal (girl moves to husband's place of residence on marriage). Polygamy 
(multiple wives) is permitted, but is no longer so widely practiced. 
Within families there is a tendency toward respect for age, male or 
female, reverence for motherhood, eagerness for children, especially sons, and 
avoidance of divorce. Rigorously honoured ideals emphasizing family 
cohesiveness through extended kinship networks endow the family with its 
primary function as a support system. 
The extended family, the major economic and social unit in the society, 
replaces government because of the absence of an adequate nation-wide service 
infrastructure. Child socialization takes place within the family because of 
deficiencies in the education system. Thus, individual social, economic and 
political rights and obligations are found within the family which guarantees 
security to each man and woman, from birth to death. 
The strength of this sense of family solidarity has been amply evident 
throughout the past years of disruption. Although families may be split and now 
reside on separate continents a world apart, those that are more affluent 
regularly send remittances to less fortunate family members. Many urban Afghan 
refugee families in Pakistan would otherwise be totally destitute. Similarly, newly 
arrived refugees always find shelter with families already established in Pakistan. 
At times, single family living spaces will be stretched to accommodate up to 
twenty new persons because family members cannot be turned away. Similar 
obligations extend to finding employment for relatives. This at times leads to the 
blatant nepotism which plagues the aid assistance network in Pakistan. 
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This is not to say that no tensions exist within the extended family 
system. Fierce competition over authority, inheritance, and individual aspirations 
do develop. The violent enmity that rises between cousins, for example, 
particularly over the selection of brides, is so often present that it has become a 
favourite theme of countless songs and folktales. 
In Afghanistan extended families are characterized by residential unity 
being it in a valley, a village or a single compound. Extended family households 
may contain three to four generations including the male head of family and his 
wife, his brothers, several sons and their families, cousins with their families, as 
well as all unmarried and widowed females. Nuclear family households 
geographically grouped within extended family settings are also common. These 
will frequently accommodate elderly grandparents and single or widowed aunts. 
No matter how they may be spaced, these multigenerational units practice close 
economic cooperation and come together on all life-crisis occasions. This permits 
cohesive in-group solidarity to be maintained. 
The core of the family consists of the mother-in-law, the daughters-in-
law and daughters, with the senior woman reigning at the top of the power 
hierarchy within the household. In families with multiple wives, each wife has her 
own room, with her own belongings and furnishings; sometimes her own cooking 
space is provided. The courtyard provides space for joint household activities and 
entertainment. 
The practice of taking more than one wife became less and less prevalent 
over the past few decades. Few men could afford to do so. Barrenness and a 
failure to produce sons are common reasons for its continuation. Barrenness is a 
frightening social stigma, not only for wives but for her family as well. Most men 
feel obliged to rectify the situation, but because divorce is so repugnant the 
option of a second wife is preferred by all. 
In other cases, multiple wives are taken in order to fulfil familial 
obligations to provide unmarried kin or young widows with a home and security. 
Although the institution of the levirate in which a widow is married, with or 
without her consent, to a member of her deceased husband's family is explicitly 
forbidden in the Qur’an, it functions traditionally to stabilize family identification 
and ensure economic security. By the 1960s the levirate had all but ceased to 
function in many areas, but it was increasingly employed after 1978 because of 
the unprecedented number of war widows. The vulnerability of widows too young 
to have established a commanding status in the family hierarchy is more 
frequently addressed through the levirate today than in pre-exodus Afghanistan. 
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While male authority in the family is paramount in all groups, some 
important differences in male-female interrelations can be noted within rural and 
urban environments. In the rural areas interrelated responsibilities between men 
and women establish a bond of partnership that builds mutual respect. One highly 
important family activity performed by rural women that is often overlooked is 
their management of family food supplies. A woman, often an elderly member of 
the household, receives the household's supply of grain following the harvest. She 
must make sure that this supply of the family's basic food staple is apportioned 
correctly over the year until the next harvest comes in. Otherwise the family must 
go into debt, or starve. Household management and responsibility for the 
upbringing of children thus give rural women considerable authority in their 
domestic sphere. 
By contrast, in traditional urban lower and middle class homes men daily 
leave the house to work at jobs with which women are not involved and about 
which they have little knowledge or interest. These women are consequently 
more rigidly relegated to purely domestic duties of serving husbands and caring 
for children. Remarkable changes took place among middle class and elite families 
after 1959 when the government supported the voluntary end to seclusion for 
women. Women sought education and moved into the public sphere in ever 
increasing numbers. Nevertheless, working women are still expected to socialize 
within the family, not with their colleagues at work. 
The innate belief in male superiority provides an ideological basis for the 
acceptance of male control over families. Socially circumscribed and male 
determined roles open to women are believed necessary to maintain social order, 
and when women do not appear to be controlled in traditional ways, as, for 
example, when they take up unusual public career or behavioural roles, this is 
taken as a danger sign heralding social disintegration. Life crisis decisions about 
education, careers and marriage are, therefore, made by male family members. 
Embodied in the acceptance of the male right to control decisions on 
female behaviour is the dual concept of male prestige and family honour. Any 
evidence of independent female action is regarded as evidence of lost male 
control and results in ostracism, which adversely affects the entire family's 
standing within the community. Community pressures thus make women 
dependent on men, even among modernized urban families. On the other hand, 
since the construction of family and male reputations, notably their much valued 
honour, depends upon the good behaviour of women, women derive a certain 
amount of leverage within family relationships from their ability to damage family 
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prestige through subtle nonconformist behaviour, such as simply failing to 
provide adequate hospitality, or a lack of rectitude within the home. 
Afghan society places much emphasis on hospitality and the rules of 
etiquette that distinguish good behaviour toward guests. By disregarding social 
niceties a person diminishes the reputation of both the immediate family and the 
extended family or group. Conversely, families gain respect, maintain status and 
enhance their standing in the community through exemplary behaviour. 
Since the family is so central to the lives of men, women and children, 
and since women's roles are pivotal to family well-being, the selection of spouses 
is of prime concern. The preferred spouse is a close relative or at least within a 
related lineage; the ideal being the father's brother's daughter, or first cousin, 
although this is not always feasible. In reality the process is far more complicated 
and involves a multiplicity of considerations, including strengthening group 
solidarity, sustaining social order, confirming social status, enhancing wealth and 
power or economic and political standing, increasing control over resources, 
resolving disputes, and compensating for injury and death. 
Within this complicated web governing marriage negotiations, other 
factors must also be taken into account such as sectarian membership, ethnic 
group, family status, kin relationships, and economic benefits. The bride's skills, 
industriousness and temperament are also considered and, with all, the 
happiness and welfare of the girl is often not neglected. 
Although endogamous marriage is prevalent in all groups, marriages 
between ethnic groups have always occurred. Over the past few decades these 
have increased because large populations have settled outside their ancestral 
areas, communication networks have improved and industrial complexes have 
drawn workers from many areas. In addition, political and economic changes 
occasioned by these developments shifted the balance of various types of 
productive resources and this led to forging marital links between unrelated and 
previously unconnected groups for benefits other than expressions of status. 
Except in cases in which the institution of marriage is manipulated for 
political and economic purposes, female family members initiate the elaborate 
process of betrothal through their own women's networks. Men are generally not 
involved in the initial stages although sometimes a son will elicit the support of his 
mother; sometimes a brother will bring about a match for his sister with one of 
his friends, or even a young man she has observed from the rooftop of her home. 
Brother-sister bonds are very strong. 
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Men enter the process in order to set the financial agreements before 
the engagement is announced. These entail the transfer of money, property or 
livestock from the groom's family to the bride's family. The large sums frequently 
demanded should not be seen only as evidence of avaricious fathers. Brides gain 
status according to the value set for them; too meagre sums devalue both father 
and bride in the eyes of their community. Islam does not prescribe such a bride-
price, but does enjoin the giving of mahr in the form of money or property for the 
personal use of the bride so that her financial welfare may be ensured in the 
event of divorce. Islamic law does not include the concept of alimony. 
In many cases, however, the bride fails to receive her legitimate portion 
of the marriage settlement. This causes friction, and cases concerning inheritance 
are frequently brought before the urban family courts, to which rural women 
seldom have access. In addition, because exorbitant sums are often demanded, 
many men are unable to marry until they are older. Very young girls, therefore, 
are frequently married with much older men. As a result young widowhood is 
common, giving rise to the practice of the levirate described above. Under normal 
circumstances, however, girls are married while in their teens to boys in their 
mid-twenties. Cases of child marriage, however, are not unknown. 
Every marriage entails two exchanges. The dowry brought by the bride to 
her husband's home normally equals the value of the bride-price. It includes 
clothing, bedding and household utensils which are expected to last the couple 
for fifteen years. Most importantly, the quality of the dowry often influences the 
treatment and status accorded the bride on her arrival at her husband's home. A 
majority of the items are made by the girl, in cooperation with her female 
relatives and friends. The preparation of the bridal hope chest, therefore, 
constitutes a crucial female activity in every home. The trousseau of embroidered, 
woven and tailored items is important to the prestige of both families and must 
be as impressive as possible. 
The ratio of inheritance is two to one in favour of males; a wife receives 
one-third of her son's shares. In practice, women are often denied their rightful 
inheritance, again causing tensions not only within nuclear families, but among 
kin groups of the wife as well. 
Various tribal and ethnic groups follow practices which are not strictly 
consistent with Islamic law. Past governments have sought to institutionalize 
social reforms pertaining to the family for over one hundred years. Using the 
dictates of Islam, Afghan monarchs since Emir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) have 
decreed and legislated against child marriages, forced marriages, the levirate and 
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exorbitant bride-prices. They upheld hereditary rights of women, authorized 
women to receive the mahr for their personal use, and supported the right of 
women to seek divorce under certain circumstances such as non-support, 
maltreatment and impotency. 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on family 
Afghan life revolves around family, including extended family. Families often 
live together, with parents living with their sons and their families in one 
compound. The women of the family care for the home and children and the 
grandmother delegates domestic chores. In the home, women have 
significant power but little in public. Children are considered a blessing from 
God and elders are highly respected and cared for. Marrying, raising children, 
funerals and all other life events are collective. 
 
Tribe 
Tribalism is not a feature of every ethnic group in Afghanistan; and even 
within tribally organized groups, tribalism is a flexible concept that allows 
variations to exist and changes to occur as kinship groups rise and fall. 
Tribal identity which merges with ethnicity rests on unified genealogies 
consisting of descendants of a common male ancestor whose name often 
provides the name of the group. Internal divisions consist of the descendants of 
intermediate descendants of the original founder. Thus an entire tribe may 
descend from a man ten or more generations in the past. Smaller segmented 
patrilineages composed of great-grandsons and grandsons form units of residence 
and strong personal loyalty. 
Although preferred marriages for males are to father's brother's 
daughters, genealogies reflect political, economic and social alliances outside 
strict descent lines. Typically, it is men from dominant groups who will seek to 
marry with females outside their own ethnic group. 
The Pashtuns represent the largest tribal entities in Afghanistan; among 
them tribal institutions are strongest within the Ghilzai. Common characteristics 
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of Pashtun tribal organization ideally feature egalitarianism, democratic decision-
making through councils called jirga or shura92
Gender Roles 
.  
The aristocratic elites, who lead subdivisions, raise to their positions 
primarily through personal charisma, patronage, and leadership abilities rather 
than by primogeniture, which is not recognized in Muslim law, or any type of 
prescribed hereditary rights. Tribal organization is therefore a cephalous or 
without a paramount chief. And the measure of their power differs. Heads of 
nomadic tribal groups, for instance, act principally as spokesmen, but have no 
right to make decisions binding on others. 
The absence of recognized principles governing the assumption of 
leadership allows for intense competition. Rivalries within and between tribal 
segments and between tribes and sub-tribes consequently have always existed. It 
is these internecine feuds that have earned the Pashtuns their reputation as an 
unruly and warlike people. Nonetheless, when outside forces threaten, the 
Pashtuns are equally reputed for their ability to forge formidable alliances, among 
themselves and with other ethnic groups. 
Both internal as well as inter-group conflicts are most often rooted in 
matters of personal and group honour, personal enmities, family dissensions 
concerning brides and property, struggles for material possession, access to 
resources, territorial integrity and extensions of power, rather than in intrinsic 
attitudes of ethnic discrimination. 
 
Afghan society is consistent in its attitudes toward the underlying 
principles of gender. It is the application of these principles that varies from group 
to group; and there is a wide range of standards set for accepted female 
behaviour, as well as differences in male attitudes toward correct treatment of 
women. Contradictions arise between traditional customary practices, many of 
which impinge on the rights of women and are alien to the spirit of Islam, the 
other functioning canon which emphasizes equality, justice, education and 
community service for both men and women. Further, the dictates of Islam are 
themselves subject to diverse interpretation among reformists, Islamists and 
ultraconservatives. Debates between these groups can be highly volatile. 
                                                          
92 During the jirga a decision has to be made. Shura allows only discussion on certain topic and does 
not require a decision.  
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Differences between men and women exist and are best preserved 
through recognized standards of behaviour. None dispute the centrality of 
women in the society. Respect for women is a notable characteristic and few wish 
to destroy this esteemed status, nor deny what Islam enjoins or Afghan culture 
values. The argument rages over definitions of precisely what constitutes 
honourable behaviour for women in terms of modern realities, especially in the 
light of today's monumental reconstruction needs which demand full 
participation from every Afghan citizen. 
The current zealous need to protect women's morality stems from the 
fact that Afghan society regards women as the perpetuators of the ideals of the 
society. As such they symbolize honour of family, community and nation and must 
be controlled as well as protected so as to maintain moral purity. By imposing 
strict restraints directly on women, the society's most sensitive component 
symbolizing male honour, authorities convey their intent to subordinate personal 
autonomy and thereby strengthen the impression that they are capable of 
exercising control over all aspects of social behaviour, male and female. 
The practice of purdah, seclusion93, including veiling, is the most visible 
manifestation of this attitude. This concept includes an insistence on separate 
spaces for men and women and proscriptions against interactions between the 
sexes outside the mahrammat94
Afghan women view their sexuality more positively and question male 
maturity and self-control. In reality the differences between private and public 
behaviour are significant. In private, there is a noticeable sharing of ideas and 
responsibilities and in many households individual charisma and strength of 
character surmounts conventional subordinate roles. Even moral misconduct can 
be largely overlooked until it becomes a matter of public knowledge. Then 
punishment must be severe for male and family honour must be vindicated. It is 
. These restrictions severely limit women's 
activities, including access to education and employment outside the home. Many 
are largely confined to their homes. Such restrictions are deemed necessary by 
conservative males because they consider women socially immature, with less 
moral control and physical restraint; women's hyper sexuality precludes 
responsible behaviour. Consequently, women are untrustworthy and must be 
kept behind the curtain so as not to disrupt the social order. The need for their 
seclusion therefore is paramount. 
                                                          
93 In Persian, literally meaning curtain. 
94 Acceptable male guardians such as father, brother son, and any other male with whom women may 
not marry. 
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the public image that counts. As a result, urban women are models of reticence in 
public and rural women appear properly submissive. 
That a family's social position depends on the public behaviour of its 
female members is a guiding reality. Stepping outside prescribed roles and 
behavioural norms, publicly, results in moral condemnation and social ostracism. 
It is the dictates of society that place a burden on both men and women to 
conform. 
Under such circumstances gender roles necessarily follow defined paths. 
Male prerogatives reside in family economic welfare, politics, and relationships 
with outsiders; within the family they are expected to be disciplinarians and 
providers for aged parents. Female roles stress motherhood, child socialization 
and family nurturing. Even among professional career women, family 
responsibilities remain a top priority. Thus women's self-perception of their roles, 
among the majority, urban and rural, contributes to the perpetuation of 
patriarchal values. 
Within the vast store of Afghan folktales covering religion, history and 
moral values, many reinforce the values governing male and female behaviour. 
They illustrate what can or cannot be done, describe rewards and punishments, 
and define ideal personality types. Thus they serve to perpetuate the existing 
gender order and through example make it psychologically satisfying. 
The status and power of a girl increases as she moves from child to bride 
to mother to grandmother. A successful marriage with many sons is the principal 
goal of Afghan women, wholeheartedly shared by Afghan men. Women's 
nurturing roles are also crucial. This does not mean that women are confined to 
domestic roles. The stereotyping of Afghan women as chattel living lives of 
unremitting labour, valued by men solely for sexual pleasure and reproductive 
services is patently false. 
Women's work varies from group to group. Among most settled rural 
families, women participate in agricultural work only during light harvesting 
periods, and are responsible for the production of milk products. 
Although statistics indicate that by 1978 women were joining the 
workforce in increasing numbers, only about eight percent of the female 
population received an income. Most of these women lived in urban centres, and 
the majority were professionals, technicians and administrators employed by the 
government which continued its strong support. A majority worked in health and 
education, the two sectors considered most appropriate for women as they are 
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extensions of traditional women's roles. Others worked in the police, the army, 
and with the airlines; in government textile, ceramic, food processing and prefab 
construction factories. A few worked in private industry; a few were self-
employed. 
The current revival of conservative attitudes toward appropriate extra 
domestic roles for women and the criticism of women's visibility in public have 
largely impacted these professional women. Islamic texts do not delineate roles 
for women. What they imply is open to interpretation. What they command is 
equality and justice guaranteeing that women be treated as in no way lesser than 
men. Educated Afghan women are standing fast in their determination to find 
ways in which they may participate in the nation's reconstruction according to 
their interpretations of Islam's tenets. This is a powerful challenge now facing the 
society. 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on gender roles 
While gender roles are clearly defined in Afghanistan and especially in the 
most religiously conservative and illiterate families, this area is perhaps the 
most stereotyped segment of Afghan society and therefore, prone to 
numerous misunderstandings. The extent to which public gender roles are 
influenced by a particular government depends to a large degree on how 
religiously conservative a government is; Islam and its various interpretations 
are perhaps the most significant factors dictating gender roles in 
Afghanistan. In the 1960s and early 1970s, especially in the large urban 
centres, women were very “free”; miniskirts were acceptable as was 
employment outside the home and male-female socializing. The much more 
conservative period under the Taliban however, resulted in the suppression 
of this type of interaction.  
Gender roles in the privacy of the family are not as strictly defined as the 
public gender roles. In the family and home, women are given great 
responsibility and motherhood is highly regarded. Despite otherwise defined 
roles, there is room for women who extend their influence outside of the 
typical roles, such as the few, but highly respected, women tribal leaders or 
military personal. 
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Recreation 
Afghans are competitive and love sports, although only men are allowed 
to play sports. Popular sports include soccer, wrestling, and field hockey. Afghan 
refugees returning to Afghanistan are introducing more sports, including tennis, 
golf, cricket, and basketball. 
Cricket teams have been organized in several cities. 
Traditional sports are also widely played. Buzkashi is an ancient game 
that originated in central Asia. It is most popular in northern Afghanistan, where 
the Uzbeks are considered buzkashi champions. 
In the game, teams of men on horseback attempt to gain possession of a 
headless animal carcass (usually that of a calf), carry it from the centre of the field 
to a post, and then return it to the centre. Opposing teams attempt to stop the 
player with possession with whips and other means of physical force. Horses are 
specially trained for buzkashi, and players must have excellent riding ability to 
master the sport. 
Another traditional sport in Afghanistan is pahlwani, a form of wrestling 
that is usually held alongside buzkashi matches. The sport entails an individual 
pinning an opponent to the ground without touching his legs. Boys and young 
men also play a game consisting of two teams of players with linked arms. They 
face each other, and one person runs across trying to break through the other 
team. 
Afghan children, including girls, enjoy playing tag, hopscotch, and 
marbles. Snowball fights are popular in the winter. Kite fighting is also a popular 
game for children. Kites are made with bamboo sticks and tissue paper and flown 
across the sky attempting to cut the lines of other kites. Some competitive kite 
fighters soak the kite line in glue and glass to make their stings sharper. Gursai is a 
rural sport where children hold their left feet with their right hands and hop 
around trying to throw each other off balance. 
Singing and dancing is popular in Afghanistan. Instead of dancing with a 
partner, Afghans dance alone or in circles. Teahouses are popular among men, 
where they talk, listen to music, and drink tea. Men also gamble on animal 
fighting, usually roosters. Music is represented chiefly by traditional folk songs, 
ballads, and dances.  
Among the stringed instruments, the six-stringed rohab is thought to be 
the ancestor to the Western violin and cello. Other instruments include the santur 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
100 
 
(a kind of zither), a hand-pumped harmonium, the chang (a plucked mouth harp), 
and a variety of drums beaten with the palm and fingers. The attan dance derived 
from Pashtun areas is the national dance. It is performed in a large circle with the 
dancers clapping their hands and quickening the movements of their feet to the 
beat of the music. On vacation holidays or weekends Afghans often gather to play 
music and sing at a picnic on a riverbank or in woodland. 
The art of telling stories with music and spoken word has been highly 
developed and passes on traditional folk tales and culture to future generations. 
Four national parks are being established in Afghanistan. Tourism 
companies lead expeditions through the beautiful mountains and valleys of 
Afghanistan. Other attractions include the Minaret of Jam, which was built in the 
12th century and is on the UNESCO world heritage list and Buddhist ruins from the 
4th century. 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on recreation 
Part of leisure time activities include storytelling, music, dance, sport 
(taekwondo has become highly popular in recent years), kite flying and 
buzkashi. Dog fights and cock fights, camel fighting fights are also popular. 
Mehimonie, or visiting, is also very important and most weekends include 
visits to one’s friends and relatives. Receiving guests well is very important 
and one must always be prepared to serve anything from a light snack and 
tea to a full meal to any guests who grace one’s home. 
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GOVERNANCE 
 
Community Councils 
At present in Afghanistan there are two separate decisions making 
bodies that should help a local population to meet their basic needs. There are 
community councils and the centralized system of local government. 
A variety of community councils exist throughout Afghanistan, with 
considerable variation between regions and between rural and urban areas. 
Traditionally, an Afghan jirga or shura is a place where all the men in the 
community can meet to discuss issues of mutual interest. Its membership is not 
fixed, but varies from one meeting to the next; in principle, all adult men have the 
right to attend. The members would be mainly elders and people with religious 
knowledge, as well as those who have economic power or social power. 
 
The State 
Those Afghan rulers who attempted to rapidly introduce models of 
strong, direct rule; whether democratic or dictatorial, consistently found 
themselves without sufficient political support from the periphery. Many 
contentious struggles raged about the creation of the nation-state. Although 
Ahmad Shah Durrani set the stage for Pashtun dominance, his successors lacked 
both his personal charisma and his leadership abilities. His son, Timur Shah (1772 
– 1783), further compounded the problem by leaving behind 23 sons born of 
wives from ten different tribes without designating a successor. Similarly, the next 
charismatic leader to consolidate the area, Emir Dost Mohammad (1834-38; 1842-
63) left 20 sons to fight for the throne. Violent episodes involving individual 
quests for power characterized much of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
With the advent of Emir Abdur Rahman (1880 – 1901), a grandson of 
Emir Dost Mohammad and the first real Afghan state builder, the situation 
changed dramatically. Emir Abdur Rahman utilized his powerful personality in 
combination with adroit politics and judicious use of financial subsidies and 
weaponry provided by the British. To further his ambition to establish a 
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centralized state under his authoritarian control, he created the first standing 
army and relied heavily on the support of his own Mohammadzai section of the 
Barakzai Durrani, to whom he granted annual allowances. Thus he raised the 
Mohammadzai to a privileged group and reduced the power of the tribal Sardars. 
At his death in 1901 he was succeeded by his son without the usual violent 
upheavals. His strategies were successful because they involved brute force and 
violence, instruments unavailable to modern-day peace builders. 
The most contentious issues between the Afghan state and society in the 
20th century were policies concerning the rights of women, conscription, marriage 
customs, and secular education, issues deeply rooted in Afghan cultural values 
and the social framework of Islam. State institution building was met with 
periodic open revolts such as that of the eastern Pashtuns which ended the rule 
of King Amanullah in 1929. He instituted reforms that delineated citizenship, 
nationality, and the rule of law in order to make real the link between the capital 
and the rest of the country. The PDPA communist regime of the late 1970s most 
radically reframed the Afghan state, inserting itself into the social, economic, and 
family lives of the Afghan people in unprecedented fashion. Both Amanullah and 
the communists eventually met with extraordinary resistance from peripheral 
elites as well as ordinary citizens. The reaction to the communist regime and the 
subsequent Soviet invasion resulted in a profound crisis for the state society 
relationship and an eventual plunge into decades of civil war. 
Most historic recollections of the state in Afghanistan focus on these 
highly turbulent periods of ambitious state building. But the mid-twentieth 
century involved several decades of rule by the Musahiban kings, whose approach 
to governing involved fairly limited intrusion on the part of the central state into 
the lives of its citizens. King Nadir (1929 – 1933) restored the pre-eminence of 
central Mohammadzai control with tribal assistance. These rulers had witnessed 
the radical and costly state building approach of their predecessor, Amanullah, 
and chose a different set of strategies. Nadir Shah, his brothers and, eventually, 
his son, Zahir Shah, pursued a limited state-building strategy, one that kept the 
state’s role in the realm of conflict management, dispute resolution, and other 
matters of social or private concern minimal. Direct taxation and troop 
conscription, two of the more intrusive instruments of the state, either vanished 
or were mediated by local power holders. The state’s legitimacy as a governing 
agent involved the following set of essential, but limited, activities: “keep the 
peace, administer justice, see that conscription went smoothly, and collect small 
amounts of taxes.” Afghan communities kept control over and set limits on the 
state’s role in their lives, and informal power holders maintained a prominent role 
in the social and political lives of the population. Nevertheless, even this period 
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endured several secessionist struggles, including the Safi Rebellion (1945-46), a 
Pashtun revolt in Kandahar (1959), and an Islamist uprising in the Panjshir Valley 
(1975). 
The 1964 constitution, upon which the 2004 document is largely based, 
advanced the idea of direct and responsive statehood, but, in reality, the regime 
continued to have limited reach beyond Kabul and the major provincial centres. 
King Zahir Shah’s constitution promised a new form of participatory politics 
intended to inoculate the regime from growing elite unrest and calls for a more 
open form of government. Unlike the attempts at institution building made today, 
however, this framework did not translate into substantial action on the part of 
the monarchy to encourage formal institutional growth. For most Afghans in the 
countryside, the state continued to represent an institution of last resort in which 
they had limited faith and trust: only if informal institutions (tribal, religious, 
elders) proved unable to address a given problem, would district, provincial, or 
national officials become involved in the politics of daily life. The ever expansive 
visions of the state imposed on the Afghan population by Prime Minister 
Mohammed Daoud Khan and then the communist PDPA regime represented a 
dramatic and ultimately catastrophic departure from the more limited Musahiban 
model. 
Parallels can be drawn between the Musahiban approach to state 
building and that of President Karzai: both administrations gave priority to regime 
preservation and formed pacts with informal power holders who dominated the 
periphery and had the capacity to threaten the state in serious ways. The 
resilience of the Musahiban kings, compared to those who came before and after 
them, offers an interesting lens through which to view the politics of President 
Karzai. 
The most successful model of Afghan governance employed the Swiss cheese 
approach, in which regimes expected their writs to run completely only in the 
most populated and economically prosperous parts of the country. The people in 
the poorer high mountains, steppes, and deserts were left to fend for themselves 
as long as they did not challenge state authorities. If they did, the state resorted 
to a range of weapons well short of direct rule to get them to cease. These 
included support of internal rivals, denial of access to vital urban markets, and 
one-off punitive campaigns designed to emphasize the cost of resistance. The goal 
was to intimidate a population and its leaders into acquiescence without changing 
the existing political structure. It was a strategy that required constant 
maintenance. A change in policy or local mismanagement could quickly turn 
cooperative groups into enemies, but none of these enemies were so beyond the 
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pale that they might be co-opted if the right opportunity presented itself. Rulers 
effectively controlled Afghanistan for many centuries with this model of 
government, and the fall of one regime and its replacement by another rarely 
resulted in chaos since the structure remained intact. 
 
 
Figure 10: Afghan Ethno - Tribal Concepts 
 
Based on Abdur Rahman’s late 19th century success in creating the 
country’s first centralized state, successor Afghan governments developed a taste 
for American cheese models of governance that posited a single rule of law and 
administration. Those regimes which attempted to make theory a reality 
(Amanullah, the PDPA, and the Taliban) experienced state collapse because they 
provoked more opposition than they could handle. By contrast, the long-lived 
Musahiban rulers of Afghanistan maintained fifty years of peace and stability by 
proclaiming their right to rule everywhere in theory, but recognizing that 
enforcing such a vision was neither practicable nor desirable. 
The post 2001 model of government in Afghanistan that attempted to 
restore a direct rule model remains as odds with the realities of Afghanistan, 
especially rural Afghanistan, and the Kabul government lacks the military and 
administrative capacity to implement it. United States and Britain rediscovered 
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the virtues of the indirect approach while seeking to bring order to the Pashtun 
regions in south and east of the country. It was realized that local order could be 
more easily had if negotiated directly with local political leaders, enabling them to 
circumvent the dysfunctional national institutions. 
The interesting observation can be drawn from the modern history of 
state building in Afghanistan; all of the rulers since 1901 neither left in exile nor 
were killed.   
 
Government 
Through differing regimes of widely varying ideologies, Afghanistan’s 
governing structure has historically consisted of a weak central government 
unwilling or unable to enforce significant financial or administrative mandates on 
the 80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. The tribal, clan, village, and district 
political structures that provided governance and security until the late 1970s 
were weakened by decades of subsequent war and Taliban rule. Some traditional 
local authority figures fled or were killed; others were displaced by mujahedin 
commanders, militia leaders, Taliban militants, and others. Traditional elders are 
widely respected, although highly conservative in orientation. The local power 
brokers who emerged from the constant warfare are far less popular and are 
widely accused of selectively applying Afghan law and of using their authority to 
enrich themselves. Some of the traditional tribal councils that have remained 
intact continue to exercise their writ rather than accept the authority of the 
central government or even local government appointees. Still other community 
authorities prefer to accommodate local insurgent commanders (whom they see 
as wayward but not irreconcilable members of the community) rather than help 
the government secure their areas. 
At the national level, Afghanistan had virtually no Western-style 
democratic institutions prior to the international intervention that took place 
after the 11th September 2001, attacks on the United States. There were 
parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah95
                                                          
95 The last were in 1969, before his reign was ended in a 1973 military coup 
, but the parliament 
during that era was not a significant check on presidential power. The elected 
institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban 
transition roadmap established by a United Nations sponsored agreement of 
major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on 5th December 2001, (the 
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“Bonn Agreement”), after the Taliban had fallen. Karzai is the first directly elected 
president in Afghan history. 
Some believe that the elements of Western-style democracy introduced 
since 2001 are supported by traditional Afghan patterns of decision making that 
have some democratic and representative elements. Meetings called shuras, or 
jirgas (consultative councils) often composed of designated notables, are key 
mechanisms for making authoritative decisions or dispensing justice. Some of 
these mechanisms are practiced by Taliban members in areas under their control. 
On the other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing mechanisms 
that resist change and modernization, generally minimize the role of women, and 
do not meet international standards of democratic governance. At the national 
level, the convening of a loya jirga, an assembly consisting of about 1,500 
delegates from all over Afghanistan, has been used on several occasions. In the 
post-Taliban period, loya jirgas have been convened to endorse Karzai’s 
leadership, to adopt a constitution, and to back long-term defence relations with 
the IC. 
A major peace jirga was held on 2nd – 4th June 2010, to review 
government plans to offer incentives for insurgent fighters to end their armed 
struggle and rejoin society. 
Afghan governing capacity has increased significantly since the Taliban 
regime fell in late 2001, but many positions, particularly at the local level, are 
unfilled or the governing function performed by unaccountable power brokers. It 
is believed that weak governance is causing some Afghans to acquiesce to, or 
even support, Taliban insurgents as providers of security and impartial justice. 
Since 2007, in line with those Afghan public perceptions, the IC and Afghan focus 
has been on reforming and reducing corruption within the central government, 
and on expanding local governance. 
 
Afghanistan’s government 
Afghanistan’s government is an Islamic republic consisting of three 
branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The constitution went into effect on 
4th January 2004. Afghanistan’s first national democratic presidential election was 
held on 9th October 2004. All laws must comply with Islam. Equal rights are 
guaranteed to women. Suffrage is universal at age 18. 
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Executive Branch 
The president is the most powerful post; he is the chief of state and the 
head of the government. Two vice presidents serve under the president. The 
president and vice presidents are elected to 5-year terms by popular vote. The 
presidential candidate chooses the two vice presidential candidates to run on his 
ticket. In the first round of voting, if no presidential candidate receives at least 50 
percent of the vote, the two candidates with the most votes will run in the second 
round. A president cannot be elected for more than two terms. 
Presidential and vice presidential candidates must be at least 40 years of 
age; adhere to Islam; hold only Afghan citizenship; have Afghan parents; and have 
no court convictions of crimes against humanity, criminal acts, or denial of civil 
rights. 
Presidential responsibilities and powers include serving as the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces; enforcing the constitution; assembling 
the Grand Council; signing laws and decrees; and appointing, dismissing, or 
accepting the resignation of members of the Supreme Court, ministers, the 
attorney general, judges, officers of the armed forces, police, national security, 
and high-ranking officials. The following presidential powers require the approval 
of the National Assembly: determining policies of the state, declaring war and 
peace, and declaring or ending a state of emergency. 
The cabinet is composed of 25 ministers. Ministers are appointed by the 
president and approved by the National Assembly. Influential regional and 
military groups are appointed to the ministries. A National Security Council is 
located in the presidential palace complex.  
 
Legislative Branch 
The bicameral National Assembly is composed of a 249-member House 
of Representatives (Wolesi Jirga) and a 102-member senate (Meshrano Jirga). 
Members of the House of Representatives are elected to 5-year terms by popular 
vote. The constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the 
upper house and 68 seats of the 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. 
Members of the senate are elected as follows: the provincial councils appoint 34 
members for 4-year terms, the district councils appoint 34 members for 3-year 
terms, and the president appoints 34 members for 5-year terms. According to the 
constitution, half of the 34 presidential appointees from the senate must be 
women, 2 must represent the Kuchi tribe, and 2 must represent the disabled. 
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Qualifications for National Assembly members include Afghan citizenship 
(citizenship for at least ten years), minimum age of 25 for the House of 
Representatives and 35 for the senate, and no convictions for crimes against 
humanity, criminal acts, or denial of civil rights by a court. 
 
 
Figure 11: Executive and legislative branch structure 
 
The powers of the National Assembly include ratifying, modifying, or 
abolishing laws or legislative decrees; approving plans for economic, social, 
cultural, and technological developments; authorizing the state budget; granting 
acceptance for loans; developing and adapting administrative units; and ratifying 
international treaties and agreements. 
The powers of the House of Representatives include approving appointments and 
accepting or rejecting state development programs and the state budget when 
the House of Representatives and the senate are not in agreement. 
Proposals for laws are introduced by the government and presented to 
the House of Representatives. If a proposed law includes new taxes or a reduction 
in revenues and there is an alternate recommendation, it is included in a working 
agenda. The House approves or rejects the proposal. A proposed law cannot be 
delayed for more than one month. The drafted law is submitted to the Senate 
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after approval from the House. The Senate decides on the draft in 15 days. Laws, 
treaties, and development plans in need of special examination are given priority 
upon request of the government. To be considered by a house, a proposed bill 
must be sponsored by 10 members and approved by one-fifth of that house. 
The government may occasionally convene a Grand Council (Loya Jirga) 
to decide pressing matters of independence, national sovereignty, or territorial 
integrity. The assembly is composed of members of the national assembly and 
chairpersons of the provincial and district councils. The assembly can amend the 
constitution and bring charges against the president. 
 
Judicial Branch 
The judicial branch is made up of a Supreme Court (Stera Mahkama), 
high courts, and appeals courts. The nine members of the Supreme Court are 
appointed to ten-year terms by the president with approval of the House of 
Representatives. Initial appointments for members are as follows: three members 
are appointed for a period of four years, three members for seven years, and 
three members for ten years. Later appointments are for ten years. Members 
only serve one term. The president appoints one member as the Head of the 
Supreme Court. 
Qualification for members of the Supreme Court include Afghan 
citizenship; minimum age of forty; a higher education in law or Islam; adequate 
experience in the Afghan justice system; high ethics and a positive reputation; no 
convictions for crimes against humanity, criminal acts, or deprivation of civil rights 
by the court; and no membership in any political party during their term. 
Judges are appointed by recommendation of the Supreme Court and 
approval from the president. They are responsible for managing the personnel, 
budgets, and policy decisions of the entire national, regional, and local court 
system. 
Although every province has a higher and lower court, the supply of 
trained judges is limited. Most local court officials come from Muslim religious 
schools and lack judicial skills, so judicial procedures are influenced by local 
authorities and traditions. The roles of Islamic and secular law in the new national 
judicial system have not been well established. Much of the current legal code is 
based on laws passed under the last king. In rural areas, where local elders and 
tribal authorities resolve criminal cases, Taliban laws have remained in effect. 
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A National Security Court handles cases of terrorism and other threats to 
national security. A separate Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 
investigates human rights abuses and war crimes. 
 
Local Level 
The local government is divided into 34 provinces: Badakhshan, Badghis, 
Baghlan, Balkh, Bamian, Daikundi, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghowr, Helmand, Herat, 
Jowzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Khowst, Konar, Kunduz, Laghman, Lowgar, 
Nangarhar, Nimruz, Nuristan, Oruzgan, Paktia, Paktika, Panjshir, Parvan, 
Samangan, Sar-e Pol, Takhar, Wardak, and Zabul. Each province is governed by a 
provincial council. Members of the provincial council are elected by popular vote 
every four years. The chief executive of the province is the governor (Wa-lee), 
who is appointed by the president. The provinces are further subdivided into 
districts and sub-districts, headed by appointed mayor (Chief of district or Ha-
k’am). Districts and villages have councils that organize community activities and 
allow people to participate in the local administration. Members of district and 
village councils are elected by popular vote every three years. Municipalities 
administer city affairs. Representative or Head of a village are called Malik (in 
Pashtun area) or Arbab or Qaryadar (in Northern provinces). Head of section in 
municipality area is Kalantar. In a village there is Wakil Gozar (Chief of street); 
civilian person elected by the people to serve as interface between the population 
and government officials. A chief of shopkeepers (Kaa-Lan-tar) could be elected in 
a village to serve as interface between business class and government officials.   
The mayor and members of the municipal councils are elected by popular vote. 
Ethnic differences heavily influence any progress within local government and 
based on historically experience Afghan population in general mistrust local 
governments due to their inability to solve basic problems of population.  
An inseparable component of Afghanistan’s stabilization process is the 
local government reform whose main aim is to improve visibility of government of 
the Islamic republic of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it is mandatory condition for 
establishing real Afghan state; this reform has achieved limited success until now. 
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of 
competent governors in all 34 Afghan provinces. International studies and reports 
all point to the beneficial effects (reduction in narcotics trafficking, economic 
growth, less violence) of some of the strong Afghan civilian appointments at the 
provincial level. However, many of the governors are considered weak, 
ineffective, or corrupt. Still, there are widespread concerns about the governing 
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capacity at the local level96
District governors are appointed by the president, at the 
recommendation of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). In 
some districts there were no district governors in place at all. Some of the district 
governors returned after the expulsion of Taliban militants. The difficulty plaguing 
the expansion of district governance, in addition to security issues, is lack of 
resources. Only about half of all district governors
. One problem noted by governance experts is that the 
role of the elected provincial councils is unclear. The elections for the provincial 
councils in all 34 provinces were held on 20th August 2009, concurrent with the 
presidential elections and the results were certified on 29th December 2009. In 
most provinces, the provincial councils do not act as true legislatures, and they 
are considered weak compared to the power and influence of the provincial 
governors. 
In the relationship between local representatives of the central 
government ministries and district governments, some difficulties have been 
noted. The provincial governors and district governors do not control Afghan 
government funds; all budgeting and budget administration is done through the 
central government, either at ministry headquarters or through provincial offices 
of those ministries. Local officials sometimes disagree on priorities or on 
implementation mechanisms. 
97
As noted throughout, there has traditionally been village-level 
governance by groups of tribal elders and other notables. That structure remains, 
particularly in secure areas, while village councils have been absent or only 
sporadically active in areas where there is combat. The IDLG, with advice from 
India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering localities to decide 
on development priorities by forming Community Development Councils (CDC’s). 
 have any staff or vehicles. No 
elections for district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical 
difficulties. 
Similarly to district governors, mayors of large municipalities are 
appointed as well. There are about 42 mayors nationwide, many with deputy 
mayors. However, no municipal elections have been held and none are scheduled. 
                                                          
96 For example, out of over 200 job slots available for the Qandahar provincial and Qandahar city 
government, only about 30% are filled. In four key districts around Qandahar city, there are 44 
significant jobs, including district governors, but only about 12 officials are routinely present for work. 
As noted above, only a few dozen of the 150 local representative positions of the various ministry 
positions of the central government in Qandahar are filled. Similar percentages are reported in 
neighbouring Helmand Province. 
97 There are 364 districts in Afghanistan 
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Thus far there are about 30,000 CDC’s established and they are eventually to all 
be elected. 
 
The Afghan Civil Service 
The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a 
number of ways, although slowly. There are about 500,000 Afghan government 
employees, and although the majority of them are in the security force, a large 
proportion works in the education sector. 
The IC does not have a broad program in place to train Afghan 
government officials themselves, but instead fund Afghan institutions to conduct 
such training. Issues of standardizing job descriptions, salaries, bonuses, benefits 
and the like are being addressed by Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission. The 
commission redefined more than 80,000 civil servant job descriptions by 2010. 
The Afghan cabinet is drafting a revised civil service law. 
Technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the commission is 
provided under a program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan. One of the 
commission’s subordinate organizations is the Afghan Civil Service Institute, which 
envisions training over 16,000 additional bureaucrats by the end of 2010. 
Many Afghan civil service personnel undergo training in India, building on 
growing relations between Afghanistan and India. Japan and Singapore are also 
training Afghan civil servants on good governance, anti-corruption, and civil 
aviation98. In order to address the problem of international donors luring away 
Afghan talent with higher salaries, Kabul conference99
                                                          
98 Singapore and Germany since 2011 jointly provide technical assistance in the field of civil aviation. 
Some of these programs are conducted in partnership with the German Federal Foreign Office and the 
Asia Foundation. 
99 20th  July 2010 
 included a pledge by the 
Afghan government to reach an understanding with donors on a harmonized 
salary scale for donor funded salaries of Afghan government personnel. 
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POLITICAL ASPECTS 
 
Politics 
Patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, 
region, and other relationships remain. These patterns have been evident in every 
Afghan election since the fall of the Taliban. All candidates, including President 
Karzai, have pursued campaign strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of 
ethnic and geographic votes, although some have also sought to advance specific 
new programs and ideas. The traditional patterns have been even more 
pronounced in province-based campaigns such as those for the provincial councils 
and the parliament. In these cases, electorates100
Ethnic Pashtuns, as the largest single ethnicity, have historically asserted 
a right to rule. Pashtuns are about 42% of the population and, with few 
exceptions, have governed Afghanistan. The sentiment of the “right to lead” is 
particularly strong among Pashtuns of the Durrani tribal confederation, which 
predominates in the south and is a rival to the Ghilzai confederation, which 
predominates in the east
 are small and candidates can 
easily appeal to clan and familial relationships. 
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there 
has been a sense among Afghans that their country now welcomes members of 
all political and ethnic groups and factions. There have been very few incidents of 
ethnic-based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but jealousies over relative 
economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have 
sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes. 
101
                                                          
100 The eligible voters of a specific province 
101 One recent exception was the 1992-1996 presidency of the mujahedin government of Burhanuddin 
Rabbani, a Tajik. President Karzai is a Durrani Pashtun, and his cabinet and inner advisory circle has 
come to be progressively dominated by Pashtuns and to exclude members of the other communities. 
The Taliban government was and its insurgency is composed almost completely of Pashtuns. 
.  
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Political Parties 
One major issue in Afghan political culture is that there is little 
overarching glue that holds factions together. The concept of nation is widely 
held, but not as strongly as are traditional patterns of affiliation. The major 
factions in Afghanistan identify only loosely with Afghanistan’s 110 registered 
political parties, which would serve as an alternate organizing principle for Afghan 
politics. There is a popular aversion to formal “parties” as a perception stemming 
from the war against the Soviet Union when seven mujahedin parties were 
funded by and considered tools of outside parties.  
Some believe that Afghan political parties are weak because the Single, 
Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, in which each voter casts a ballot for only 
one candidate, favours candidates running as independents rather than as 
members of parties. Moreover, Western-style parties are generally identified by 
specific ideologies, ideas, or ideals, while most Afghans, as discussed above, retain 
their traditional affiliations. 
All political parties are required by the Political Parties Law of 2003 to 
register with the Ministry of Justice and confirm that they practice Islam. 
Candidates were not permitted to affiliate with a party in the 2005 parliamentary 
election. Most political groups are based on alliances that formed during the 
military struggles during the past few decades. For example, the Northern Alliance 
is an influential loose confederation of several Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek groups 
who fought against the Taliban. Factions of the alliance became powerful players 
in the parliament of 2006. A key division of political power is between the 
Pashtun-dominated south and the Tajik- and Uzbek-dominated north. 
 
Main Political Parties 
• The Afghan Social Democratic Party or Afghan Nation (Afghan Mellat) is 
a political party with a large following of educated Pashtuns living in 
urban areas of eastern Afghanistan. 
• The Afghanistan’s Islamic Mission Organization (Tanzim-e Dahwat-e 
Islami-ye Afghanistan) is composed of a small group of extremely 
conservative Islamists. Its original name was Islamic Union for the 
Liberation of Afghanistan (Ittihad-e Islami Barai Azadi Afghanistan), 
which was popular in the 1980s and 1990s. This group has substantial 
financial resources and links to Islamists outside Afghanistan, especially 
in the Arab Gulf states. 
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• The Islamic People’s Movement of Afghanistan (Harakat-e Islami-ye 
Mardum-e Afghanistan) is an offshoot of the jihadi parties of the 1980s 
and 1990s, with strong ties to the Shi’ite community of Kabul and 
surrounding provinces. 
• The Islamic Society of Afghanistan (Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan), 
provisionally headed by Salahuddin Rabbani since the 2011 death of his 
father, Burhanuddin Rabbani. It is deeply divided between several 
factions, but remains the dominant party in northern Afghanistan and 
the most active representative of the Tajik ethnic group. 
• The Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye 
Afghanistan) is the successor to a party of the same name that was 
established in 1990 when several Iran-based Shia jihadi parties merged. 
The main supporters of this political party are from the Hazaras ethnic 
group. 
• The Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e 
Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan) is an offshoot of the original Wahdat 
group formed by the merger of Iran-based, Shia jihadi groups. The main 
supporters of this political party are from the Hazaras ethnic group. 
• The National Congress Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Congrae-Mili 
Afghanistan) is a liberal political party that supports the creation of a 
secular and democratic political system in Afghanistan. Its key supporters 
are non-Pashtun, leftist intellectuals. 
• The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Mahaz-e Melli-ye Islami-ye 
Afghanistan) is one of the original jihadi parties of seven Pakistan-based 
groups that fiercely resisted Soviet occupation. This group is popular 
among the Pashtun ethnic group. 
• The National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Junbish-e-Melli-
ye Afghanistan) represents the Uzbek minority. 
• The National Movement of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Nuhzhat-e-Mili 
Afghanistan) is a coalition of 11 political parties that serves as a platform 
for ethnic Tajiks. 
• The New Afghanistan Party (Hizb-e Afghanistan-e Nawin) represents the 
interests of Panjshiri Tajiks. 
• The Youth Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Hambastagi-ye Melli-
ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan) promotes democratic ideas and encourages 
younger people to participate in the government. 
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Afghan general perspective / view on governance and politics 
Governance has been traditionally handled by tribal leaders (councils) and in 
some cases, has little tangible connection to a centralized government. In 
many cases, the significance of interpersonal relationships dictates 
adherence to or rebellion against a centralized government. In recent years, 
the unprecedented level of corruption has severely alienated many Afghans 
from the central Karzai government. Few Afghans see any of the potential 
leaders as reliable, and a sense that after a politician has “filled his pockets” 
(with money), there is less danger to the common person. That is, a new 
politician is not only unpredictable, but hungry for money, and this can instil 
distrust in many minds. Despite the international community’s efforts in 
persuading the government to use merit based hiring processes for 
government employees, the local population strongly believes that all 
government positions from the highest to the lowest district level are 
managed by a government mafia system where an individual must pay for 
the position in order to get appointed.  These problems, however, have not 
bred apathy: on the contrary, Afghans are very involved in the political 
processes and even the youngest child can lisp the names of power holders. 
This is a reflection on how daily life is affected by even minor changes in the 
government. 
 
Foreign Relations 
Before the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Afghanistan was neutral in 
its foreign policy. Between 1979 and 1989, Afghanistan’s foreign policy reflected 
that of the Soviet Union. Few countries supported the Soviet occupation (1979 to 
1989) or the Taliban regime (1996 to 2001). Attempts by the Taliban to occupy 
Afghanistan’s seat at the UN and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
failed. 
Afghanistan’s foreign relations improved dramatically after the fall of the 
Taliban in 2001, and most countries now maintain diplomatic relations with 
Afghanistan. In December 2002, Afghanistan’s six bordering countries signed a 
Good Neighbour Declaration that pledged to respect Afghanistan’s independence 
and territorial boundaries. Afghanistan has been slowly integrated into regional 
security and economic organizations. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and, in June 2012, 
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Afghanistan was granted full observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). 
The Afghan government has established two tripartite border 
commissions with Pakistan (including the US) and Iran (including the UK) to deal 
with security issues of mutual concern. Afghanistan and its neighbours signed a 
declaration of cooperation on counter narcotics at the Berlin Conference102
Pakistan 
. 
Afghanistan has had many differences with its neighbour Pakistan. Many 
in each country maintain visceral distrust and prejudice toward the other. 
Pakistan took the lead in diplomatically opposing the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan and Soviet-backed regimes. During the war against Soviet occupation, 
Pakistan served as the main supply point for Afghan resistance. Pakistan 
developed close ties to the Taliban regime in the late 1990s, but reversed its 
support under U.S. pressure after the Taliban refused to surrender Osama bin 
Laden in 2001.  
Strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan result from the 
separation of Pashtun tribes, the growing Islamist insurgency on both sides of the 
border, and disagreements on border security procedures and smuggling. The 
presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Pakistan’s border provinces and 
Afghanistan’s increasing relations with India further strain the relationship. 
Pakistan wants to minimize India’s influence in Afghanistan to avoid being 
surrounded by unfriendly states. Anti-Pakistan sentiment is particularly strong 
among the minority communities of northern and western Afghanistan, 
particularly the Tajiks. After the end of the rule of Pakistani military leader and 
President Pervez Musharraf in 2008, there was improvement in Afghanistan-
Pakistan relations103
                                                          
102 1st April 2004 
103 President Karzai attended the 9th September 2008, inauguration of civilian President Asif Zardari. 
President Zardari visited Kabul on 9th January 2009, where he and President Karzai signed a joint 
declaration against terrorism that affects both countries. (A September 2010 meeting between them 
reaffirmed this declaration.) Afghan and Pakistani ministers jointly visited Washington, DC, during 23rd 
– 27th February 2009; to participate in the first Obama Administration strategic review, and Karzai and 
Zardari conducted a joint visit to Washington, DC, in May 2009. 
. The September 2011 attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the 
killing of former President Rabbani worsened again relations significantly. 
Pakistan’s worst fears about Indian influence in Afghanistan were inflamed when 
President Karzai, on 5th October 2011, and perhaps as a reaction to the Haqqani 
attacks in Kabul, flew to India to sign a significant trade and security pact. 
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Relations have improved substantially since late 2012 in line with Pakistan’s 
possible shift toward more cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan, as 
demonstrated by its release of Afghan Taliban figures who reputedly seek 
reconciliation.  
Regarding the long-term relationship, Pakistan wants the government of 
Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line”. Afghanistan and Pakistan 
are engaged in dialogue through the Tripartite Commission104
Iran 
 to resolve bilateral 
issues.  They agreed to set up five “border coordination centres” (BCCs) which 
include networks of radar nodes to give liaison officers a common view of the 
border area. These centres build on an agreement in May 2007 to share 
intelligence on extremists’ movements. Four have been established to date, but 
all four are on the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan has not fulfilled its May 
2009 pledge to establish one on the Pakistani side of the border. 
Economically, Pakistan is Afghanistan’s vital corridor to the Arabian Sea, 
while Afghanistan is a vital connection for Pakistan to the natural resources of 
Central Asia. Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) was signed 
on 18 July 2010, allowing easier flow of Afghan products. On 12th June 2011, in 
the context of a President Karzai visit to Pakistan, both countries began full 
implementation of the agreement. It is expected to greatly expand the US$2 
billion in trade per year the two countries were doing prior to the agreement. A 
drawback to the agreement is that Afghan trucks, under the agreement, are not 
permitted to take back cargo from India after dropping off goods there. The 
Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement followed agreements to send more Afghan 
graduate students to study in Pakistan, and a June 2010 Afghan agreement 
resulting in sending small numbers of ANA officers to undergo training in Pakistan. 
Relations between Afghanistan and Iran are generally good. Iran 
opposed the Soviet occupation and the Taliban. During the Soviet occupation, Iran 
supported Afghan resistance and provided financial and military assistance to 
rebel leaders who pledged loyalty to the Iranian vision of Islamic revolution. 
The Taliban seized the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif and executed 
Iranian diplomats in 1998, severely damaging relations between Iran and the 
Taliban. Afghanistan’s relations with Iran have improved since the fall of the 
Taliban. Iran has been active in Afghan reconstruction.  
                                                          
104 Afghanistan, Pakistan, and ISAF 
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There is a dispute over water rights on the Helmand River, which 
irrigates Afghanistan’s southern agricultural region before flowing into Iran. The 
Afghan government has felt pressure from the West to create closer ties to Iran. 
Other issues between Iran and Afghanistan include Afghan expatriates and 
refugees in Iran, Iranian support for warlords in Afghanistan’s border provinces, 
and Iranian concerns for the Shia minority in Afghanistan. 
Tajikistan 
Afghanistan’s role in Tajikistan’s long civil war has complicated relations. 
Tajik insurgents used Afghanistan as a base for military operations, and about 
100,000 Tajiks took refuge in northern Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Tajikistan 
provided assistance to the Northern Alliance because of the Taliban’s harsh 
treatment of Afghanistan’s Tajik minority. A planned bridge over the Amu Darya 
River will enhance the trade route north into Tajikistan. 
Uzbekistan 
Relations between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan have been limited. 
Uzbekistan has enforced harsh border controls to prevent the entry of narcotics 
smugglers and Islamic fundamentalists from Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s ongoing 
support for Uzbek warlords who control parts of Afghanistan has also been a 
source of contention. 
Turkmenistan 
Throughout the post-Soviet era, Turkmenistan has taken a neutral 
position on almost all international issues. In the late 1990s the country 
maintained relations with the Taliban and its chief opponent in Afghanistan, the 
United Front. Turkmenistan offered limited support to the military campaign 
against the Taliban following 11th September 2001. Relations with Afghanistan 
have gained importance in the early 2000s with the prospect of a trans-Afghan 
pipeline moving Turkmenistan gas to markets in India and Pakistan. Turkmenistan 
and Afghanistan are seeking closer cooperation through a broad package of 
mutual cooperation that includes reiteration of support for a trans-Afghan gas 
pipeline, transit of Turkmen electricity to Afghanistan, extension of a Turkmen rail 
network to Afghanistan, and a common struggle against narcotics and terrorism. 
China 
Of all the bordering countries, China has had the least direct influence on 
Afghanistan. Although technically a neighbour, China’s border with Afghanistan is 
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only 76 km long and is located in the remote and largely inaccessible Pamir 
Mountain range. An old Silk Route camel caravan trail that used to pass through it 
was closed by the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, China began to play a larger role in Central Asian politics and 
economic development. Alarmed by the Taliban’s support of Uighur separatists 
seeking the independence of the western Xinjiang Province, China founded an 
international alliance in 1996 known as the “Shanghai Five”105
India 
 that focused on 
battling terrorist threats and drug smuggling emanating from Afghanistan. These 
diplomatic moves and increasing investment in its western Xinjiang province have 
given China more prominence in Central Asia than it has had for many centuries. 
China has been supportive of the Karzai government but its aid program 
had been relatively small and low profile if compared with that of Iran or India. 
This changed in May 2008 when China signed a US$3 billion agreement for a 30-
year lease to develop Afghanistan’s biggest untapped copper deposit that has an 
estimated value of US$88 billion. China also agreed to construct a 400-megawatt 
power plant for the project that would electrify much of Kabul. To get the ore out 
of Afghanistan, China plans to build the country’s first railroad north through the 
Hindu Kush Mountains to its western province of Xinjiang. If the project is 
completed, China would have the largest direct economic stake in Afghanistan 
and would facilitate investments in Afghanistan’s extensive iron, aluminium, and 
marble deposits. Although China is currently the least important of Afghanistan’s 
immediate neighbours, it may become one of the most important in the next 
decade. It is unclear whether Chinese investment is part of a broader political 
strategy by the People’s Republic of China to gain future influence in Afghanistan 
or just another example of its willingness to take on risky investments to meet its 
economy’s growing need for raw materials.  
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are the inverse of 
those of Pakistan: India’s goals are to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in 
Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan the ability to block India from trade and other 
connections to Central Asia and beyond, and to prevent militants in Afghanistan 
from attacking Indian targets in Afghanistan. India saw the Afghan Taliban’s 
hosting of Al Qaeda during 1996 - 2001 as a major threat to India itself because of 
Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan, such as LET 
                                                          
105 China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. In 2001, when Uzbekistan joined, the group 
was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; it now includes India, Iran, Mongolia, and 
Pakistan as observers. 
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(Laskhar-e-Tayyiba, or Army of the Righteous), one of the groups that was formed 
in Pakistan to challenge India’s control of part of the disputed territories of 
Jammu and Kashmir106
Afghanistan has sought close ties to India but without alarming Pakistan. 
During a May 2011 visit to Afghanistan by India’s Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh, India and Afghanistan announced a “Strategic Partnership to better 
integrate Afghanistan into regional political, economic, and security structures. 
On 5th October 2011 President Karzai visited Delhi to sign the pact. The pact 
affirmed Pakistan’s worst fears because it gave India, for the first time, a formal 
role as one of the guarantors of Afghan stability, and it provided for expanded 
India-Afghanistan political and cultural ties. Indian experts noted that no Indian 
troops or security forces would deploy to Afghanistan as a consequence of the 
pact, but it did lead to a late 2011 agreement for India to train some ANSF 
personnel in India
.  
107
Persian Gulf States 
.  
India has stressed its economic aid activities there, showcased by its 
hosting of a 28th June 2012 meeting in Delhi to discuss investment and economic 
development in Afghanistan. India publicly expressed support for the ongoing 
reconciliation process.  
The Gulf States are considered a key part of the effort to stabilize 
Afghanistan. The Gulf States have also been a source of development funds and 
for influence with some Afghan clerics and factions. 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia has a role to play in Afghanistan in part because, during the 
Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channelled hundreds of millions of dollars to the 
Afghan mujahedin, primarily the Islamist factions. In doing so, Saudi Arabia 
developed extensive intelligence ties to these factions as well as to the Taliban. A 
majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam similar to that 
of the Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to formally recognize 
the Taliban government. Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with 
OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and 
                                                          
106 Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India, including the terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 and in July 2011. 
107 As an outgrowth of a four-day president Karzai follow-up visit to India in November 2012, India 
reportedly agreed to train up to 600 ANSF per year at the Indian Army’s jungle warfare school. 
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quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air 
operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. air strikes from it. 
Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between 
the Afghan government and “moderate” Taliban figures. The Afghan government 
also sees Saudi Arabia as a potential new source of investment; in early November 
2012 it was reported that the Saudis will fund a US$100 million mosque and 
education centre in Kabul. Some see the investment as a Saudi effort to enhance 
its influence in Afghanistan as international involvement there wanes. 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban 
regime, is emerging as another major donor to Afghanistan. It contributes about 
300 troops to OEF and ISAF missions108
The UAE has donated at least US$135 million to Afghanistan since 2002, 
according to the Afghan Finance Ministry
 in southern Afghanistan, including 
Helmand province.  
109
Qatar 
. At the same time, the UAE property 
market has been an outlet for investment by Afghan leaders who may have 
acquired their funds through soft loans from the scandal-plagued Kabul Bank or 
through corruption connected to donor contracts or other businesses. 
Until 2011, Qatar was not regarded as a significant player on the 
Afghanistan issue. It had not recognized the Taliban regime when it was in power, 
and had little influence with Taliban figures interested in reconciliation. However, 
since late 2011, Qatar has increased its profile as host of some Taliban negotiators 
there. Qatar is viewed as less influenced by Pakistan than is Saudi Arabia, and this 
might explain why the United States has pushed for Qatar to be the accepted host 
of a Taliban presence. 
International Organizations 
Afghanistan participates in many international organizations, to include 
the following: 
                                                          
108 Some are military medical personnel who run small clinics and health programs for Afghans in the 
provinces where they operate. 
109 Projects funded include housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in Zabol province, and a 
university in Khost. 
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• Asian Development Bank (AsDB) 
• Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
• World Bank 
• International Criminal Court (ICCt) 
• International Development Association (IDA) 
• Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
• International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
• International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
• International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
• Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
• Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (partner) 
(OSCE) 
• United Nations (UN) 
• World Health Organization (WHO) 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on Afghanistan international 
relationship 
On a personal level, many Afghans are open to foreigners, have been 
overseas or have relatives overseas.  In contrast, the public political, 
international relationship between Afghanistan and other nations is much 
more structured. In the 1970s, Afghanistan maintained relationships with 
both the US and the USSR and benefited in the form of aid. Following the 
Soviet invasion, Afghanistan’s international relations conformed to those of 
the Soviet government. The Taliban take-over notably alienated the 
country and only the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 
recognized its government.  Since 2001, diplomatic ties have been re-
established with many of the countries that previously supported 
Afghanistan. The Karzai government has concentrated on winning 
continued aid for its military, infrastructure and economy and is heavily 
dependent on this support. 
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ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
 
Economy 
Afghanistan is the poorest country in Asia, and one of the poorest in the 
world. Security threats remain the most significant deterrents to economic 
development. Afghanistan relies heavily on foreign troops and international aid. 
However, in the aftermath of the NATO-led invasion in 2001, domestic and 
international initiatives work to revitalize the economy by developing government 
institutions, constructing and repairing nationwide infrastructure, developing 
public and private industries, and developing natural resources. 
The construction industry is promising. Large contracts focus on building 
needed infrastructure, including a reliable electrical power grid, water distribution 
networks, and major highways. Afghanistan is taking steps to exploit its resources, 
especially precious stones and newly discovered oil and natural gas. 
Afghanistan is transitioning to a free market economy and creating 
incentives for foreign investors. Improvements have been made to the banking 
sector, tax policy, and customs regulations. A new currency has been established, 
and inflation is under control. These policies have created potential economic 
growth in various sectors, but the need for development and reform in many 
areas remains. 
Afghanistan has made some progress in developing its economy in the 
last few years. However, until basic needs such as security, reliable electricity, and 
infrastructure are met, substantial economic improvement and sustainability 
remain questionable. Afghanistan must also develop economic institutions and 
laws that enable firms to engage industrial sectors. Lack of security in Afghanistan 
is the most significant obstacle to economic growth. Afghanistan will remain 
dependent on foreign aid and security forces. Opium production is also a major 
impediment to economic development, and eradication of the crop is not likely in 
the near future. Agriculture remains an important but underdeveloped sector, 
and earnings remain dependent on the climate and weather conditions. 
Afghanistan is preparing to exploit its oil and natural gas resources and also serve 
as a transit point for regional trade. 
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Figure 12: Share of economic sectors in GDP, 2011 
 
Since 2001, the Afghan national economy has been growing steadily and, 
during 2008 – 2011 reached a total real GDP growth of 85 percent, while the rate 
of inflation has been kept at around 10%. Although real GDP growth slowed, to 
7.3% in 2011 (from 8.4% in 2010), due mainly to unfavourable weather and a poor 
harvest, the agriculture sector rebounded strongly in 2012 and is expected to 
boost economic growth to over 10%. The good harvest has also brought 
Afghanistan to near food self-sufficiency110
                                                          
110 Self-sufficiency in wheat production as of May 2009 (first time in 30 years) 
 and slowed inflation to 4.6% in July 
2012. Services, which account for about half of GDP, grew by over 12% in 2011. 
Telecommunication, transport, and public services were the most dynamic sub-
sectors. Mining saw progress in the development of oil and gas resources. On the 
demand side, private consumption accounted for more than half of GDP growth. 
The medium-term outlook for Afghanistan remains optimistic. At the 
Tokyo conference in July 2012, donors pledged sufficient funds to fill the financing 
gap, and this should allow the government to sustain development gains and 
continue making progress towards achievement of the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals. Nevertheless, the transition process and the upcoming 
presidential elections will further increase uncertainty in the medium term and 
will likely take a toll on investor confidence. 
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Statistics 
GDP (purchasing power parity) US$ 29.74 billion (2011 est.) – 109th in the 
world 
GDP (official exchange rate)  US$ 18.02 billion (2011 est.) 
GDP (growth rate)  5.8% (2011 est.) 
GDP Per Capita    US$ 1.000 (2011 est.) – 212th in the world 
Industry (% of GDP)  25% 
Agriculture (% of GDP) 34.9% 
Services (% of GDP) 40% 
Inflation Rate    16.3% (2005) 
Debt  US$ 1.28 billion (FY 10/11) 
Unemployment Rate  about 8%, but underemployment rate may  be 
nearly 50% 
Imports  US$ 9.152 billion (2010 est.), food, energy, 
capital goods, textiles, autos. Top five trading 
partners (in descending order): Pakistan, 
Russia, Iran, India, United States. 
Exports  US$ 2.625 billion (2010 est.) fruits, raisins, 
melons, pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, 
carpets, lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber 
products 
Labour Force    15 million (2004 est.) 
 
Resources 
In the 1980s, natural gas accounted for 56% of export revenue. However, 
the Soviet Union capped natural gas fields before withdrawing troops in 1989. 
Since then, Afghanistan has not been able to benefit from these resources until 
recently. In 2006, the U.S. Geological Survey completed a 2-year assessment of oil 
and natural gas potential in Afghanistan and discovered many more resources 
than expected. Reports claim that Afghanistan has 18 times more oil resources 
and more than three times the natural gas resources previously known. Northern 
Afghanistan contains 100 billion to 1 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, 0.4 billion 
barrels to 3.6 billion barrels of oil, and 126 million barrels to 1,325 million barrels 
of natural gas liquids. Afghanistan has completed several important steps in the 
process of developing its resources, including assessing petroleum resources, 
certifying reserves, and passing petroleum legislation. 
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Afghanistan also has deposits of barites, bauxite, beryllium, chromium, 
coal, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, manganese, mercury, nickel, salt, silver, sulphur, 
talc, tin, uranium, zinc, and zinc. Other precious and semi-precious minerals 
include alabaster, amethyst, beryl, emerald, jade, lapis lazuli, quartz, ruby, 
sapphire, and tourmaline. Mining throughout Afghanistan is underdeveloped for 
several reasons, including violence in much of the country. There are few railways 
and major roads, making travel and transport difficult and costly. Some materials 
are used in small-scale hand crafted items, but few are exploited for larger 
commercial use. Materials for the construction industry are in demand, including 
bricks, cement and cement blocks, glass, gravel, marble, paving stones, steel, 
sand, tile, and wood. 
Agricultural resources include grazing land and fertile soil land for 
growing crops in the northern province of Kunduz and the southern province of 
Helmand. Less than 3% of Afghanistan was forested, and after years of war and 
illegal cutting for fuel, about half of the forest remains. Afghanistan has a 
significant water shortage. 
 
 
Figure 13: Natural resources in Afghanistan 
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Industry 
Afghanistan’s industrial sector once processed large quantities of sugar, 
textiles, and chemical fertilizers, and exported hundreds of millions of dollars 
worth of natural gas. By 2004, however, almost all Afghan industry had been 
destroyed by years of conflict, and reconstruction efforts were focused more on 
the slow rebuilding of national infrastructure than on industry.  
Industry faces many challenges in Afghanistan. Regional warlords often 
extort or take resources from private firms, and corruption in the construction 
sector also deters prospective investors and hinders many projects. Domestic and 
international organizations are working to rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure 
using donations from the international community. These initiatives have made 
construction and construction materials one of the largest industrial sectors in 
Afghanistan. These efforts include projects to build high quality industrial parks 
with reliable power supply near important industrial areas. These professionally 
managed industrial parks will provide incentive for investment and development 
in Afghan industry. 
Afghanistan is considering privatizing some state industries such as oil, 
gas, and precious and semi-precious stones. Newly discovered oil and natural gas 
deposits will soon be exploited. Medium and small scale industry that has investor 
attention includes telecommunications, hand woven carpet making, and 
agricultural processing. Small factories and plants in Kabul and other cities 
produce textiles, leather goods, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizers, cement, and 
copper. The United Nations established a project aimed to resume sugar 
production in Baghlan. Development of the dried fruit and nut industry has strong 
potential. 
Another main commodity, especially in rural areas, is carpet weaving. 
Due to the demand for world famous Afghan carpets and their importance to the 
rural economy, the government has given significant attention to the 
revitalization of this sector. 
The capital market in Afghanistan developed rapidly despite deficiencies 
in the legal framework in 2001 – 2004, notably weak formal mechanisms for 
contract enforcement. New banking laws were passed in 2003 and 2004 
establishing the Afghanistan central bank Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB); as of 2009 
there were 17 licensed commercial banks providing long-term credit that were 
supervised by the DAB (for more details see chapter on Afghan Bank system).  
 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
130 
 
Agriculture 
Afghanistan’s rough terrain and arid climate leave little land use for 
agriculture. Only 12% of the land is arable, and not all of that is actually used to 
cultivate crops111
Since the early 1950s, billions of dollars of international assistance have 
been spent in Afghanistan, much of it directed towards upgrading agriculture and 
increasing production through the development of large-scale infrastructure, and 
the expansion of forestry and natural resource management. Some of this aid was 
shockingly misguided. By 1978 Afghanistan was largely self-sufficient in food. It 
was also a significant exporter of high quality fruit, silk, cotton and other 
products. Between 1978 and 1989, international assistance, mainly from the 
Soviet bloc, focused on bringing government-controlled land into production 
through large-scale development and state farms. During the decade-long Soviet 
occupation, much of Afghanistan’s agricultural infrastructure was ruined
. Prolonged and severe drought adds to the challenges of 
growing food and raising livestock. Despite these obstacles, 70% to 85% of people 
in Afghanistan rely on agriculture for their livelihood. Almost 40% of Afghanistan’s 
legitimate GDP is agricultural, but poor conditions have forced million of rural 
Afghans to rely on food aid. 
112
During the 1990s, donor aid to Afghanistan was primarily humanitarian. 
Current approaches are now shifting from quick-impact activities to longer-term 
development. As the cash economy expands, pressures will grow for greater 
capital accumulation and investment. This is already happening in certain parts of 
the country such as Helmand and Wardak. Aid groups maintain that increasing 
overall food supply and creating saleable surpluses will provide the greatest 
potential access to food for all Afghans. With better quality seeds and improved 
agricultural methods, coupled with more marketable new crops, such as 
. The 
mass exodus of one-third of all Afghans to Pakistan and Iran during the 1980s (the 
majority from rural areas) also severely affected the agricultural situation. 
Afghanistan suffered further destruction of the countryside during civil war and 
Taliban regime. 
                                                          
111 Three-quarters of the country supports only sparse but extensive grazing in the mountains and 
deserts. A mere five percent of the land area, mainly in the irrigated valleys, produces 85% of overall 
agricultural output. 
112 An estimated 22,000 villages in the country’s provinces were destroyed or severely damaged. In 
many areas, Soviet and Afghan government troops cut down vineyards, orchards, ornamental trees 
and shrubs for security reasons. The Soviets also destroyed some 3,000 ancient irrigation systems as a 
means of deliberately disabling the local economy, particularly in parts known to support the 
mujahideen 
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sunflower seed, there is no reason why Afghanistan should not become a 
significant food exporter. 
The most common legal crop grown in Afghanistan is wheat. Farmers 
also grow barley, beets, castor beans, corn, cotton, fruits, madder, nuts, mutton, 
rice, sugar, tobacco, various vegetables, and wheat and produce wool. Farming 
methods are outdated, using few modern machines, chemical fertilizers, or 
pesticides. A failure to modernize irrigation methods hampers effective 
agricultural production. However, programs are in place to improve cultivation, 
including reforming land titles, improving irrigation, distributing seeds, conducting 
cultivation and farm-related training sessions, establishing demonstration centres, 
practicing fertilizer use, and building roads to town markets. 
Opium production is illegal but widespread. Poor agricultural conditions 
and extreme poverty create incentives for farmers to turn to growing opium 
poppies, which are easy to grow in the harsh terrain and climate of Afghanistan 
and sell for a high price (for details see Drug Cultivation).  
 
Utilities 
Electricity 
Only about 15% to 20% of Afghanistan’s land area lies within the 
electrical power network113
Afghanistan has an installed electricity generating capacity of 450 
megawatts, but only about 270 megawatts are available. Electrical demand is 
much higher, about 750 gigawatt-hour, and expected to rise to 3,334 gigawatt-
hour by 2015
. Even the areas of the country that have access to 
electricity have unreliable service. Challenges to solving Afghanistan’s electrical 
shortage include severe damage to physical infrastructure, lack of qualified 
personnel, organizational limitations, dependence on funds from donors, and lack 
of security. 
114. Afghanistan operates one natural gas-burning power plant in 
Mazar-I-Sharif, two gas turbines functioning on diesel fuel in Kabul, and five 
hydroelectric power plants115
                                                          
113 The Afghan government set a goal for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 
25% in rural areas by 2010, a goal that was not met. 
114 Electricity production – 913.1 million kWh (2009 est.), electricity consumption – 2.226 billion kWh 
(2009 est.)  
115 23.5% electricity from fossil fuels (2009 est.) and 76.5% from hydroelectric plants (2009 est.) 
. The Naghlu Hydro Power Station has a production 
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capacity of 100 megawatts and is Afghanistan’s largest plant. However, the plant 
is in poor condition and may fail. Many more plants, power lines, and substations 
are needed. Much of the existing electricity generating components are outdated 
and incompatible with modern efficient systems. Afghanistan imports power from 
neighbouring countries, including Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan116
Hydrocarbons energy sector 
. 
Electrical sector projects include providing Afghanistan with technical 
and organizational assistance; developing the Kajaki Dam for hydroelectricity in 
southern Afghanistan; constructing a natural gas power plant in northern 
Afghanistan; supplying diesel fuel to thermal power plants in various major cities; 
and developing power lines to import more electricity from Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan. Due to the lack of security, the United Nations declared that 
construction of a power plant in the Farah province will not start until local 
warlords disarm and declare themselves disbanded. 
Years of war have stunted development of a hydrocarbons energy sector 
in Afghanistan. The country has no hydrocarbons export industry and a small 
refining sector that provides some of Afghanistan’s needs for gasoline or other 
fuels. Most of Afghanistan’s fuel comes from neighbouring states. However, 
Afghanistan’s prospects in this sector appeared to brighten by the announcement 
in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet 
of gas reserves, amounts that could make Afghanistan self-sufficient in energy or 
even able to export. In a major development, on 15th  December 2010, the Afghan 
government signed a six-month contract with a local firm, Ghazanfar Neft Gas, to 
collect and market crude oil from the Angot field in northern Afghanistan (part of 
a field that may contain 80 million barrels of oil), initially producing at the low rate 
of 800 barrels per day. 
Water 
Fewer than 20% of people in Afghanistan have access to safe drinking 
water. Afghanistan’s climate varies between arid and semiarid and is prone to 
prolonged and severe droughts. Water distribution systems need to be replaced.  
Afghanistan has 75,000 million cubic meters of water resources, but only 
one-third of these resources are being used. The Ministry of Irrigation, Water 
Resources, and Environment is responsible for designing, constructing, and 
                                                          
116 Electricity imports – 1.377 billion kWh (2009 est.)   
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maintaining irrigation canals and reservoirs. Several projects aim to explore 
Afghanistan’s terrain for additional sources of water. Other projects include 
developing deep wells and water pumps for communities and building pipes to 
transport water to provincial towns. Regional cooperatives similar to the Aral Sea 
Basin Program may help to address the water shortage. 
 
Foreign Investments 
Many obstacles deter foreign investors in Afghanistan. The lack of sea 
access and adequate infrastructure makes exporting products expensive. Customs 
regulations and property laws are underdeveloped. The banking system is also 
underdeveloped and raises little revenue. Law enforcement is sporadic, and 
corruption and extortion are rampant. Airports cannot handle large-scale 
transport of expensive items. Basic necessities such as water and electricity are 
sometimes unreliable, even in Kabul. 
Another major obstacle is nationalized industry. Some of the most 
attractive industries, such as oil, gas, and precious stones, are state-owned and 
unavailable to foreign investors. 
Despite these challenges to foreign investment, Afghanistan’s new 
government is creating liberal trade laws, tax reforms, and incentives to 
encourage much needed foreign investment. Incentives to foreign investors 
include 100% foreign ownership and the ability to transfer all profits abroad. The 
Afghan Investment Support Agency assists foreign investors with required 
documents and information on starting a business enterprise. 
Construction contracts are the most plentiful, but this sector has been 
tainted by corruption. Many contracts awarded to firms are small-scale 
community based programs. Other enterprises include Afghan carpets, leather 
goods, and processed foods. 
 
Modes of Subsistence 
Afghans have developed a number of different strategies to wrest a living 
from their difficult, often marginal environment. Some pastoralist or herdsmen 
groups live a seasonally nomadic existence although other herding communities 
are sedentary. Often groups combine animal husbandry with agriculture; some 
rely very little on livestock. These subsistence patterns are to some extent fluid; 
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pastoralists often change their degree of reliance on cultivation, depending on 
ecological, economic, and political factors. 
 
 “Pastoralism” 
Afghanistan has fine pastures permitting a considerable portion of its 
population, perhaps 9%, to engage in nomadic “pastoralism”. This entails annual 
migrations with large flocks of sheep and goats from lowland winter settlements, 
where they sow and reap crops and live in housing of a fairly permanent nature, 
to highland summer pastures located above 1,000 meters; sometimes as high as 
3,500 meters. Here they occupy fixed grazing grounds which they do not own but 
on which they have traditional grazing rights. Sometimes they pay a fee. Other 
nomadic groups practice various types of trading. Uniquely adapted to the 
environment, pastoral nomads help maintain the nation's ecosystem and 
contribute substantially to the national economy. 
Estimates of nomadic populations are even more uncertain than those 
for settled populations. The figure of 1.5 million given in many official publications 
in 1996 is an average of 1970 estimates which varied from 800,000 to over 2.5 
million.  
Nomadic groups are found among the Pashtun, Baluch, Aimak, Turkmen, 
Arab, Uzbek, and Kirghiz; perhaps over 80% are Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtun. 
Within each of these groups, however, the nomads form a minority. 
Many differences between groups have been described by leading social 
scientists noted in the bibliography. Yet a few patterns may be noted. During the 
fall and winter, nomadic groups live in permanent or temporary housing on 
steppes and plains; in the spring they move to lush pastures in the central 
mountains. The big herds that travel along high mountain trails are composed 
largely of sheep, including a highly valuable breed called karakul or Persian lamb, 
a major export. Only 10% - 40% of the herds are goats because the market price 
for sheep is usually twice that of goats. 
The flocks belong to single nuclear families from different segments of 
sub-tribes and each household will own an average of about 100 animals. 
Typically 4-6 households will join together to form herd units of optimum size 
consistent with the labour capacities of individual families and prevailing 
conditions of the pastures. Each herd unit is tended by a shepherd, who is paid a 
share of the lambs and kids born under his care. 
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Nuclear households grouped again by tribal segments move along lower 
routes more suitable for the heavily laden camels, horses and donkeys carrying 
household goods, women, children and the elderly. These groups, accompanied 
by smaller numbers of animals and guarded by fierce mastiff-like herd dogs, 
follow traditional routes with little variation, moving only 5 kilometres or so a day 
when travelling through grassy regions, but up to 20 kilometres a day when the 
terrain is barren. For some, the migration may be only a matter of a few 
kilometres; others move up to 500 kilometres away from their winter 
headquarters. 
Camp sites seldom include more than 100 single household dwellings; 
often no more than 5. These portable dwellings are of distinct shapes, including 
several variants of the classic rectangular black goat's hair tent predominately 
used by the Pashtuns and Baluchi. 
The nomads neither move nor live in isolation for they maintain 
relationships with both agriculturalists and merchants to whom they sell pastoral 
products, mainly live animals, wool, skins and dairy products, in exchange for 
agricultural produce, primarily cereals, household and luxury items, including 
radios. Poorer nomadic families may serve farmers as seasonal labour during 
harvest periods while richer nomads who extend credit may acquire land from 
farmers who, unable to pay their debts, become their tenants. Nomads also act as 
disseminators of local news. 
Internally, the effects of increases in population, modernization, state 
interventions and abnormal climatic conditions causing market prices to fall 
necessitated severe adjustments. For many nomads by the end of the 1970s their 
situation deteriorated to such an extent that they were obliged to settle down. 
The Soviet-Afghan war exacerbated these trends. Despite this, many nomadic 
groups acquired significant political power because of their major roles in the 
resistance, particularly in the transportation of arms. They became one of the 
best armed groups in Afghanistan. 
This laid the ground for potential tensions over settlement rights in the 
future as evidenced by controversies between nomadic and settled groups that 
arose when nomads occupied land around Khost because their traditional 
movement patterns had been disrupted. In resolving the issue, the Taliban were 
obliged to sanction the nomad occupations because of their superior strength. 
Other groups have also been forced to abandon their nomadic way of 
life. Numbers of nomads have purchased shops in provincial centres such as Khost 
and Gardez. A major portion of the Kirghiz has resettled in Turkey. Among 
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nomadic groups forming part of refugee populations in Pakistan, few have been 
able to retain their flocks and the assistance community has been unable to 
address their special needs. Yet, among the refugees there are a few who have 
accumulated fabulous riches and live opulently in elite suburbs of Peshawar, 
Islamabad and Karachi. 
 
Mixed Subsistence Patterns 
Mixtures of “pastoralism” with limited migration and agriculture are very 
common. In all ethnic groups there are fully sedentary villages with semi-
sedentary elements, such as short vertical summer migrations into the hills to 
graze flocks or harvest grains and melons. The picture does not remain static as 
the degrees of agricultural versus pastoralist strategies increases during difficult 
times, such as periods of drought, because of disease, or the inability to repay 
debts. Poorer nomads can become sedentary because they lose their flocks. On 
the other hand, wealthy nomads who invest in land may eventually prefer to 
settle in order to manage their holdings. 
Sedentary populations can also take up elements of “pastoralism” and 
generate new semi-nomadic units. Farmers practicing a mixed subsistence tend to 
invest surpluses in enlarging their flocks which may soon overgraze lands 
surrounding the irrigated oases around settlements if they are not kept moving. 
Agriculturists with relatively large herds will therefore assign nomadic pastoralist 
duties to younger brothers who in time may elect to remain nomadic and 
relinquish land inheritance in favour of increased livestock. A new nomad family is 
thus born, although the process may take more than one generation. 
Former nomads may also return to “nomadism” if, after being forced 
through poverty to give up herding, they manage to earn enough to start another 
herd. Pastoral “nomadism” and sedentary agriculture, therefore, are not 
necessarily permanent adaptations and vary in any given place at any given time. 
Agricultural subsistence patterns differ with the terrain. The majority of 
cultivators own their own land. Holdings are typically small and there are 
relatively few landowners with large estates. But in all areas water is the most 
important determining factor and must be carefully managed. Because of the 
scarcity of water, only 10% - 12% of the surface of Afghanistan is cultivated, and 
of this only one-quarter is irrigated. The rest depends on vulnerable rain-fed dry 
farming known as lalmi. Ingenious indigenous water technologies are practiced 
throughout the country, including hand dug underground water channel systems 
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called karez. These carry water for many miles from the base of mountains to 
fields on the plains. 
Rural-urban migration increased measurably as the road system 
improved and industrial complexes near cities proliferated. Urban expansion 
brought in new architectural styles and building materials; prefabricated cement 
apartment blocks required adjustments in living styles. Still, despite monumental 
jumps in urban populations nowhere are slums evident. 
 
Development of economic situation in recent years 
In late 2001 Afghanistan faced a daunting set of challenges. Over a 
million Afghans, mostly civilians had been killed in two decades of fighting. Severe 
drought (which continued through 2003) reduced cereal grain production by half 
and decimated livestock herds. Agricultural land had been rendered useless by 
unexploded mines. Roads, bridges, irrigation canals and power lines had been laid 
waste. The risk of famine was real. Nearly six million people, including much of 
Afghanistan’s educated elites, had taken refuge in neighbouring countries and 
around the world. The Afghan state had become non-functional in terms of 
policy-making, service delivery and revenue collection. 
From this dire state, very significant progress has been made, but 
enormous challenges remain. Today, Afghanistan still remains a conflict-affected 
state with many parts of the south and east difficult to access for government and 
development workers.  
At the early beginning of the Afghan reconstruction and development, a 
large amount of assistance had been channelled through different GO, NGO’s, IC 
and contractors which has resulted in duplication, mismanagement, and in some 
cases corruption. The London Conference (2006) which followed the Bonn 
agreement117
                                                          
117 The Afghanistan Compact to be agreed in London on 31st Januray 2006 succeeds the Bonn 
Agreement signed on 05th December 2001. Bonn agreement provided a framework for the 
international community to help Afghans create a legitimate government, while the Afghanistan 
Compact provides a framework for the international community to help rebuild Afghanistan. 
 recognized the urgent need for channelling assistance via the 
Afghan government. During the conferences, Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS), an interim strategy for security, governance, economic growth 
and poverty reduction, was presented. Subsequently The Afghanistan Compact 
has been agreed upon among the participants.  
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The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) was set up as the 
outcome of the London Conference to oversee the implementation of the 
“Afghanistan Compact” and to ensure greater coherence of the efforts by the 
Afghan Government and the international community in meeting the objectives 
agreed upon in the Afghanistan Compact.  
Following the adoption of the Afghan National Development Strategy at 
the Paris Conference (June 2008)118
• Security: (Peace and Reintegration); 
, the JCMB expanded its focus from merely 
monitoring the  implementation of the Afghanistan Compact to include the 
provision of strategic and policy guidance on the prioritized implementation of 
the ANDS as well as the political visions and priorities agreed upon between the 
Afghan government and the international community at subsequent international 
conferences on Afghanistan in The Hague (March 2009), London (January 2010) 
and Kabul (2010).  
In 2010, the Government of Afghanistan initiated the Kabul Process, 
which aims to support full Afghan leadership and responsibility for the 
development of Afghanistan over the coming years. The Afghan Government has 
initiated 22 National Priority Programs (NPPs) and for effective implementation of 
NPPs, these 22 NPPs are grouped together into 6 clusters: 
• Human Resource Development: (Skills Development and Labour, 
Education for All, Higher Education, Women Affairs, Capacity 
Building for Health); 
• Infrastructure Development: (National Regional Resource 
Corridor, Extractive Industries, National Energy Program, Urban 
Development); 
• Private Sector Development: (Trade Facilitation and SME, E-
Afghanistan); 
• Agriculture and Rural Development: (Water and Natural Resource 
Management, Comprehensive Agriculture, Rural Access, 
Strengthening Local Institutions); 
• Governance: (Economic and Financial Reform, Transparency and 
Accountability, Efficient and Effective Government, Local 
Governance, Justice for all, Human Rights).  
                                                          
118 An updated ANDS for years 2008 – 2013 was presented during Paris Conference which reflects the 
Afghan government’s vision, principles and goals for Afghanistan based on implementation of the 
Afghanistan Compact. 
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The government asked donors to align their programs with the NPPs to 
coordinate and target development efforts in support of principles of aid 
effectiveness. The Kabul Process is fully supported by and coordinated with JCMB. 
Achievements in reconstruction and development of Afghanistan: 
• The annual per annum income rose from US$ 85.00 to US$ 
350.00. Community Empowerment efforts reaching 19 million 
people in all of the country’s 34 provinces. As of 4th March 2011, 
approximately 26,623 communities have been mobilized, and 
26,311 communities have successfully elected Community 
Development Councils (CDCs). A total of 45,220 sub-projects have 
been completed to date. 
• 2,350 kilometres of ring roads around Afghanistan has been 
rebuilt (78% completed). Kabul-Kandahar drive reduced to 6 
hours. The National Emergency Rural Access Project (NERAP) is 
working to provide year-round access to the rural areas. Since 
2007, over 1,251 km of district and village roads and more than 
9,000 meters of cross drainage structures have been completed. 
• Three railway projects are under way. One, a 70 km line from 
Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairaton, on the border with Uzbekistan, was 
completed in March 2011 with US$165 million from the Asian 
Development Bank. It began operations in early 2012 and shortly 
thereafter began carrying its peak capacity of 4,000 tons of cargo 
per month. On the other hand, some other rail lines might not be 
built if foreign investors believe they will not yield a significant 
payoff for their projects in the mining sector. In particular, China 
has committed to building a line from its Aynak copper mine 
project to the northern border. A spur to the Hajji Gak iron mine 
would be funded by India (about US$1 billion) as part of its project 
there. However, there are indications India and China might opt 
not to build these lines and to instead truck their minerals out, a 
process that would slow full exploitation of these mines. There are 
also plans to build a line from Herat and Kabul to Kandahar, and 
then on to the border with Pakistan. The planned railways will link 
Afghanistan to the former Soviet railway system in Central Asia, 
and to Pakistan’s railway system, increasing Afghanistan’s 
economic integration in the region. 
• The health system in Afghanistan has improved dramatically since 
2002 with the creation and implementation of the basic package 
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of health services (BPHS) and later the essential package of 
hospital services (EPHS). 680 clinics built affording 65% of 
population basic health services access-compared to 8% during 
Taliban era. The death rate of children and infants has been 
reduced from 257 and 165 to 97 and 77 per 1,000 live births. 
• Since 2002, the achievements in the academic system have been 
impressive. School enrolment has increased from 1 million in 2002 
to 7.2 million children in 2011, of which 2.7 million (37%) are girls. 
Tertiary/post-secondary education has increased from 23,000 
students in 2002 to more than 70,000 in 2010, including over 
12,000 females. The number of female university students has 
grown from zero to 19.3% and the percentage of female faculty 
members from zero to 14.8%. Different programs helped train 
137,681 teachers, including 39,003 female teachers. More than 
150 teachers received their master’s degrees from foreign 
universities. 1,659 schools have been built to enhance access to 
education in remote areas.  Over 3,000 new classrooms and over 
540 schools were built by the Education Quality Improvement 
Program (EQUP) program. Eleven partnerships between Afghan 
and foreign universities has been established focusing on 
curriculum development, teacher training, lab equipment, and 
establishment of laboratories and libraries. Still Afghanistan’s 
university system is woefully underfunded, in part because 
Afghans are entitled to free higher education (to the B.A. level) by 
the Constitution, which means that demand for the higher 
education far outstrips Afghan resources. The shortfall is impeding 
the development of a large enough pool of skilled workers for the 
Afghan government. Afghanistan requires about US$35 million to 
operate its universities and institutes for one year 
• Over 1,000 judges (incl. 200 women) trained since the fall of 
Taliban. 
• Afghanistan has created a competitive, transparent mining 
investment climate that has attracted large foreign direct 
investment commitments of more than US$8 billion (2010 – 2012) 
across a portfolio of oil & gas, copper, iron ore, and gold.  
o Mes Aynak Copper Field. A major project, signed in 
November 2007, is with China Metallurgical Group for the 
company to invest US$3.0 billion to develop Afghanistan’s 
Mes Aynak copper field in Logar Province. The agreement 
Human Aspects in Afghanistan - Handbook 
 
141 
 
includes construction of two coal-fired electric power plants 
(one of which will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a 
segment of railway; and a road from the project to Kabul. 
Actual digging at the mine was expected to begin in mid-
2012. 
o Hajji Gak Iron Ore Project. In September 2011 seven bids 
were submitted for another large mining project, the Hajji 
Gak iron ore mine (which may contain 60 billion tons of iron 
ore) in Bamiyan Province. The Steel Authority for India Ltd. 
(SAIL) was awarded the largest share of the project. The 
project is expected to generate US$200 million in annual 
government revenues when fully operational, expected by 
2017. 
o The energy sector took a major step forward with the 
awarding in early 2012 of development rights to the Amu 
Darya basin (northern Afghanistan) oil fields to China 
National Petroleum Co. The field is expected to start 
producing 5,000 barrels per day by early 2013, with a longer-
term potential of 145,000 barrels per day. The US$3 billion 
development has a local partner, the Watan Group. 
o Another long-stalled major energy project that appears to be 
gaining momentum is TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India) Gas Pipeline Project. During 1996 – 1998 a 
consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation 
proposed a US$7.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline that 
would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through 
Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India. 
The project stopped in 1998. At a summit meeting in late 
May 2002, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan agreed to revive the project. Sponsors held an 
inaugural meeting on 9th July 2002, in Turkmenistan, signing 
a series of preliminary agreements. On 12th December 2010, 
in the Turkmenistan capital Ashkabad, the relevant leaders 
reaffirmed their intent to complete the project. In late 2011, 
the Asian Development Bank agreed to finance the project. 
TAPI could be a superior alternative to a proposed gas 
pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan. 
• Afghanistan now has approximately 8 million fixed and mobile 
telecommunication subscribers across 4 GSM based networks and 
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1 CDMA based network throughout the country covering 75 
percent of the population compared to services available to one 
percent of the population in 2002. 
• As of 31st December 2011, the incremental irrigated area resulting 
from rehabilitation of more than 750 irrigation schemes exceeded 
800,000 hectares, which is more than the end-of-project target of 
715,000 hectares. The number of beneficiaries is over 840,000 
people. Under the Horticulture Component of the Horticulture 
and Livestock Project, over 2,700 ha of new orchards (grapes, 
apricots, almonds, and pomegranates) have been planted so far, 
and over 600 women have participated in the program. 
• 14 microfinance institutions (MFIs) to fill a huge gap in financial 
services have been created, with a network of 294 branches in 26 
provinces, and more than 429,989 clients. Sixty percent of the 
clients are women and 30% of the businesses are run by women. 
• National park opened in Bamiyan in June 2009. 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on economy 
The economy from 2001 onwards drastically changed as a result of the 
immense foreign presence. Average Afghans found prices soaring and 
wistfully remembered the prices of the previous, hard (Taliban) years when 
food was more affordable. The foreign presence has created a sense of a 
“bubble” economy and many fears what will happen when the number of 
foreigners is significantly reduced. Unemployment continues to be high, 
especially as many have not received higher education. The years of war 
have meant an absence of time to develop highly skilled workers in various 
trades with high quality work. This plagues the best of work, while a high 
level of corruption reduces chances of fair growth. 
 
Islamic business contracts  
Business contracts in Afghanistan follow the principles of Mu'amalat of 
Sharia law. Broad-based economic well-being, social and economic justice, and 
equitable distribution of income and wealth is the primary objective of Islamic 
economics. The intense commitment of Islam to brotherhood and justice makes 
the well-being or ‘falah’ of all human beings the principal goal of Islam. Among 
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the most important teachings of Islam for establishing justice and eliminating 
exploitation in business transactions is the prohibition of all sources of unjustified 
enrichment. Three aspects of forbidden elements in contracts which may induce 
people for unjustified enrichment are: Riba (Interest), Gharar (Dubiousness in 
Contract) and Maysir (Gambling). 
• Riba or Interest: Riba or interest is completely prohibited under 
Islamic law. Riba is a prominent source of unjustified advantage, 
because Sharia does not consider money as a commodity such 
that there should be a price for its use. Money is a medium of 
exchange in an asset oriented economy, and a store of value. 
However, the term riba is used in the Sharia in two senses, riba-
an-nasiah and riba-al-fadl.  
 Riba-an-nasiah119
 Riba-al-fadl, on the other hand, is related to the transactions 
of the homogeneous goods. Riba-al-fadl arises if gold, silver, 
wheat, barley, dates, and salt are exchanged against 
themselves with unequal proportion. That is, they should be 
exchanged on the spot and be equal and alike, otherwise any 
change in transactions will create riba-al-fadl.  
 refers to the time allowed to the borrower 
to repay the loan in return for additional funds (financial 
increment). It makes no difference whether the return is a 
fixed or a variable percentage of the principal, an absolute 
amount to be paid in advance or on maturity, or a gift or 
service to be received as a condition for the loan. This leaves 
no room for arguing that riba refers to usury and not 
interest.  
However, the absolute prohibition of riba or interest in the Qur’an 
and Hadith is a command to establish an economic system from 
which all forms of exploitation are eliminated, in particular, the 
injustice of the financier being assured of a positive return 
without doing any work or sharing in the risk, while the 
entrepreneur, in spite of his management and hard work, is not 
assured of such a positive return. The prohibition of interest is, 
therefore, a way to establish justice between the financier and 
entrepreneur.  
                                                          
119 nasiah is related to the verb nasa’a, meaning to postpone, defer or wait 
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• Gharar or Dubiousness in Contract: The Sharia determined that in 
the interest of fair and transparent dealing in the contracts 
between the parties, any unjustified enrichment arising out of 
uncertainty or undefined essential pillars of contract are 
prohibited. Gharar is originated out of deception through 
ignorance by one or more parties to a contract. Gambling is also a 
form of gharar because the gambler is ignorant of the result of 
the gamble. There are several types of gharar, all of which are 
forbidden (haraam). The following are some examples: 
 Selling goods that the seller is unable to deliver; 
 Selling known or unknown goods against an unknown price, 
such as selling the contents of a sealed box; 
 Selling goods without proper description, such as shop 
owner selling clothes with unspecified sizes; 
 Selling goods without specifying the price, such as selling at 
the ‘going price’; 
 Making a contract conditional on an unknown event, such as 
when a friend arrives if the time is not specified; 
 Selling goods on the basis of false description; and 
 Selling goods without allowing the buyer to properly 
examine the goods. 
In order to avoid gharar, the contracting parties must 
 ascertain that both the subject and prices of the sale exist, 
and are able to be delivered;  
 specify the characteristics and amounts of the counter 
values;  
 define the quantity, quality and date of future delivery, if 
any. 
• Maysir or Gambling: The prohibition of maysir arises from the 
premise that an apparent agreement between the parties is in 
actuallityy the result of immoral inducement provided by false 
hopes in the parties’ mind that they will profit unduly by the 
contract. 
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The Nature of the Forbidden Contracts 
A number of barter arrangements peculiar to pre-Islamic market trading were 
expressly forbidden by the Prophet Muhammad. The characteristic they have in 
common is that they depend on conjectured or uncertain definition of the goods 
being traded. It is from the explicit prohibition of such barter arrangements that 
Islamic law developed its strict rules about definition of the objects (and terms) of 
contract. Examples of forbidden contracts are: 
• Muzabana: The exchange of fresh fruits for dry such that the 
quantity of the dry fruit is measured and fixed but the quantity of 
the fresh to be given in exchange is estimated while still on the 
trees. 
• Muhaqalah: The sale of grains still growing (that is, unharvested) 
in exchange for an equal quantity of harvested grains120
• Mulamasah: An historic sales contract in which the sale was 
finalised with the buyer or seller touching a piece of cloth. 
. 
• Munabudhah: An historic sales contract in which the sale was 
finalised with the buyer or seller throwing a piece of cloth towards 
the other. 
 
Bank System 
In late 2001 the financial and banking systems of Afghanistan were 
devastated. Afghanistan had six licensed state-owned commercial banks that 
were almost entirely Kabul-based and, to a large extent, inactive. The banks 
lacked connectivity, reliable information on assets and liabilities, and did not 
follow commonly agreed and accepted accounting standards. Nonperforming 
loans were not written off and no provisioning was made for them. Managers 
were political appointees with little or no banking experience; knowledge and 
capacity of bank staff were low. The operation of commercial banks had been 
hampered during the Taliban era as banks were not allowed to pay or to charge 
interest, in line with Islamic law. As a result, banks had ceased all lending 
activities, which had moved into the informal sector. Nevertheless, the banks had 
substantial assets (primarily real estate) on their books; they were solvent and 
some earned income from foreign currency deposits held abroad. 
                                                          
120 (The prohibition of this particular transaction is an important element in the general discussion of 
gharar (uncertainty), the basis of the prohibition of futures trading in grain and other foodstuff and 
stock commodities. 
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The lack of confidence in the banking system and uncertainties and 
difficulties faced by the population and businesspeople led them to rely almost 
exclusively on the long-established, highly efficient, informal “Hawala” system (for 
details see chapter below) – based on trust and reputation, where participants 
engaged in self-regulation of activities. During the Taliban period the Hawala 
system replaced commercial banks, including deposit taking, the provision of 
credit, and foreign exchange operations. IMF estimates that, at the time, Kabul 
alone had approximately 5,000 money traders. 
New banking laws were passed in 2003 and in early 2004, based largely 
on international best practice. The laws include the Law of central bank Da 
Afghanistan Bank (DAB), which was introduced in February 2004. With the help of 
the international community and donors, DAB started to develop the capacity to 
carry out bank supervision and monetary policy operations. The Banking Law 
came into force in September 2003, establishing the legal framework for 
commercial bank operation in Afghanistan. The law stipulates that the central 
bank is authorized to register, regulate and monitor commercial banks. 
The banking system grew rapidly in the post-Taliban period: by 2005 
there were eleven licensed banks: three state-owned banks and eight private 
local and foreign banks. Most banks offered basic services and their operations 
were constrained severely due to deficiencies with regard to inadequate laws and 
regulations (including bankruptcy, mortgage and contract laws), property rights 
and inaccurate, incomplete and flawed title deeds and inefficient and corrupt 
courts. Uncertainty and security issues limited the operation of commercial banks 
in remote areas. 
As of March 2008, the financial system of Afghanistan comprised 15 
licensed commercial banks with 183 branches in 20 provinces; 332 foreign 
exchange dealers; and 100 licensed money service providers. 
In 2009, the banking system increased its number of Banks to 17, 
generating 5,000 jobs since 2003, when the Afghan Central Bank resumed 
licensing.   
In 2010, the biggest scandal in the Afghan bank sector emerged, with 
serious consequences on the Afghan economy and public trust of the financial 
sector, when Kabul Bank Chairman and other insiders were spending the bank's 
US$1 billion121
                                                          
121 An USAID inspector general report in 2011 estimated that fraudulent loans diverted US$850 million 
to bank insiders. Kabul Bank have been accused for providing extended huge loans to a coterie of well-
 for their own profit. The Kabul Bank management activities were 
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compounded by the erroneous audit of international company, which was blamed 
on ineffective international technical assistance and supervision. The crisis 
threatened to be a trigger of a broader collapse in Afghanistan’s financial system 
and exposed graft rampant in the banking sector122
In 2011 and 2012, the banking sector was still recovering from the Kabul 
Bank crisis. The official authorities made little progress in recovering the assets 
owned by the previous shareholders
. The government has decided 
that all private banks in Afghanistan, including Kabul Bank, will be a subject to 
audits. More than a year after the government seized control, officials recovered 
less than 10% of the nearly US$1 billion that went missing. The crisis has weighed 
on Afghanistan’s attempts to win a resumption of support from the International 
Monetary Fund, which has refused to agree to a new package until Kabul enacts 
bolder reforms. Subsequently the Afghan government had to pay 5% - 6% of its 
GDP to save the bank in order to avoid a huge blow to the country’s economy.  
123
Without a successful resolution of Kabul Bank’s crisis, the Afghan 
financial sector could face continued distrust of public
 and related parties of Kabul Bank and 
subsequently shifted their asset recovery strategy. The privatization of New Kabul 
Bank (NKB) was moving forward but with a risk of insufficient interest from the 
investor community to buy NKB. Sector-wide audits have revealed considerable 
weaknesses at all levels of banking governance and operations, which also affect 
the micro finance sector. 
124
• Afghan United Bank 
. 
List of Afghan banks: 
• Afghanistan International Bank (AIB) 
                                                                                                                                      
connected businessmen, ministers and relatives of Afghan president Mr Karzai whose brother 
Mahmood was a seven percent shareholder in the bank. 
122 In September 2010 depositors had withdrawn US$180 million in two days that could destroy the 
country's financial system. 
123 The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee report stated on 28th 
November, 2012 that US$5 billion, including US$400 million the Kabul Bank’s shareholders, were 
illegally transferred abroad. About 22 people are accused of embezzlement in the case, and their trial 
started. Some US$935 million of the bank assets was transferred abroad through various systems and 
US$825 million are needed to bail out the bank. 
124 Prior to the crisis, the banking sector experienced strong growth (from a very low base), reaching 
US$4.1 billion in total assets and over US$3.6 billion in total deposits. While still small and nascent, the 
crisis has stalled development of the sector. Growth of bank deposits slowed from an annual average 
of 79.7% between 2005 and 2010 to an average of 6.5% over the 2011 – 2012 years. Growth of 
commercial loans, which were nearly doubling annually in the years before the crisis, has plummeted 
to -15% since 2011. Subsequently Afghanistan’s banking performance is the lowest in the region. 
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• Alfalah Bank 
• Aryanbank 
• Azizi Bank 
• Bakter Bank 
• Bank e Mili 
• Brak Afghanistan Bank 
• Central Bank 
• First MicroFinance Bank 
• Ghazanfar Bank 
• Habib Bank Afghanistan 
• Kabulbank 
• Miawand Bank 
• National Bank Of Afghanistan  
• Pashtany Bank 
• Standard Chartered Bank 
 
The Hawala system remained important for many transactions because 
the public was comfortable with its procedures. This system is perceived to 
provide services more rapidly, at a lower cost, and in a more convenient manner 
than commercial banks because it appears better-suited to many aspects of local 
circumstances: it requires no paperwork or bureaucratic procedures for client 
verification, risk assessment or transaction approval. 
 
The mechanics of the hawala system 
In Arabic, the term "hawala" " means "transfer", and in simple terms 
denotes the practice of transferring money and value from one place to another 
through service providers, known as hawaladars. The practice is understood in 
Arabic legal commentaries as the "exchange of debt", particularly in its historical 
context of long-distance trade. When the word was adopted into Hindi and Urdu, 
it retained this sense but gained the additional meanings "trust" and "reference", 
which reflect the code by which the system functions. Afghans involved in the 
trade tend to call themselves sarafi, or the singular, saraf, which means "money 
changer". 
Informal money service providers, or hawaladars, have gained an 
enhanced role as an important informal institution and key economic agents in 
Afghanistan. The hawala system, handling both financial transfers and currency 
exchange, was important in Afghanistan even before the war. But during the long 
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period of conflict, and especially under the Taliban regime, the hawala markets 
fully replaced the formal banking system, providing people with the only facility to 
transfer money into and out of the country. These markets became host to a 
complex interplay of actors from the benign through to the ethically questionable 
and patently criminal. Today, hawala continues to be the system of choice for 
most cash payments, transfers, currency exchange, and remittances in the 
country. This is partly due to restricted public access to modern banking services. 
The hawala process consists of three main functions: money exchange, 
the sending and receiving of money125
Despite the emphasis on familial connections, it should be noted that the 
business is like any other, driven first and foremost by profit
, and the settlement of transactions. In the 
transfer of money, various intermediaries tend to be engaged, but this does not 
generally delay the payment or affect its reliability, cost, or convenience to the 
customer. These features make it the remittance system of choice for many 
labour migrants wanting to remit money back home. 
When a hawaladar sends payment instructions to his counterpart, an 
informal debt is created which must at some stage be settled. Kinship and family 
ties usually ensure a smooth settlement process. In Afghanistan, intermarriages 
between the families of hawaladars are commonplace because they are seen as a 
way of cementing the trust between parties. It is common for a number of 
brothers to operate in the same hawala business, covering some of the world's 
major financial centres such as Karachi, Dubai, London, Mumbai, New York, and 
Shanghai. 
126
Hawaladars utilise the services of formally constituted banks to affect 
transfers. Deposits are occasionally fragmented and wired to various banks 
throughout the world before being brought back together in an aggregate (the 
"starburst" effect), or they can be sent on a circuitous trip and returned back to 
the account of origin (the "boomerang" effect). The movement and layering of 
funds from informal to formal institutions blurs the boundary between the two. 
. In this sense, 
hawaladars should be perceived in their true form as financial entrepreneurs 
operating as part of the informal economy; instead, they are portrayed in some 
accounts as motivated primarily by ethnic ties to distant relations abroad, or 
tarnished with the brush of terrorist and insurgent financing in others. 
                                                          
125 "outbound" and "inbound" transmissions 
126 In reality, if it maximizes profit to deal with a Tajik when the dealer is Pashtun, he will not hesitate 
to do so after verifying that the other party is trustworthy. Ethnicity is thus a poor explanatory factor 
in the cooperation among hawala dealers. 
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The formal and informal banking systems become interlocked, just like the official 
and unofficial markets serviced by the hawala system itself. 
The fieldwork conducted indicates that the widespread perception of the 
hawala system as being paperless is incorrect. Access to financial records reveals 
that each transaction is carefully logged, and follows its own accounting 
procedures. Not surprisingly, transfers made on behalf of drug traffickers tend to 
be kept more discreet, either by maintaining very simple notes locked in the safe, 
or by not keeping a record at all. However, one hawaladar confided that he 
documents all the shop's drug-related financial transfers on his home computer. 
 
 
Figure 14: Hawala transaction 
 
It should now be clear that, while anonymity and potential for nominal 
documentation make the hawala system an attractive means to transfer money, 
these qualities also make it vulnerable to abuse. But it is notoriously difficult to 
draw a simplistic distinction between the illicit and licit forms of Afghanistan's 
informal economy, especially when evaluating the extent of drug money passing 
through the hawala system. A glance at the various users of the system reveals 
that it is critical to the movement of both illicit and licit finance. 
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Conclusion 
It would be virtually impossible for a country like Afghanistan to piece 
together its shattered economy without relying on this kind of informal financial 
system. Although only occupying small shop fronts the hawala system is 
immense, transmitting million of dollars outside of formal legal reckoning through 
familial ties, ethnic linkages, and important business partnerships. It remains, 
legally and morally, an indeterminate grey area where the money changing hands 
straddles numerous illicit/licit boundaries. Like any other financial market, it is a 
place where fortunes are won and lost, and those willing to take risks are 
rewarded accordingly. 
As long as Afghanistan depends on the hawala system, the door for 
large-scale money laundering activities remains wide open. Policy makers should 
thus aspire to develop over time a fully functioning banking system. However, 
they must also recognize that there will be no quick transition, and that any new 
banking system has to be developed in a manner that is sensitive to the needs of 
an emerging licit economy in Afghanistan. The application of rigid rules in this 
context could turn out to be counter-productive. The business sector and the 
general public will still have to be convinced of the advantages of a modern 
banking system. In the meantime, it is also clear that Afghanistan will have to live 
with its traditional hawala system. While recognizing the likelihood of abuse of 
the hawala system for illegal business activities, such as drug-related money 
laundering, it is also clear that without the hawala system, the provision of even 
basic financial transfers could not be guaranteed in Afghanistan for the time 
being. 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on money transfer 
Money transfer from Afghanistan to other countries and vice versa takes 
place through banks, institutions such as Western Union and Hawala. 
Hawala is based on honour and a wide network of money brokers. 
Historically, it began in Islamic law in the Middle East and provided a 
reliable method of money transfer for traders before modern banking 
institutions arose. It is still in wide use today, especially in areas where 
banking systems are less complex. It allows an individual to receive or 
send money internationally without funds actually being “moved” 
anywhere and is entirely based on the honour system. In many cases, it 
has lower commission rates attached to exchanges than other systems do 
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and is convenient and fast. 
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CRIMINALITY AND SECURITY 
THREATS 
 
Corruption 
Corruption is generally considered to be a symptom and outcome of 
weak governance, in the case of Afghanistan reflecting in large part the legacy of a 
quarter-century of conflict and erosion of state institutions, irregular financing of 
the conflict from various sources, worsening tensions among ethnic and tribal 
groups, and the growth of informal/illicit economic activities. Hence in the Afghan 
context corruption has been intimately linked with the development (and 
destruction) of the state. Since 2001 the burgeoning drug economy (combined 
with unintended adverse side effects of counter-narcotics efforts) and large 
inflows of aid have greatly increased opportunities for corruption, including, to 
some extent, through the revival of the economy. 
Afghanistan currently ranks in the second lowest percentile on the World 
Bank’s corruption index127
Moreover, widespread corruption (or perceptions about the level of 
corruption in Afghanistan) deters and distorts private investment. But perhaps 
most important, are the adverse implications of corruption, and popular 
perceptions of widespread corruption, for the effective functioning, credibility, 
and legitimacy of the state. A particular problem in this regard is drug-related 
. A significant component of this index is based on the 
activities of corruption prone government agencies. 
Corruption has multiple and severe adverse effects on Afghanistan. In 
addition to the direct financial costs of corruption (higher costs of contracts and 
public services, loss of public funds due to theft or misuse of government facilities 
and assets) there are substantial costs related to time devoted to corrupt 
practices by government officials, private businesses, and the public as well as, 
especially in the case of the security sector, the human costs (e.g. of threats, 
intimidation, victimization of people by security forces).  
                                                          
127 http://info.worldbank.org/governance. 
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corruption, allegedly involving senior Government officials, which interacts 
destructively with corruption in the security sector (especially the police) and 
justice sector.  
“Transparent” is not an apt description of the general business culture of 
Afghanistan. Corruption and collusion between government and business is 
believed to be commonplace. Business is conducted based on personal, familial, 
ethnic and historical relationships, and businesses must negotiate a maze of 
bribes, taxes and murky government requirements that raise the risks and costs 
of doing business.  
Those businesses with the right connections are able to sidestep many of 
these costs and risks. They are also more successful in getting access to land and 
capital, two critical constraints in the business enabling environment of 
Afghanistan. However, for small businesses and potential new investors or 
entrepreneurs without political influence, there are significant and sometimes 
insurmountable barriers to entry. 
Some experts assert that the Afghan market and economy are actually 
highly regulated by informal social norms that restrict competition and 
participation and ultimately result in a consolidation of market benefits in the 
hands of the already wealthy and powerful. According to these experts, the major 
traders in today’s market are the same ones who emerged in the 1970s and 
operated under the mujahideen and the Taliban, often from Pakistan. They are a 
relatively small group of businessmen who dominate the sectors in which they are 
involved, having access to capital and political influence that small and medium-
sized businesses do not. Most deal in many commodities within their region of 
operation, e.g. carpets, dried fruits and nuts, televisions and fertilizers — 
depending on price and demand — allowing an exporter of carpets to import 
televisions to get his money back into the country. 
It has been observed that many of the traders operating today originally 
obtained their capital base through illicit activities, even though they may now be 
dealing mainly in licit commodities. Whatever they are involved with now, they 
must maintain good relationships with those involved in the illicit economy 
because they are often the ones who control the supply routes and transport 
systems. 
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, and the last few 
decades of war have seriously disrupted its mainly agricultural economy. The illicit 
opium trade is the one economic activity that not only survived, but flourished, 
during and after the war. Now it accounts for more than half of GDP and is said to 
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involve corrupt government officials at every level. Tribal warlords control the 
poppy-growing areas, using the proceeds to fund their militias and arms 
purchases. 
Most interactions with government services in Afghanistan generally 
involve some form of bribery. The judicial branch is quite weak and regarded as 
corrupt. Property rights are a major constraint on business expansion. Land 
ownership is required as collateral for bank loans, and many people do not have 
titles to the land they have occupied for generations. Other land has been 
appropriated by the military, police or government. Popular perception is that 
property rights are for sale by the government to insiders with influence. Thus 
acquiring land or the rights to use land for business purposes is regarded as a 
bureaucratic ordeal fraught with many risks, including that the government might 
grant title to land but then re-appropriate it after investments have been made. 
Whether this is actually a prevalent practice or not, the perception is that it is 
seems to be a strong hindrance to new investments. 
The Afghan National Police is part of the problem; ill trained and badly 
paid, they are notorious for preying on the citizens they are supposed to protect. 
Security is a problem throughout the country, and growing worse in the east and 
southeast. Insurgents attack the population, government and ISAF. The police are 
widely seen as incompetent and corrupt, allowing criminal behaviour to increase 
and perpetrating a fair amount of it themselves. Police, like bandits, are said to 
stop trucks hauling produce to market and order them to pay “taxes” and bribes 
before they can continue.  
The war criminals of the post-Soviet period have gone unpunished; 
indeed, many of the worst offenders are now members of the current local, 
provincial or national administrations. This has angered the population, sowing 
mistrust and bitter disillusionment that yet another corrupt, predatory regime has 
replaced the last.  
Corruption in Afghanistan, which is morally rejected on the grounds of 
being against the basic principles of Islam, further undermines the social fabric 
and erodes trust, possibly contributing to persistence or resurgence of conflict. 
Corruption comprises one of the main obstacles to state-building and 
development in Afghanistan. NATO estimates that about US$2.5 billion in total 
bribes are paid by Afghans each year. Transparency International, a German 
organization that assesses governmental corruption worldwide, ranked 
Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180 countries ranked in terms of government 
corruption. 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
156 
 
At the 28th January 2010, London conference, the Afghan government 
committed to 32 different steps to curb corruption. Only a few of the pledges 
have been completed outright, others have had their deadlines extended or been 
modified. The following are measures pledged: 
• Assets Declarations and Verifications 
• Establishment of High Office of Oversight 
• Establishment of Additional Investigative Bodies: Major Crimes 
Task Force and Sensitive Investigations Unit 
• Anti-Corruption Unit,” and an “Anti-Corruption Tribunal 
• Implementation: Prosecutions and Investigations of High-Level 
Officials 
• Salary Levels 
• Bulk Cash Transfers 
• Auditing Capabilities 
• Legal Review 
• Local Anti-Corruption Bodies 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on corruption 
The wide spread corruption since 2001 has been a new experience for 
Afghanistan. Many Afghans feel this is the result of exposure to highly corrupt 
practices in neighbouring countries, lack of accountability, the absence of a 
radical interpretation of Islam in politics and the foreign presence creating 
inflation.  Previously, central government accountability, honour and loyalty 
played major roles in preventing widespread corruption. The breakdown in 
government structure, traditional Afghan structures, values and identity is 
blamed for the rising levels of corruption. 
 
Organized Crime 
Post-conflict societies are particularly vulnerable to the growth of 
organized crime. The decline of authoritarian rule or the ending of conflict often 
leads to a transition to democratic governance and in many cases steps toward 
the establishment of market economies. This may frequently take place in the 
context of a legislative void, lack of transparency, lack of capacity in key 
government institutions, and, as a result, increased vulnerability to criminal and 
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corrupt practices. Historical and institutional factors, such as continuing political 
tensions, the existence of patronage networks, non-applicability of the rule of 
law, and fragile civil society provide fertile grounds for organized criminal 
activities. In such circumstances law enforcement agencies often are not capable 
(due to extensive corruption or involvement in criminal activities themselves), or 
lack adequate resources or credibility, to effectively combat or prevent illegal 
activities. Organized crime groups, warlords, terrorists, opponents, and even 
members of the government (or a combination of these) may take advantage of 
institutional and legal weaknesses and engage in illegal activities, impeding the 
establishment of democratic norms and principles. Law enforcement (including 
any international presence) may be slow in adjusting to new trends, whereas 
organized crime groups are able to rapidly adapt to changing social, economic, 
and political contexts.  
Obtaining reliable data on organized crime in any setting is a significant 
research challenge. In Afghanistan in particular, this challenge is accentuated by 
the weakness of state institutions, the blurring of political and criminal interests, 
and the increasing secrecy in which drug trafficking is being conducted. Studying 
organized crime in such a context has been compared to palaeontology128
                                                          
128 the study of fossils 
, i.e. the 
collection of small fragments of evidence from which broader hypotheses can be 
constructed and tested against other ideas and new finds. Such a process is 
crucial, since understanding the evolving nature of organized crime in a fragile 
post-conflict setting such as Afghanistan has critical policy implications. 
Criminal groups are the main organizers and beneficiaries of the opium 
trade in Afghanistan. They are critical to the transportation of drugs, contributing 
substantially to corruption and undermining state capacity. Many of the criminal 
industries these groups engage in encourage or require international connections. 
In addition to drug trafficking, organized criminal syndicates are engaged in arms 
trafficking, human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants, all activities that 
tend to be transnational. On a local level, the recent upsurge in violent crime 
across Afghanistan, including burglary and kidnapping, is viewed by many as an 
indicator of rising organized crime activity. The emergence of these groups in 
Afghanistan has been facilitated by several factors, including: a recent and 
continuing history of conflict which has helped breed an environment conducive 
to crime; widespread economic hardship; and nepotism/corruption. In short, 
Afghanistan provides multiple opportunities and few constraints on organized 
crime growth and activity. 
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Figure 28: Complexity of organized crime in Afghanistan 
 
Organized criminal groups in Afghanistan are mostly indigenous, even if 
some members have their residences in border areas of neighbouring countries. 
Groups appear to be ethnically-based and can generally be classified as small 
gangs. At the top of the pyramid are organizations with recognizable structures, 
leaders and established modus operandi, invariably involving transnational 
linkages into Afghanistan’s neighbours and beyond. 
In Afghanistan the most powerful criminal organizations (unsurprisingly 
given the amount of resources involved) are engaged in the trafficking of drugs. In 
this respect there is evidence of consolidation of control into fewer hands and of 
the emergence of a limited number of criminal organizations. The locus of this 
control is in the south of the country, with strong links to Kabul. The nature of the 
emerging criminal organizations suggests a close linkage with state institutions; 
indeed, the protection provided by state functionaries is critical for their survival 
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and prosperity. While it is clear that a considerable degree of consolidation is 
occurring in the control of drug trafficking in Afghanistan, and that those involved 
have powerful political protectors, there is no evidence that the key traffickers act 
together to set prices and regulate the market through a cartel. However, there 
does appear to be a surprising level of contact between key traffickers and those 
who provide them with political protection, particularly in facilitating cross-
provincial trading. What form such communications take is difficult to discern, 
and whether there have been detailed discussions among key players on issues 
such as what quantity of drugs are "in-stock" and how much should be released is 
impossible to say. The overall impression is that the market at higher levels still 
remains competitive, in part because the process of consolidation of organized 
criminal control is not yet complete. Given the rapidity with which the current 
consolidation has taken place, it is not inconceivable that a cartel of powerful 
groups could form in the future. 
The borders between licit and illicit markets in Afghanistan are 
exceedingly blurry and many of the players involved in both the licit and illicit 
streams are the same. 
 
Drug Cultivation 
Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant 
negative factors in Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic order over the past 
25 years. In 2007, poppy cultivation and opium production reached record highs. 
This is despite ongoing efforts by the Afghan government, and international 
community to combat poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. The magnitude and 
importance of Afghanistan's opium economy are virtually unprecedented and 
unique in global experience129
                                                          
129 It has been roughly estimated as equivalent to 36% of licit (i.e. non-drug) GDP in 2004/05, or if 
drugs are also included in the denominator, 27% of total drug-inclusive GDP. 
. The sheer size and illicit nature of the opium 
economy mean that not surprisingly, it infiltrates and seriously affects 
Afghanistan's economy, state, society, and politics. It generates large amounts of 
effective demand in the economy, provides incomes and employment including in 
rural areas (even though most of the final "value" from Afghan opium accrues 
outside the country), and supports the balance of payments and indirectly 
(through Customs duties on drug-financed imports) government revenues. The 
opium economy by all accounts is a massive source of corruption and undermines 
public institutions especially in (but not limited to) the security and justice sectors. 
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There are worrying signs of infiltration by the drug industry into higher levels of 
government and into the emergent politics of the country. 
Farmers in Afghanistan usually cultivate crops twice a year in irrigated 
areas, typically growing maize, rice, vegetables or cotton after harvesting opium 
or wheat. Some farmers grow cannabis after the first summer harvest. None of 
Afghanistan’s licit agricultural products can currently match the gross income per 
hectare from opium, although the difference is not as high as it used to be some 
years ago. 
 
 
Figure 15: Global potential opium production, 1980 - 2009 (Tons) 
 
Across Afghanistan, warlords, regional militia commanders, criminal 
organizations, and corrupt government officials have exploited opium production 
and drug trafficking as reliable sources of revenue and patronage. This has 
perpetuated the threat these groups pose to the country’s fragile internal security 
and the legitimacy of its nascent democratic government. The trafficking of 
Afghan drugs also appears to provide financial and logistical support to a range of 
extremist groups that continue to operate in and around Afghanistan, including 
the resurgent remnants of the Taliban and some al-Qaeda operatives. Although 
coalition forces may be less frequently relying on figures involved with narcotics 
for intelligence and security support, many observers have warned that drug-
related corruption among appointed and elected Afghan officials may create new 
political obstacles that will hinder progress. Afghan president Hamid Karzai has 
identified the opium economy as “the single greatest challenge to the long- term 
security, development, and effective governance of Afghanistan.” 
Human Aspects in Afghanistan - Handbook 
 
161 
 
It can now be said that all actors involved in destabilizing Afghanistan are 
directly or indirectly linked to the drug economy. Insurgents’ access to the opium 
economy translates into increased military capabilities and prolongs conflict. 
Opiates also fuel insecurity across Afghanistan as groups fight for control of 
routes and territory. Finally, the drug trade also indirectly contributes to political 
instability in Pakistan, Central Asia and the Chinese province of Xinjiang 
(bordering Central Asia and Afghanistan). These are all consumption markets in 
their own right, but also transit regions for heroin travelling to western, Chinese 
and Russian markets, in which organized crime groups control distribution 
networks. 
Afghanistan provides 85% of the estimated global heroin and morphine 
supply, a near monopoly130. Production in Afghanistan increased from around 200 
tons in 1980 to 3,300 tons in 2000, reaching a peak of 8,200 tons in 2007, before 
dropping slightly to 7,700 tons in 2008 and again to 6,900 in 2009. Expressed as a 
proportion of the global illicit opium production, Afghanistan’s share rose from 
around 20% in 1980 to 70% in 2000, and to more than 90% since 2006. Although 
Afghanistan’s potential opium production decreased by 10% from 2008 to 2009, it 
is still well above the average annual production recorded during the 1990 - 2006 
period. In 2008, approximately 2,700 tons of Afghanistan’s opium was refined into 
an estimated 380 tons of heroin to supply the global market. Generally speaking, 
there is a geographical overlap between regions of opium production and heroin 
processing. It is established that there is a considerable number of heroin 
laboratories in Afghanistan131
Since 2007, opium cultivation in Afghanistan has actually declined, 
although it remains at high levels. In 2010, opium production in Afghanistan 
declined (-48%) and it is linked to lower yields as a consequence of various plant 
diseases that affected poppy plants. After a blip in global production in 2010, 
production in Afghanistan in 2011 returned to its 2009 level. Potential opium 
.  
                                                          
130 Favourable cultivation conditions: Owing to favourable conditions, yields in Afghanistan have been 
consistently higher than in other opium-producing countries. 
High morphine content: In many opium producing countries, notably in Southeast Asia, about 10 kg of 
opium is needed to produce one kg of heroin. However, the transformation yields are much higher in 
Afghanistan, where on average only 6 to 7 kg of opium is needed to produce one kg of heroin. 
Poor infrastructure: Opium is relatively drought-resistant, making its cultivation easier than wheat in 
areas where irrigation is limited. Moreover, dry opium is easy to store and transport, which, given the 
poor state of roads and stocking facilities in Afghanistan, gives it an advantage over other crops. 
131 This is evidenced by reports from the Afghan authorities on the destruction of 69 facilities in 2008 
(against 57 in 2007) while UNODC surveyors identified 97 laboratories that same year. 
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production in Afghanistan fell to 3,600 tons in 2010 but resurged to 5,800 tons in 
2011. Opium production is expected to again increase in 2012. 
 
 
Figure 16: Detailed global potential opium production, 1997 - 2011 (Tons) 
 
Afghanistan remained the world’s largest illicit opium-producing country, 
accounting for 63% of global opium production in 2011, down from 74% in 2010, 
88% in 2009 and 92% in 2007. 
 
 
Figure 17: Main source countries of cannabis resin, 2002 - 2010 
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Cannabis continues to be an attractive cash crop in Afghanistan.  The 
extent of cannabis cultivation and production in Afghanistan could only be 
estimated as ranges with a high level of uncertainty at between 9,000 and 29,000 
ha in 2010. However, the large yield of the Afghan cannabis crop (128 kg of 
cannabis resin per hectare, compared with about 40 kg per hectare in Morocco), 
which led to the production of between 1,200 and 3,700 tons of cannabis resin in 
2010, makes Afghanistan a very important  producer of cannabis resin worldwide.  
 
 
Figure 18: Average farm-gate price for opium and cannabis resin (first “garda”) 
 in Afghanistan 2005 - 2011 
 
In Afghanistan, processing (and cultivation) is concentrated in the 
southern provinces, such as Helmand, Kandahar and Nimroz, where the 
insurgency and lack of government control provide the ideal cover. Notably, 
Kandahar’s Spin Boldak district was the location of the largest acetic anhydride 
seizure in 2008, with 7,500 litres (enough for over 3.5 tons of heroin) confiscated 
in a single incident. But Helmand province is at the core of the global trade in 
Afghan opiates. As well as its vast production of opium, it is also the location of 
large, fixed heroin processing facilities. In 2008, Helmand province alone 
accounted for almost 50% of Afghanistan’s opium seizures. Of the known district 
locations, Dishu in the south and Nad Ali in the centre saw the greatest seizure 
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volumes. The latter district is a major opium poppy cultivation area on the 
Helmand River, while Dishu is a processing district and a hub for trafficking into 
Pakistan. However, all of the laboratories dismantled in Helmand in 2008 were in 
central and northern districts. Well known opiate bazaars in places such as 
Lashkar Gah, Baramcha and Girishk continue to operate, although they were the 
scene of several seizures in 2008. 
U.N. officials estimate that in-country illicit revenue from the 2006 opium 
poppy crop would be more than US$3 billion, sustaining fears that Afghanistan’s 
economic recovery continues to be underwritten by drug profits and those large 
sums are reaching criminals, corrupt officials, and extremists. Since 2007, market 
forces have played a major role in influencing farmers’ decisions against opium 
cultivation. This is under threat as the price of licit crops (especially wheat at -
43%) is falling faster than that of (dry) opium (-6%). Yet the reversal is not 
imminent: in the south-west, where most of the opium is grown, a quarter of 
farmers cited low prices and low yields as the main reasons for not growing opium 
this year.  
Good governance and control of the territory are vital factors to uphold 
the law. In the more stable (north-western) provinces most farmers (61%)132 
refrained from growing opium in 2010 “because it is illegal”. This figure is 
significantly lower (39%)133
                                                          
132 Reasons for not cultivating opium in 2010 are: Reasons reported by headmen for not cultivating 
opium differed between the southern and western region and the rest of the country. The 
predominant reasons given by 39% of respondents for not growing poppy in the Southern and 
Western regions are ‘banned by the Government’, 13% responded with the reason ‘not enough yield’ 
and 12% mentioned the ‘low sale price of opium’. ‘Cultivating opium is against Islam’, ‘elders and 
shura’s decision’ and ‘fear of eradication’ were also mentioned, but by fewer headmen. 
133 Reasons for opium cultivation in 2010 are: “Higher sales price of poppy as compared to other 
crops” was the predominant reason (39%) for growing opium. Although the opium price continues to 
decrease, its level is still higher than other crops and for some farmers; opium continues to be a more 
lucrative investment than other crops. About 32% of respondents also cited ‘poverty’ as the most 
dominant reason. Interestingly, in 8% of the responses, the reason for growing opium poppy was the 
“lack of governmental control”. 
 in the south-west where “governance is poorer and 
insecurity higher”. Actually, the strongest correlation is between insurgency and 
cultivation. The UN survey indicates that almost 80% of villages with very poor 
security conditions grew poppies, while opium only grows in 7% of villages 
unaffected by violence. 
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Figure 19: Cultivation trend vs. security situation 2010 
 
Following the 22 % reduction in opium cultivation in 2009 (123,000 ha), 
the UNDOC anticipates an overall stable opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 
2010134
About a third of the heroin produced in Afghanistan travels to Europe 
(110 tons) while a quarter goes north to Central Asia and the Russian Federation. 
Afghan heroin is also increasingly meeting a rapidly growing share of Asian, 
mainly Chinese, demand. Approximately 15 – 20 tons are estimated to be 
. Of the estimated 380 tons of heroin produced in Afghanistan, 
approximately 5 tons stay in the country for local consumption or is seized by 
local law enforcement. The remaining 375 tons are exported to the world via 
routes flowing into and through the neighbouring countries of Pakistan (150 
tons), the Islamic Republic of Iran (105 tons) and the Central Asian countries of 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (95 tons) towards their final destinations 
in Europe, the Russian Federation and Asia. 
                                                          
134 The global area under opium poppy cultivation declined to 181,400 hectares (ha) in 2009 (15%) or 
by 23% since 2007, however in 2010 increased to 191,000 hectares (ha) up to some 207,000 ha in 
2011. 
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trafficked to China while another 35 tons are trafficked to other South and South-
East Asian countries. Perhaps 35 tons are shipped to Africa, while the remainder 
supplies markets in other parts of Asia, North America and Oceania. 
In addition to heroin, Afghanistan also exports some 1,000 tons of opium 
annually to its immediate neighbours (the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and 
Central Asia) and further to a global market of some 4 million opium consumers - 
most of which are in Asia. With the exception of South and Central America, 
Afghan opiates are now trafficked and sold in virtually every corner of the globe. 
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian States continue to be 
the countries with opiate use higher than the global estimate. 
 
Complex pyramids of protection and patronage 
The developments, in the specific circumstances of Afghanistan, have 
resulted in complex pyramids of protection and patronage, effectively providing 
state protection to criminal trafficking activities. A schematic representation of 
such a pyramid of protection and patronage is shown in Figure 20 below.  
 
Figure 20: Pyramid of Protection and Patronage 
 
A brief description of the various levels illustrated in the figure is as 
follows. 
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Farmers: At the base of the pyramid are the opium poppy farmers 
themselves. A great deal of excellent work has focused on the factors contributing 
to decisions by farmers to cultivate opium poppy as well as the specific dynamics 
of the Afghan rural economy. While these issues largely fall outside the scope of 
this assessment, several specific points are worth recording. First, there is still 
relatively free entry at the cultivation stage. Farmers who have access to land, 
credit, and seed (the latter two typically provided by the trafficking organisations 
themselves) are able to farm cultivate opium poppy. Second, the process of 
poppy eradication has imposed additional financial burdens on farmers in some 
areas. That is, payment must be provided to local authorities, usually the police or 
the local commander, to avoid eradication. 
Small-scale traders: Also at the base of the pyramid are small-scale 
traders. These traders generally live within the rural communities and know the 
opium poppy farmers in their areas well. Farmers often sell directly to such small-
scale traders, both because they know them and have developed a relationship of 
trust over a period of time, and also for the sake of convenience, as it may be 
difficult for farmers to travel to the village to sell directly to village traders. 
Moreover, farmers may, for example, fear that they would have to pay off the 
local police during such a journey. The market at this, the lowest level, is relatively 
open, and a farmer generally may choose the small-scale trader to whom he sells. 
Such small-scale traders are normally local shopkeepers or general traders who 
may exchange goods such as sugar, flour, or food directly for opium. 
Local traders: Generally situated in villages, local opium traders buy up 
the produce of a number of small-scale traders or farmers. The market at this 
level also remains relatively open, with there being some choice with respect to 
who small-scale traders can sell their produce to, although this is generally based 
on existing networks and connections. Depending on the area, such local traders 
may have to provide payments to the local police, administration officials, or local 
commander. Interviews suggest, however, that the relationship between local 
traders and those they sell to is now much more organized and operates with a 
greater degree of secrecy than in the past. 
Middle-level traders: These traders buy up opium from local traders. The 
market at this level remains relatively fluid, with middle-level traders still having 
some degree of choice on who they sell to at the next level. Nevertheless, several 
informants reported that levels of secrecy at this level are considerably higher 
now, and that there are now restrictions on who can enter the market. Middle-
level traders therefore operate on the edge of the criminal underworld 
(represented by the "line of criminal control" in Figure 8). The individuals and 
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operations above this point in the pyramid are highly secretive, and entry is very 
restricted for new players without the necessary resources or connections. 
Traffickers: Traffickers buy opium from middle-level traders and sell it to 
connections on the other side of the border. These individuals are reported to be 
highly organized and comparatively wealthy. Their link to the next level is on the 
basis of key contacts and connections. Interviews repeatedly confirmed that new 
operators are excluded from entering at this level, and that the relationship 
between traffickers and the "trafficking elite" is characterised by a high degree of 
secrecy and "discipline". In some cases, traffickers at this level may have 
connections to two or three of the key traffickers (described below), but in the 
vast majority of cases they owe their allegiance to a single individual. There may, 
however, be some cooperation between such traffickers, particularly where they 
owe their allegiance to the same member of the "trafficking elite". Traffickers are 
engaged in the movement of the drugs themselves and also pay off local 
commanders and police chiefs as required. 
Key traffickers: The apex of the operational component of the pyramid is 
the "trafficking elite". This constitutes a limited number of players country-wide. 
The individuals at this level have important political connections which ensure 
that their operations are not compromised and for which they provide payments. 
These individuals are extremely wealthy and sometimes play key roles in their 
communities or political environment. For this reason, they do not "dirty their 
hands" with the actual process of trafficking. They do appear in most cases to play 
a critical role in regulating supply, in two ways. The first is supervision of the 
laboratories and the processed heroin that is produced at them. This includes 
control over the trafficking of precursor chemicals, although the actual work is 
done by the traffickers described above. The second is regulating the market 
through the stock they hold, and when it is released for trafficking. It is estimated 
that as many as 20 - 30 traffickers may be clustered around each of the key 
traffickers. 
 
Paying for Protection 
The provision of protection to the trafficking pyramid is surprisingly complex, 
with what several interviewees described as an in-built system of checks and 
balances. Protection is paid at all levels of the pyramid, although such payments 
are much more clearly regulated at its apex. Key issues in relation to the system of 
protection payments are summarized below: 
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• Farmers may in some areas have to pay in order to cultivate their 
crops. The threat of opium poppy eradication has also introduced 
new protection payments into the system. This generally takes 
two forms. The first is direct payment to the local police or other 
authority not to eradicate. The second is an undertaking to turn 
over a portion of the crop in exchange for not having it eradicated. 
It was reported in a number of cases that farmers may be "taxed" 
in this way several times. Small-scale, local, and middle-level 
traders may have to pay some form of protection fee, whether to 
the local police or to relevant commanders, for them to be able to 
continue trading. 
• The district chief of police (or an equivalent official) receives 
payment directly from traffickers in order to operate. A separate 
set of payments is made to move the products themselves (for 
more detail on this aspect see below). The district level official 
makes a payment to the provincial police chief (or equivalent 
official) who in turn provides payment to the individual who 
provides overall political protection (either at a high level in the 
provinces or at the centre) for the trafficking pyramid to operate. 
• The system of checks and balances operates when the key 
trafficker, who maintains relations with all of the other principal 
players, "checks" with both the district chief of police (and his 
equivalent) and his provincial counterpart as to the amounts that 
have been received. This contact is in part to ensure that 
traffickers working within the network are not withholding 
protection payments for themselves and also to ensure that all 
relations are being adequately maintained to facilitate trafficking. 
If the key trafficker is displeased with the protection that is being 
provided, he may petition the individual providing overall political 
protection to replace the chief of police, or for the provincial chief 
of police to replace one of the district chiefs. Players outside of 
the trafficking pyramid who do not have the required protection 
will be excluded from the system, which, as argued above, has led 
to a consolidation of trafficking activities in fewer hands. 
• If the district police chief (or equivalent official) does not provide 
adequate payment (which means of course ensuring payment 
from others in the system), he runs the risk of being replaced (or 
killed). Thus while such posts are lucrative in that a portion of the 
payments is kept for personal enrichment, there are also inherent 
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dangers in occupying them, and these relationships may often be 
relatively fragile. For these reasons swapping of police chiefs from 
various districts or provinces is very destructive to established 
trafficking networks. Equally, there is anecdotal evidence that 
some new appointments may have been carried out to favour 
certain traffickers over others. 
 
The Consolidation of Control over Drug Trafficking 
The system of protection described above has been critical in 
consolidating the criminal organizations engaged in the drug trade, but also in 
concentrating control over drug trafficking in fewer hands. As already indicated, 
two inter-linked processes have been underway in the last few years. The first is 
consolidation among drug traffickers at all levels, with some players excluded. The 
second is that overall control of drug trafficking now lies in fewer hands, with the 
emerging locus of control of the drug market lying increasingly among criminal 
organizations in the south of the country. 
Figure 21 provides a simplified diagrammatic overview of the process 
through which consolidation has been occurring. As already described, until 
2001/02 drug trafficking was more loosely organized, with opium being traded 
openly. While at the more senior levels of the trafficking hierarchy some key 
figures did exist, below them the market was relatively open, with new players 
able to enter with relative ease. In some parts of the country local or regional 
strongmen/warlords levied a "tax" on trafficking and provided protection. 
Warlord controlled armed groups remained relatively cohesive and in many cases 
received external payments, although when these were transferred to the 
Ministry of Defence the flow of financial resources diminished and slowed. 
 
Figure 21: Schematic Overview of the Process of Consolidation of Criminal Groups 
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The deepening of the political normalization process resulted in 
important changes during 2003/04. Most critical was the role of political 
developments in ensuring that (at least publicly) prominent individual warlords 
and commanders were not involved in drug trafficking. Interest groups within the 
state used their influence and connections to eliminate some of those involved in 
drug trafficking at several levels. Some key players who did not have political 
protection in the emerging order were excluded, as were others further down in 
the trafficking pyramid. As international pressure increased, and with the closing 
of open markets for opium, the level of secrecy under which trafficking is 
conducted and the level of "organization" and "discipline" also has increased. 
New players have been effectively prevented from entering the market. The net 
result resembles the pyramid of protection and patronage described earlier. This 
process continues to evolve. 
It is difficult based on currently available information to provide a 
reliable indication of the numbers of individuals involved in drug trafficking at 
various levels, and in particular the number of key traffickers who exert control. 
Figure 22 provides rough estimates of the numbers of people involved in the 
trafficking hierarchy. These are drawn from various interviews and should be seen 
as an illustration of the scale of the problem rather than as a conclusive picture. 
 
 
Figure 22: Rough Estimates of Numbers of People at Each Level of Trafficking 
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A number of bazaars openly operated, with traders travelling from 
Pakistan, Iran, become sometimes further places to purchase opium. In contrast, 
in the east of the country at the time control was much more centralised, with 
trading concentrated in one location. The closing of the opium markets in the 
south, significant international and law enforcement pressure in the east, and the 
greater secrecy under which opium trafficking and trading now operate, have led 
to important shifts how and by whom the illicit drug market is controlled. 
Significant changes have been occurring in the nature of drug trafficking 
and the criminal organisations that control it in the south. These changes also 
appear to have important implications for trafficking in other parts of the country 
and thus for Afghanistan as a whole. The two most important and interconnected 
changes in the south are that drug trafficking has been consolidated in the hands 
of a relatively small number of people, and that trafficking networks from the 
south have extended northward and have played a pivotal role in the expansion 
of opium production in the north. In this process it is reported that a number of 
small and medium-level traders have become excluded from the market, with one 
estimate suggesting that about half of all traders have been excluded in this way, 
leaving the trade to a smaller number of people who have connections with the 
emerging organized criminal structure. Interviews conducted in the south of the 
country suggest that the opium trade has become much more organized and that 
trafficking is now controlled by a limited number of individuals with powerful 
political connections. 
Political protection for the operation of trafficking networks from the 
south in the north most likely runs through Kabul. Traffickers in the north of the 
country have based themselves in Pashtun dominated areas with close 
connections and networks in the south. The people who collect the harvest are 
locals, but the traffickers are from the south135
The drug markets in the east and northeast display different patterns. Of 
all regions, the east has received the greatest attention from the international 
community and the Afghan government. Officials in the east report that while in 
the past most of the commanders were involved in drugs; the number of key 
traffickers in the east has been reduced to only a handful, possibly 5-6. Law 
. One of the factors which has 
facilitated the development of the north-south axis is that, as already indicated, 
the ongoing political process in the country has forced powerful warlords in the 
north to avoid being closely associated with drug trafficking. 
                                                          
135 In one Northern Province, it is reported that the Chief of Police has for the last number of years 
been appointed from Kandahar. 
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enforcement initiatives have also forced many of the laboratories in the east to 
close, or to shift to more inaccessible areas in the mountains. Drug traders from 
the south (primarily Kandahar) were reported to have been active in the east until 
the fall of the Taliban.  
The processes by which internal trafficking occurs, and the organization 
of the necessary payments and protection that are required, are complex. When 
consignments are moved from the north to the south, local strongmen (often now 
appointed as police) are paid off to ensure a smooth transfer. As in the case of the 
systems of political protection that have already been described, there is some 
"oversight" of this process, with interventions from central or provincial level 
possible if required. Bulk consignments are moved southward in convoys, 
complete with sophisticated communication systems and armed guards. 
 
Farmer and small scale traders
Local traders
Mid-level traders
Traffickers
Key trafficker
Political protection
Key trafficker
Political protection
Farmer and small scale traders
Local traders
Mid-level traders
Traffickers
Kandahar Nangahar
Transfer of drugs
Payment through hawala system
Payment of 
road taxis
Facilitation of the transaction
Sending representatives to 
“border” facilitate transfer
Additional facilitation depending on 
context and size of transaction
Trafficking to the border
 
Figure 23: Arrangements for Cross Provincial Trafficking from the East to the South 
If transfers are made between the east and the south, representatives of 
key traffickers may be sent to the "borders" between provinces or areas of 
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influence to meet the consignment and ensure a trouble-free handover. The 
practical organization of the transfers takes place between middle-level 
traffickers, although higher levels of "oversight" of the process, including contacts 
between the key traffickers or if necessary those responsible for political 
protection at a higher level. The necessary "taxes" are paid to ensure smooth 
transfer of shipments, and payments for consignment are generally handled 
through the hawala system. The arrangements required for transferring drug 
consignments between two criminal organizations in the east and south are 
illustrated in Figure 23. 
There is general agreement among those interviewed that Afghan 
trafficking groups control the drug trade up to the borders of Afghanistan, from 
where consignments are sold to trafficking networks in the surrounding countries. 
There is, however, substantial evidence that the networks and contacts of Afghan 
traffickers, particularly those based in the south, extend well beyond the borders 
of the country, with Dubai serving as a key financial hub for transactions 
conducted outside of Afghanistan. There is limited evidence that some Afghan 
trafficking groups have sought to transport drugs to their end destinations in 
Europe (where some arrests have been made), but this is not yet a widespread 
phenomenon. 
 
Drug trafficking 
Some 25% of all Afghan heroin (95 tons) is trafficked each year from 
Afghanistan into Central Asia to meet a demand of some 70 tons in the Russian 
Federation, along the ‘Northern Route’. From Afghanistan to the north, traffickers 
are offered a choice of three countries: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
There are nine official crossings between Afghanistan and Central Asia, including 
two river ports, one on the Uzbek border and one on the Tajik border.  
Uzbekistan’s border with Afghanistan is short (137 km) and well-policed. 
While armed attempts at night crossings still occur, traffickers generally prefer to 
avoid this border in favour of easier alternatives such as the Tajik border. It 
appears instead that most opiates that do enter Uzbekistan first transit Tajikistan 
and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan. What cannot be excluded, however, is that 
larger, long-distance shipments by well-protected networks may find it 
convenient to use the better-developed infrastructure of Hayraton, or even to 
import precursor chemicals. 
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Afghanistan’s border with Turkmenistan is lengthy (744 km) and mostly 
desert. There is some lab activity in the border areas of adjoining Afghan 
provinces (such as Badghis), which is of concern since traffickers generally export 
opiates over the closest border. The Turkmen route is facilitated by the presence 
of approximately 1 million ethnic Turkmens in Herat, Badghis and Faryab 
provinces.  
From a law enforcement perspective, control of the Tajik-Afghan border 
(1,387 km) is becoming more and more elusive. Outside fixed border points, 
traffickers continue to swim, wade or cross the Amu Darya River by boat, with the 
majority reportedly crossing undetected. The building of new bridges across the 
Amu Darya River, while crucial for the development of regional trade, is misused 
by traffickers. These developing corridors can also be potentially misused for 
precursor conveyance destined for laboratories in north-eastern Afghanistan. 
One small stream (approximately 1 ton) veers east towards China’s 
Xinjiang province to supply the Chinese market. This route may have grown in 
significance although it is unclear if one or all of Central Asia’s borders with China 
are used for trafficking. 
There is also evidence that traffickers are increasingly resorting to 
violence in order to protect shipments. Armed clashes used to occur mostly on 
the Tajik-Afghan border. 
Drug traffickers are able to offer substantial bribes to poorly paid local 
police, border guards and customs to turn a blind eye to suspicious shipments. 
Approximately 105 tons of heroin are smuggled from the Afghan 
provinces of Nimroz, Herat and Farah into eastern Iran. Possibly due to increased 
law enforcement efforts at that border, Afghan traffickers are thought to 
increasingly rely on the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran route, estimated to handle an 
additional 35 tons of heroin. To do this, they must first cross into the Pakistani 
province of Baluchistan and veer east into the Iran. 
Iran’s eastern border with Afghanistan and Pakistan is 1,845 km long and 
consists of mainly mountainous or harsh desert terrain. Given the huge sums 
involved and the serious penalties if caught, traffickers along the Iran-Afghanistan 
borders are generally well-organized and well-armed. Depending on the border 
region, smugglers may be Baluchi tribesmen or Kuchi nomads. If opiates are 
trafficked through Baluchistan – via the largely uncontrolled borders of the 
Nimroz, Helmand and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan – Taliban insurgents are 
known to provide security to drug convoys up to the border. Baluchistan-based 
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organized crime groups then transport the heroin to the Iran – Pakistan border. 
Shared ethnicity and language undoubtedly helps smugglers to facilitate opiate 
trafficking from the source, through the Iran-Pakistan and Afghanistan-Pakistan 
borders. At the same time, different ethnic groups cooperate seamlessly. 
 
 
Figure 24: Global heroin flows of Asian origins 
 
Some 150 tons (40%) of Afghan heroin/morphine are trafficked to 
Pakistan. More Afghan opiates pass through Pakistan than any other country 
bordering Afghanistan. Controlling this border is a major challenge; the long, 
thinly guarded boundary (2,500 km) follows a chain of mountains with long 
sections reaching altitudes of more than 4,000 metres gradually ceding to open 
plains and dunes in Baluchistan province facing southern Afghanistan. 
The most important points for all trade, both licit and illicit, on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border are the Torkham crossing in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa 
(formerly, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Chaman 
checkpoint in Baluchistan province. In addition to these, there are hundreds of 
natural passes and desert roads coursing across the entire border, most of which 
are unmanned and unsupervised. 
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A cross-border insurgency has precluded effective law enforcement work 
in much of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and in parts of Baluchistan province. The biggest 
vulnerability, however, is Pakistan’s immediate proximity to heroin processing 
zones in Afghanistan, notably the adjoining provinces of Helmand, Nimroz and 
Kandahar.  
Finished heroin is smuggled into Pakistan using multiple methods of 
transportation, including the wide usage of camels and pack animals. Although 
significant quantities are shipped from Eastern Afghanistan into Khyber 
Pukhtunkhwa, the Pakistani province of Baluchistan is the primary transit area.  
The first stage of the route offers relatively few challenges to 
experienced traffickers, many of whom belong to ethnic groups that live on both 
sides of the border. In Baluchistan, drug trafficking convoys consist mostly of 
Baluch traffickers receiving from Pashtuns in Afghanistan. These convoys are 
heavily militarized and intimidation/violence occurs all around their business, 
including in areas of Baluchistan that suffer from having very low penetration of 
government security forces. 
 
 
Figure 25: Major drug trafficking routes in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
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Trafficking from eastern Afghanistan into Khyber Pukhtunkhwa generally 
involves the use of mountain trails and pack animals. Violence is rarely reported 
during crossings (which often occur at night). The cross-border trade is under the 
control of several prominent cross-border Pashtun tribes, notably the Afridi and 
Shinwari, but also others such as members of the Mohmand and Waziri sub-
tribes. 
Major destinations for heroin trafficked through Pakistan include Iran (35 
tons, most for onward shipment to Europe), various countries in Asia (25 tons), 
Africa (some 20 tons) and the United Arab Emirates (11 tons for onward shipment 
to China and East/Southern Africa). Pakistani traffickers also operate numerous 
air (and sea) trafficking routes to Europe, mostly to the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, shipping an estimated 5 tons annually via these direct connections. 
 
 
Figure 26: Drug trafficking routes in Pakistan 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on drugs 
Afghanistan has been a producer of the majority of worldwide opium. 
Following the fall of the Taliban, the opium production continued and even 
increased. This production is a many faceted issue, involving warlords, corrupt 
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official practices, poor farmers, and ambivalent attitudes from local and 
foreign power holders. Some farmers are forced into growing opium by drug 
traffickers through unpaid debts while others are pushed into it in order to 
provide for their families as there is little other profitable growing option. 
 
Terrorism and Insurgency 
Security in Afghanistan is challenged by several armed groups, loosely 
allied with each other. There has not been agreement about the relative strength 
of insurgents in all of the areas where they operate. 
 
The Taliban  
The core insurgent faction in Afghanistan remains the Taliban136
Taliban can be characterized as a traditionalist’s movement. Until the 
Taliban came to prominence, it was the Islamists who combated the rising forces 
of secularism and, later, communism in Afghanistan. It is important to notice the 
distinction between traditionalists epitomised by the Taliban and Islamists 
 
movement, much of which remains at least nominally loyal to Mullah Muhammad 
Umar, leader of the Taliban regime during 1996 – 2001. Following the Taliban’s 
collapse as the ruling faction of over 80% of Afghanistan in November 2001, the 
movement quickly receded into hiding. Mullah Muhammad Umar and his 
subordinates still operate from Pakistan, probably the city of Quetta but possibly 
also Karachi, thus are called “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). The Taliban remain 
highly popular among many non-tribal Pakistanis, including key elements of the 
Pakistani armed forces, especially the powerful Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) 
organization. 
                                                          
136 “Taliban” is the Pashto plural for “Talib”. “Talib” is originally an Arabic word meaning ‘seeker.’ The 
Prophet of Islam urged believers to ‘seek’ knowledge thus the word become commonly used for a 
seeker of religious knowledge a religious student. Afghan students have become used to travelling, 
first to India Deoband (Darul Uloom, Deoband) and to a lesser extent Delhi (Darul Uloom Aminiyya) 
and then to Pakistan, for acquiring knowledge of religion. Following the independence of India and 
Pakistan, leading scholars of the Deobandi School opted to open madrassas in Lahore, Karachi and 
Akora Khattak in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province. With the establishment of these madrassas, 
there was a gradual increase in the number of students from Afghanistan crossing the Durand Line to 
receive Islamic education. Until the independence of India and Pakistan, the “Afghan connection” of 
the Deobandi School was synonymous with anti-British sedition. The number of Pakistani madrassas 
increased dramatically with the beginning of the Afghan war in 1978, and the Islamization policies 
followed by the President of Pakistan, Mohammed Zia-ul Haq. 
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represented by such parties as the Jamiat-e-Islami of Professor Burhanuddin 
Rabbani137
During most of their years in power (1994 – 2001), the Taliban enjoyed 
broad popular support in the Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern provinces 
of Afghanistan. However, as early as 1999 or 2000, the movement’s leadership 
was beginning to implode, with splits between the Kandahar-based Taliban and 
other factions in Jalalabad, Khost and elsewhere
 and Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Taliban were 
educated in religious schools called madrassas while the Islamists are generally 
products of the state education system. Moreover, the Taliban are traditionalists 
seeking to return to the purity of the teachings of the Koran and the Sunnah, the 
practice of the Prophet. The Islamists, meanwhile, are modernists in that they are 
seeking a contemporary, albeit political, interpretation of Islam. The Taliban, 
being products of religious madrassas in Pakistan, are more inclined towards that 
country, while the Islamists have mostly received higher religious education in Al-
Azhar University in Egypt, where they have been influenced by the political 
thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamists, particularly the Hezb-e-Islami 
of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, have been able to form highly organized political parties 
whereas the Taliban are still not organized along party lines. By the time of the fall 
of Kabul, the Taliban movement had been hijacked by tribal, ethnic and even 
nationalist elements to a certain degree. 
There is evidence of the Taliban being organized on a provincial basis 
from the time of the jihad (holy war) against the Soviet army and Communist 
government in Afghanistan. Organizations of Taliban took the form more of 
regional associations than political parties. The majority of Taliban are from the 
Pashto-speaking areas particularly the Pashtun strongholds of Greater Paktia 
(Khost, Paktia and Paktika), Wardak, Ghazni and Kandahar. However there were 
also organizations of Talibs from predominantly non-Pashtun provinces such as 
Takhar, Badakhshan and Baghlan.  
138
                                                          
137 The former alliance president of Afghanistan ousted from Kabul by the Taliban in September 1996 
138 As has often happened in Afghan history, one group sought to monopolize its control by not 
consulting with its counterparts. 
. Moreover the IC since 1998 
increased the pressure to countries to withhold their support to Taliban severely 
reduced their financial resources. In the autumn of 2001, the Taliban were unable 
to resist heavy military pressure by the Northern Alliance supported by massive 
coalition forces support. Although the Coalition succeeded in collapsing the 
regime, many of the Taliban’s leaders and supporters simply escaped into 
Pakistan, or went into hiding in Afghanistan’s Pashtun belt. From late 2002 
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onwards, however, the Taliban began to re-emerge139
The pragmatists are facing debate from younger and reputedly hardliner, 
anti-compromise leaders such as Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir
. In recent years, Mullah 
Umar has lost some of his top aides and commanders in military operations or 
Pakistan arrests, including Mullah Dadullah, Mullah Obeidullah Akhund, and 
Mullah Usmani. His top aide, Mullah Abdul Ghani Bradar, was arrested by 
Pakistan in February 2010. 
Some of Umar’s inner circle has remained intact, and the release by 
Pakistan in late 2012 of several top Taliban figures close to Umar has helped him 
fill out his leadership circle. Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, a logistics expert, is 
head of the Taliban’s senior shura council and a reputed pragmatist. Other senior 
pragmatists include Shahabuddin Delawar, who attended informal talks with 
Afghan officials in late 2012, and Noorudin Turabi, who was released by Pakistan 
in December 2012.  
140
It is quite clear that the phenomenon of the Taliban was not artificially 
created. The Taliban have deep roots in Afghan society. Because these roots were 
indigenous to Afghan society, others may have decided that they were a force 
worth supporting. Numerous Afghans, particularly in rural areas, are increasingly 
nostalgic about the Taliban, who reined in abusive armed groups (including 
former mujahideen) and brought peace to much of the country, even if their 
methods proved harsh
. Zakir is the top 
military commander of the Taliban and purportedly believes outright Taliban 
victory is possible after 2014. The Taliban has several official spokespersons at 
large; including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, and it operates a 
clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat” and publishes videos. 
141
                                                          
139 Coalition Forces have been inadvertently contributing to the re-emergence of the Taliban and other 
anti-government groups through often heavy-handed operations against the local Afghan population. 
Another factor in the re-emergence of the Taliban is a rising sense of grievance among Pashtuns in the 
south and east of the country. Pashtun resentment is further fuelled by a perception that both foreign 
military forces and international aid agencies are pro-Kabul or focus their attention on Kabul at the 
expense of the east and south. 
140 A U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba until 2007 
141 During 1996-97, the Taliban’s Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice 
issued various decrees, aimed to prevent: 
. 
• Girls going to school 
• Women working for or visiting foreign aid agencies 
• Women participating in politics 
• Women revealing any part of their body (even ankles) in public 
• Young women washing clothes by the river 
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Al Qaeda 
It is considered Al Qaeda to have been largely expelled from Afghanistan 
itself, characterizing Al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan as facilitators of militant 
incursions into Afghanistan rather than active fighters. The number of Al Qaeda 
fighters in Afghanistan is about 50 – 100; some are believed to belong to Al Qaeda 
affiliates such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). It is assumed that Al 
Qaeda has still some safe havens in areas of eastern Afghanistan, and can move 
back and forth from Pakistan.  
After the death of Bin Laden on 1st May 2011 in Pakistan, counter 
terrorist efforts focused on his close ally Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is also presumed 
to be on the Pakistani side of the border and who was named new leader of Al 
Qaeda in June 2011. Primarily armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) strikes have 
killed numerous other senior Al Qaeda operatives in recent years. In August 2008, 
an air strike was confirmed to have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu 
Khabab al-Masri. Another two senior operatives allegedly involved in the 1998 
embassy bombings in Africa were reportedly killed by an UAV strike in January 
2009. Following the killing of Bin Laden, three top operational leaders, Ilyas 
Kashmiri, Attiyah Abd al-Rahman, and Abu Yahya al-Libi were killed in Pakistan by 
armed drone strikes in June 2011 and August 2011 and June 2012, respectively. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
• Men shaving or cutting beards 
• Men growing long hair 
• Men measuring for and tailoring ladies’ clothes 
• Music or drumming in any buildings or vehicles 
• Music and dancing at weddings 
• Displaying any representations of the human face 
• Shopping during prayer time 
• Keeping pigeons or playing with birds 
• Kite flying and selling 
• Drug pushing and addiction 
• Gambling 
• Interest charges on loans and money changing 
• Sorcery 
• Homosexuality 
Punishments were harsh: beating with whips and imprisonment for minor offences; amputation of 
hands for theft; burial alive for homosexuality; execution for murder; and death by stoning for 
adultery or “multiple intercourse” (sleeping with two men in one month) if witnessed by at least four 
people. 
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Hikmatyar Faction 
Another significant insurgent leader is former mujahedin party leader 
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who leads Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). The faction 
received extensive support against the Soviet Union, but turned against its 
mujahedin colleagues after the Communist government fell in 1992. Hikmatyar 
was displaced by the Taliban as the main opposition to the 1992 – 1996 Rabbani 
government, but it is now active against coalition and Afghan forces in Kunar, 
Nuristan, Kapisa, and Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul. The group is 
ideologically and politically allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents but 
sometimes has armed clashes with Taliban fighters over control of territory.  
At the same time, HIG is widely considered amenable to a reconciliation 
deal with the Afghan government. In January 2010, Hikmatyar outlined specific 
conditions for reconciliation, including elections under a neutral caretaker 
government following a coalition troop’s withdrawal142
 
.  
Haqqani Faction 
Another militant faction, perhaps the most potent threat to Afghan 
security, is the “Haqqani Network,” founded by Jalaludin Haqqani, a mujahedin 
commander. He subsequently joined the Taliban regime (1996 – 2001), serving as 
its Minister of Tribal Affairs. Since 2001, the network has staunchly opposed the 
Karzai government and his faction is believed closer to Al Qaeda than to the 
Taliban in part because one of the elder Haqqani’s wives is Arab. Over the past 
few years, he has delegated operation control to his sons Siraj (Sirajjudin), 
Badruddin, and Nasiruddin, although Badruddin was reportedly killed in a strike in 
late August 2012. 
Suggesting it may sometimes act as a tool of Pakistani interests, the 
Haqqani network, which reputedly has 3,000 fighters and supporters, has 
primarily targeted Indian interests.  The attacks on the U.S. Embassy and ISAF 
                                                          
142 On 22nd March 2010, both the Afghan government and HIG representatives confirmed talks in 
Kabul, including meetings with Karzai, and Karzai subsequently acknowledged additional meetings 
with group representatives. 
HIG representatives attended the consultative peace loya jirga on 2nd – 4th June 2010, which discussed 
the reconciliation issue. HIG figures met government representatives at a June 2012 academic 
conference in Paris and a follow up meeting in Chantilly, France on 20th – 21st December 2012. 
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headquarters in Kabul on 13th September 2011 were the work of the faction as 
well143
 
. 
The faction is tolerated or protected in the North Waziristan area of 
Pakistan and also its purported ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI) has caused sharp criticism of Pakistan. The ISI is believed to see 
the Haqqanis as a potential ally in any Afghan political structure that might be 
produced by a political settlement in Afghanistan.  
Experts debate whether the faction is amenable to a political settlement 
with the Afghan government. Many consider the faction less ideological than 
either the Taliban or Al Qaeda; experts say the group is primarily interested in 
earning funds through licit and illicit businesses in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf 
and in controlling parts of Khost Province. Such interests could potentially be 
accommodated as part of a political settlement. On 13th November 2012, a top 
Haqqani commander said that the Haqqani Network would participate in political 
settlement talks with the United States if Taliban leader Mullah Umar decided to 
undertake such talks 
Pakistani Groups 
A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, 
TTP), is primarily seeking to challenge the government of Pakistan, but it supports 
the Afghan Taliban goals of recapturing Afghanistan and some of its fighters 
reportedly are operating from safe havens in Taliban-controlled areas on the 
Afghan side of the border. Its current leader is Hakimullah Mehsud.144
                                                          
143 It claimed responsibility for two attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul (July 2008 and October 2009), 
and reportedly was involved, possibly with other groups, on the December 2009 attack on a CIA base 
in Khost (that killed seven CIA officers), on the 28th June 2011 Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul attack, 
10th September 2011 truck bombing in Wardak Province (which injured 77 USA soldiers) to the group. 
144 He succeeded Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in August 2009. 
  
Another Pakistani group to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan is 
Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET is an Islamist militant 
group that has previously been focused on operations against Indian control of 
Kashmir. Some assess the group as increasingly active in South Asia and 
elsewhere, and could rival Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliates.  
Another Pakistan-based group that is somewhat active in Afghanistan is 
Lashkar-i-Janghvi. It has been accused of several attacks on Afghanistan’s Hazara 
Shia community during 2011 – 2012. 
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Insurgent Financing 
All of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan benefit, at least in part, from 
narcotics trafficking. However, the adverse effects are not limited to funding 
insurgents; the trafficking also undermines the rule of law within government 
ranks. In particular, the trafficking generates an estimated US$70 million – 
US$100 million per year for insurgents. 
Another source of financial support is continuous donations from 
wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. Two money exchange networks (hawalas) 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan allegedly used by the Taliban to move its funds 
earned from narcotics and other sources has been sanctioned on 29th  June 2012 
by US administration. 
A multinational task force to combat Taliban financing has been 
established.  
 
Reintegration and Reconciliation with Insurgents 
The issues of reintegrating insurgent fighters into society and reconciling with 
insurgent leaders have received high-level attention. Both are Afghan-led 
processes but they have some concerned in the international community and 
Afghanistan because of the potential for compromises with insurgents that may 
produce backsliding on human rights. Most insurgents are highly conservative 
Islamists who agreed with the limitations in women’s rights that characterized 
Taliban rule. Many leaders of ethnic minorities are also sceptical of the effort 
because they fear that it might further Pashtun political strength within 
Afghanistan, and enhance the influence of Pakistan in Afghan politics. Any 
settlement with insurgents requires that fighters and leaders agree on three basic 
principles: 
• To cease fighting,  
• To accept the Afghan constitution,  
• To sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. 
 
Reintegration 
The concept of providing incentives to persuade insurgents to surrender 
and re-enter their communities has received at least some attention since 2002. A 
“Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation” operated during 2003 – 
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2008, headed by then Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and Vice 
President Karim Khalili, and overseen by National Security Council. The program 
persuaded 9,000 Taliban figures and commanders to renounce violence and join 
the political process. This effort had marginal success and made little impact on 
the tenacity or strength of the insurgency. 
A more conceptual approach was chosen by Afghan government, which 
drafted a formal reintegration plan145. This plan was adopted by a “peace loya 
jirga” during a June 2nd – 4th 2010 meeting146
Reconciliation with Militant Leaders 
. The plan included elements of 
providing surrendering fighters with jobs, amnesty, protection, and an 
opportunity to be part of the security architecture for their communities. Later in 
June 2010, President Karzai issued a decree to implement the plan, which involves 
outreach by Afghan local leaders to tribes and others who can convince 
insurgents to lay down their arms. 
As of the end of 2012, about 6,800 fighters had entered the reintegration 
process. However, the pace of reintegration slowed somewhat in 2012 compared 
to 2011. Those reintegrated are still mostly overwhelmingly (about 3,900 of the 
reintegrates) from the north and west, with perhaps some gradually increasing 
participation from militants in the more violent south and east. Some observers 
say there have been cases in which reintegrated fighters have committed Taliban-
style human rights abuses against women and others, suggesting that the 
reintegration process might have unintended consequences. 
The reintegration effort received formal international backing at the 20th 
July 2010, Kabul Conference. An international donation fund to support the 
reintegration process has been established with a total amount of about US$235 
million. 
 
Reconciliation is an initiative to reach a conflict-ending settlement with 
the Taliban. Many in the international community initially withheld endorsement 
of the concept, fearing it might result in insurgent leaders incorporation into the 
Afghan political system, especially those who retain ties to Al Qaeda and will roll 
back freedoms instituted since 2011. The minority communities in the north, 
women, intellectuals, and others remain sceptical that their freedoms can be 
                                                          
145 Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program 
146 The Taliban as a movement was not invited to the consultative peace jirga, but some Taliban 
sympathizers reportedly were there. 
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preserved if there is a political settlement with the Taliban. These groups fear that 
the Taliban could be given major ministries, seats in parliament, or even tacit 
control over territory as part of any deal.  
To respond to those fears the outcome of a settlement would require the 
Taliban to drop at least some of their demands that:  
• foreign troops have to leave Afghanistan;  
• a new “Islamic” constitution must be adopted; 
• Islamic law has to be imposed. 
An “Afghan High Peace Council” which oversees the settlement process 
was established on 5th September 2010. Former President and Northern Alliance 
political leader Burhanuddin Rabbani was appointed by President Karzai147
Prior to the Rabbani killing, a different negotiation meeting took place in 
2011. However, the process stalled after the Rabbani assassination and Pakistan’s 
boycott of the Bonn Conference
 to 
head it. Among other accomplishments, Rabbani established provincial 
representative offices of the Council in at least 27 provinces. On 20th September, 
2011, Rabbani was assassinated by a Taliban infiltrator posing as an intermediary. 
On 14th April 2012, the High Peace Council members voted Rabbani’s son, 
Salahuddin, as his replacement. 
148
                                                          
147 Appointment of Rabani should be viewed as a President Karzai effort to bring sceptical Tajiks and 
other minorities to support reconciliation. These minority figures fear that reconciliation with the 
Taliban will strengthen Pashtun control of government to the detriment of the non-Pashtun 
minorities. 
148 5th December  2011 
 due to a 26th November 2011, security incident 
in which 24 Pakistani border troops were killed. In December 2011 officials agreed 
to open a Taliban political office in Qatar to facilitate talks. A release of Taliban 
captives from the Guantanamo detention facility to a form of house arrest in 
Qatar had been discussed as well. However there is still valid demand for a public 
Taliban statement severing its ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, possibly 
as a prelude to a limited battlefield ceasefire. Talks stalled in March 2012 
reportedly in large part over Qatar’s failure to fully assure officials that the 
detainees would not be able to escape custody. The joint statement of President 
Karzai and President Obama on 11th January 2013 revived the issue, stating both 
presidents had agreed to support the formal opening of a Taliban office in Qatar. 
However, in early February 2013, President Karzai appeared to balk on the Taliban 
office issue, insisting on written guarantees about the validity of the Taliban 
representatives and controls on the Taliban representatives’ activities by Qatar. 
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Still, even without a formal office, several Taliban figures are operating in Qatar 
informally, using it as a base to conduct negotiation meetings. 
Some Afghan officials express optimism the talks will yield a settlement 
eventually, particularly if the Afghan government provides assurances of security 
for Taliban leaders who reconcile. In late June 2012, Afghan government officials 
and Taliban representatives held talks at two meetings, one in Paris, and one an 
academic conference in Kyoto149
Highly significantly, Pakistan is signalling that it wants to play a more 
active role in the reconciliation process. In February 2012, Pakistani leaders, for 
the first time, publicly encouraged Taliban leaders to negotiate a settlement to 
the conflict. More significant steps came in the course of a visit to Pakistan in mid-
November 2012, by Salahuddin Rabbani and other High Peace Council members, 
as well as a subsequent visit by Afghan Foreign Minister Rassoul. As a result of the 
visits, Pakistan released at least eighteen high ranking Taliban figures who favour 
reconciliation, and it released another eight in December 2012
, Japan, on reconciliation issues. The Kyoto 
meeting appeared to represent an acceptance by the Taliban of direct talks with 
Afghan government officials. In August 2012, Afghan officials reportedly held talks 
with high-ranking Taliban figure Mullah Abdul Ghani Bradar, who was arrested by 
Pakistan in February 2010, purportedly to halt between Bradar and Afghan 
intermediaries. A potentially even more significant meeting took place in Paris, 
France during 20th – 21st December 2012, because talks took place between senior 
Taliban figures and members of the Northern Alliance faction, considered least 
amenable to reconciling with the Taliban, and included submission by the Taliban 
of a political platform that signalled acceptance of some aspects of human rights 
and women’s rights provisions of the current constitution. 
150
A key Taliban demand in negotiations which is supported by the Afghan 
government is the removal of the names of some Taliban figures from UN lists of 
terrorists
. Additional 
releases by Pakistan are reportedly planned, although it is not clear if Mullah 
Bradar will be among them. 
151
                                                          
149 At the Kyoto meeting, the Afghan government was represented by Mohammad Stanekzai, a 
member of the High Peace Council, and the Taliban was represented by Qari Din Mohammad, a 
member of the Taliban political council who had traveled from Qatar. 
150 Among the released was the son of the late mujahedin party leader Yunus Khalis and Noorudin 
Turabi, the Justice Minister in the Taliban regime. 
151 These lists were established pursuant to Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333 (15th October 1999, 
and 19th  December, 2000, both pre-September 11 sanctions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda) and 
Resolution 1390 (16th  January 2002) 
. Before the 20th July 2010, Kabul Conference the Afghan government 
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had submitted a list of 50 Taliban figures it wants taken off this list152
The Warlords 
 as a 
confidence-building measure. International community officials attending the 
conference express their willingness to support de-listings on a case-by-case basis. 
On 17th June 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1988 and 1989 
which drew a separation between the Taliban and Al Qaeda with regard to the 
sanctions. However, a decision on whether to remove the 50 Taliban figures from 
the list, as suggested by Afghanistan, was deferred. On 21st July 2011, 14 Taliban 
figures were removed from the “1267” sanctions list; among them were four 
members of the High Peace Council. 
 
Years of wars in Afghanistan created a security vacuum within a country, 
and in some areas this has resulted in the formation of new phenomena in Afghan 
tribal society called warlords. The term “warlord” (or newly used powerbrokers) is 
commonly linked to actors who are diametrically opposed or hostile towards the 
state. The sole motivation of warlords is their personal economic profit and 
enrichment. The warlords have military forces and together with their control 
over a territory, give them in turn a political role, but without the benefits of 
political legitimacy.  
Nevertheless there are still areas in Afghanistan where only a just few 
warlords emerged, and only a few of those who did lasted very long. These are 
mainly areas where tribal structures work well and it appears obvious that the 
weak presence of warlords must be due to local factors. 
Until the early 1980s, Pashtun tribes were frequently described as an 
extreme example of a segmented society. The power of the tribal leaders, maliks 
and khans, was described as limited and subject to the approval of tribal councils 
(jirgas). The tribes, therefore, were seen as very egalitarian, providing a type of 
political environment in which warlord polities could hardly establish themselves. 
Those leaders in many cases went far beyond the role attributed to them. Khans 
have long been reported to be manipulating the election of jirgas so that their 
own people were selected. As the Afghan state started developing during the 20th 
century, the leaders frequently and often successfully attempted to get their own 
relatives and friends into positions within the administration. 
                                                          
152 The list includes about 140 Taliban-related persons or entities. 
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The ousting of Mohammad Daud Khan in 1978 destabilised the tribal 
environment, creating a situation in which the old established khan families lost 
much of their influence as security became the primary concern. This 
development opened the way to a new generation of “rougher” tribal leaders, 
who were more likely to be proficient in the handling of militias and armed 
groups. Although this dynamic was focused on the local level, a key aspect of this 
loss of influence was the severing of the link to the central government, due to 
the removal of the old aristocratic elite from Kabul. This was by no means a 
weakening of tribal and ethnic affiliations themselves, since these reasserted 
themselves when the state started to collapse during the 1980s and the centre 
progressively lost its authority over the periphery.  
The tribes stepped in to provide a modicum of security in the absence of 
the central state. This in turn favoured the emergence of “warlords or 
strongmen”, who claimed tribal leadership on the basis of a real or alleged 
unifying role within the different tribes or tribal segments. However, the role of 
warlords becomes problematic once the external threat disappears, since their 
military legitimacy loses importance and competition from tribally rooted rivals 
can reassert itself and this led in civil war in Afghanistan. The importance of 
warlord support increased during the invasion of coalition forces in Afghanistan. 
After 2001 this allowed them to reach a certain level within society hierarchy 
enabling them to establish powerful political entities. Using a net of followers and 
supporters they still benefit from their power and can influence the future of the 
state on a high political level or local level.  
On the one hand, warlords take over state functions and posts as 
governors, ministers, police chiefs or military officers, while on the other they 
pursue their own interests and do not hesitate to deploy state resources to 
accomplish their private goals. The relationship between warlords and the state 
can be described as a process in which the former take over state positions and 
simultaneously fail to fulfil state functions and to obey the state rules. 
Most of these warlords are embedded in social-economic contexts and 
are part of reciprocal interpersonal networks. The loyalty of their militiamen 
depends not only on economic benefits, but is often tied by family, clan, tribal, 
ethnic or religious relationships. Many of the Afghan warlords spend their 
revenues to strengthen their networks. The exchange of women through 
marriage is a common strategy used to tighten relationships with important allies. 
Functional differentiations between politics, economics, and the military are 
virtually non-existent in non-modern societies such as those we find in 
Afghanistan. Moreover, social status is not necessarily defined by wealth. In most 
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cases, it is rather achieved by conforming to a certain positively connoted 
archetype of Afghan society such as the “brave warrior” (Rashid Dostum) or the 
“wise emir” (Ismail Khan). Thus individual behaviour is tied to ideal figures of 
Afghan society in a positive way. But alongside the variety of actors, regional 
differences play a crucial role. 
 
Party Leader Ideology / Ethnicity Regional Bases 
Taliban Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad 
Umar (still at large possibly in 
Afghanistan). Umar, born in Tarin 
Kowt, Uruzgan province, is about 65 
years old. 
Ultraorthodox 
Islamic, Pashtun 
Throughout south and 
east. 
Small numbers 
elsewhere. 
Haqqani 
Network 
Jalaludin Haqqani. Allied with 
Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to be 
supported, or at least tolerated, by 
Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence 
(ISI). 
Ultraorthodox 
Islamic, Pashtun 
Paktia, Paktika, Khost, 
Kabul 
Islamic 
Society 
(leader of 
“Northern 
Alliance”) 
Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower 
house) / Muhammad Fahim / 
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign 
Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan, a 
so-called “warlord,” heads faction 
of the grouping in Herat area. 
Former party head, Burhanuddi 
Rabbani, assassinated by Taliban in 
September 2011. 
Moderate 
Islamic, mostly 
Tajik 
Much of northern and 
western Afghanistan, 
including Kabul 
National 
Islamic 
Movement 
of 
Afghanistan 
Abdul Rashid Dostum. He was 
Karzai’s rival in October 2004 
presidential election, then his top 
“security adviser”. As of October 
2011, reportedly he has joined new 
opposition movement called “Truth 
and Justice Party”. 
Secular, left-
leaning, Uzbek 
Jowzjan, Balkh, Faryab,  
Sar-i-Pol, and Samangan 
provinces. 
Hizb-e-
Wahdat 
Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes 
from central Afghanistan. A former 
member Karim Khalili is vice 
president, but Mohammad 
Mohaqiq is Karzai rival. Generally 
pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani 
1992-1996 government, and fought 
unsuccessfully with Taliban over 
Bamiyan. Still revered by Hazaras is 
Shiite, Hazara 
tribes 
Bamiyan, Ghazni, Dai 
Kundi province 
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Party Leader Ideology / Ethnicity Regional Bases 
the former leader of the group, 
Abdul Ali Mazari, who was captured 
and killed by the Taliban in March 
1995. 
Pashtun 
tribal/ 
regional 
leaders 
Various regional governors and local 
leaders in the east and south; 
central government led by Hamid 
Karzai. 
Moderate 
Islamic, Pashtun 
Dominant in the south 
and east 
Hizb-e-Islam 
Gulbuddin 
(HIG) 
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin 
Hikmatyar. It was part of Soviet-era 
“Afghan Interim Government” 
based in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was 
nominal “prime minister” in 1992-
1996 mujahedin government but 
never actually took office. Lost 
power base around Jalalabad to the 
Taliban in 1994, and fled to Iran 
before being expelled in 2002. Still 
active in operations east of Kabul, 
but open to ending militant activity. 
Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam 
faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of 
Mullah Umar, died July 2006. 
Orthodox 
Islamic, Pashtun 
Small groups in 
Nangarhar, Nuristan, 
and Kunar provinces 
Islamic 
Union 
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic 
conservative, leads a pro-Karzai 
faction in parliament. Lived many 
years in and politically close to 
Saudi Arabia, which shares his 
“Wahhabi” ideology. During anti-
Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with 
Hikmatyar was a principal recipient 
of U.S. weaponry. Criticized the war 
against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait. 
Orthodox 
Islamic, Pashtun 
Paghman (west of 
Kabul) 
Source: CRS 
Figure 27: Major Fractions in Afghanistan 
 
Afghan general perspective / view on warlords 
Warlords held the most power in the period between 1992 and 1996. The 
Taliban rose as a reaction to the chaos of warlordism. They brought a tight, 
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Islamic, law enforcing presence, limiting the power of the warlords and in 
some cases eliminating them. Following the fall of the Taliban, many warlords 
have regained power in the government, especially in respect to the drug 
trade and organized crime. Officials throughout the country vacillate between 
pacifying leaders of organized crime (sometimes for personal protection) and 
carrying out their official duties. 
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COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA 
 
Communications 
 
Telecommunications 
Afghanistan has limited telephone and telegraph services although 
domestic telephone service is improving with the licensing of four private wireless 
GSM telephone service providers as of 2007; the two largest are Roshan and 
Afghan Wireless Communications Company. In the early 2000s, expansion 
occurred almost entirely in mobile phones; between 2002 and 2004, only 7,000 
new landlines went into service. 
 
Internet 
Under Taliban rule, internet access was forbidden by anyone not 
associated with the government. Much of the country is in the beginning stages of 
acquiring internet access. The number of Afghans with internet access has 
increased rapidly since 2000, multiplying from an estimated 1,000 to 25,000. 
There are thirty-five internet service providers licensed with the Afghan 
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Companies include 
Ariana Telecom, CeReTechs, Neda, Insta Telecom, New Dunia Telecom, KBI AF, 
and LiwalNet. 
As of 2004, public internet facilities were available in Herat, Kabul, 
Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, although they have been increasingly targeted by 
terrorists. Customers are charged up to US$3 per hour depending on the venue. 
Internet terminals have recently been installed at post offices as well. 
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Satellites 
Afghanistan has 5 VSATs (Very Small Aperture Terminals) installed in 
Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad to provide domestic and 
international voice and data connectivity. 
Since June 2004, Afghanistan has been serviced by the NSS-6 satellite. 
NSS-6 is a powerful satellite that delivers broadband internet connections to the 
Middle East region, former Soviet Union countries, and northwest Africa. 
In July 2006, Afghanistan launched an earth satellite station in Kabul that 
consists of an 8-meter (26-feet) satellite dish to act as an international gateway 
for international voice, data, and TV services. It provides transmissions of 
telephone, television programs, data communication, and internet services and 
allows the Ministry of Communication to offer space segment for rent to mobile 
and internet service providers. 
 
Postal Service 
Afghan Post, the national postal service of Afghanistan, provides 397 
post offices across the country, including 32 central post offices and 36 city post 
offices. 
Domestic mail service offers pick-up and deliveries from Kabul to the 
cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, Khowst, Ghazni, and neighbouring cities/ 
provinces two to three times per week. Kandahar and neighboring provinces are 
serviced four to five times per week while Herat, Ghowr, and neighboring 
provinces, six times per week. 
International mail services arrive via Kabul International Airport. Mail 
destined for the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, 
Poland, Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium is flown out twice a week. Mail destined 
for the UAE, India, Russia, Kuwait, Turkey, Japan, China, Australia, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Thailand, and Iran is flown out once a week. 
The Afghan Post has issued operating licenses to four mail delivery companies:  
• DHL,  
• FedEx,  
• TNT, and  
• Bakhter Speedy Post. 
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Media 
 
Radio  
Radio is the most popular communications medium in Afghanistan, with 
21 AM and 23 FM stations. All stations broadcast in a variety of languages and 
dialects such as Pashto, Dari (Afghan Persian), Urdu, and English. Additionally, 
relays of foreign radio stations or stations funded from overseas are on the air in 
Kabul, including the BBC; Radio France Internationale; Deutsche Welle; and U.S.-
funded broadcasts from Radio Free Afghanistan, which uses the name Azadi 
Radio, and the Voice of America, which broadcasts in Dari and Pashto as Radio 
Ashna (Friend). 
BBC World Service is available on FM and AM in other parts of 
Afghanistan. In 2003 there were 167,000 radios in Afghanistan, but the Coalition 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have distributed thousands of free 
radios to the Afghan population over the past few years. 
 
Radio Stations Programming 
Arman Radio 98.1 FM Music, talk; (privately-owned) 
Azad Afghan Radio  
(10 shortwave frequencies) 
News, music; (operated by Radio-
Free Europe) 
Radio Afghanistan 1107 AM 24-hr news, state-run by Radio-
TV Afghanistan (RTA) 
Radio Herat 94.7 FM News, music 
Radio Killid 88 FM Private talk radio 
Figure 29: Major radio stations 
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Television 
There are at least 10 television broadcast stations in Afghanistan, with 1 
government-run central television station in Kabul and regional stations in 9 of 
the 34 provinces. The regional stations operate on a reduced schedule. The state-
owned Radio-Television Afghanistan was the most powerful broadcast outlet. 
Four cable stations operate in Afghanistan, carrying Indian and U.S. programs. In 
2003, cable television was banned by the Supreme Court. The ban on cable 
television was lifted after a few months, but programs deemed immoral remained 
banned. 
All current television channels are broadcast by satellite; channel 
numbers/frequencies vary by location. There are 100,000 televisions in use 
throughout the country. 
 
Television Stations Owner 
National Television Afghanistan Operated by RTA 
Tolo Television Private, KABUL-based with provincial relays 
Aina Television Private, based in the city of SHEBERGHAN 
Ariana Television Private, KABUL-based with provincial relays 
Afghan Television Private, KABUL-based 
Balkh Province Television Local to MAZAR-E-SHARIF 
Herat Province Television Local to HERAT 
Figure 30: Main television stations 
 
Newspapers and Magazines 
The circulation of independent print publications has been confined to 
the Kabul region. Although freedom of the press was instituted shortly after the 
fall of the Taliban, a 2004 media law requires registration of periodicals with the 
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Ministry of Culture and Youth Affairs (formerly Ministry of Information and 
Culture). 
In 2005, 250 periodicals were registered. There are now an estimated 
300 independent publications in Afghanistan; 50 to 70 are active, 20 are 
published regularly. 
 
Publications Frequency Language Politics 
Hewad Daily Pashto-Dari Government-sponsored 
Anis Daily Dari-Pashto Government-sponsored 
Kabul Times Daily English Official 
Kabul Weekly Wednesdays English, Pashto-Dari Private 
Payam-e Mojahed Weekly Pashto-Dari Northern Alliance 
Figure 31: Main publications 
 
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms 
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in 
recent years on media freedoms, which were hailed during 2002 – 2008 as a 
major benefit of the IC effort in Afghanistan. A press law was passed in September 
2008 that gives some independence to the official media outlet, but also contains 
a number of content restrictions, and requires that new newspapers and 
electronic media be licensed by the government. Backed by Islamic conservatives 
in parliament and Shiite clerics such from conservative Council of Ulema (Islamic 
scholars) has been ascendant. At the same time there has been a growing number 
of arrests or intimidation of journalists who criticize the central government or 
local leaders. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s “Radio Azadi” service for 
Afghanistan has distributed 20,000 solar powered radios to poor (and usually 
illiterate) Afghans to improve their access to information. 
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Afghan general perspective / view on media and communication 
The media and communication industry has steadily expanded since the fall 
of the Taliban and most Afghans have access to a mobile telephone (land 
lines are nearly non-existent). Even the most remote districts have a 
combination of mobile phones, televisions, satellites, radios or internet 
connections and keep abreast of the ever-changing situation. Many Afghans 
have taken advantage of the communication opportunities provided by 
Facebook, Twitter and email, for communicating both in Afghanistan and 
outside of it. However, word-of-mouth communication is still the most 
important mode of communication. 
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AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY 
FORCES (ANSF) 
 
The ANSF have expanded considerably since 2002. With international 
community support, including more than 40 countries participating in Operation 
Enduring Freedom and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 
the Afghan government's capacity to secure Afghanistan's borders and maintain 
internal order is increasing. 
The joint UN-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB) 
agreed on 21st January 2010 that, by October 2011, the ANA would expand to 
171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000, (total ANSF of 305,600). Both forces 
reached that level in September 2011. In August 2011, a larger target size of 
352,000 (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) was set, to be reached by November 
2012. The gross size of the force reached approximately that level by the end of 
September 2012, although some of the later recruits have not been trained. 
About 1,700 women serve in the ANSF, of which about 1,370 are police. 
A core element of NATO’s training efforts is its mentoring teams known 
as Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational 
Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs). These teams are responsible for training 
and mentoring deployed ANSF units. The whole process is overviewed by NATO 
Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). Working with NTM-A is a separate 
European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) that has been established to train Afghan 
forces in the provinces. The European Union is providing a “EUPOL” training effort 
and experts to help train the ANP. 
The ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a 
national symbol. The ANA now leads about 80% of all combat operations, and it 
leads operations in 261 of Afghanistan’s 364 districts. However, according to the 
Defence Department report of December 2012, only one of 23 ANA Kandaks 
(battalions) is assessed as able to operate “Independent with Advisors”. The 
commando forces of the ANA are considered well-trained and are taking the lead 
in some operations against high-value targets. Equipment, maintenance, and 
logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan Air Force, and it remains 
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mostly a support force for ground operations rather than a combat-oriented 
force. However, the Afghan Air Force has been able to make ANA units nearly self-
sufficient in airlift. 
Building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as 
important to combating the insurgency as building the ANA. ANP training 
significantly strides in professionalizing of ANP. However, outside assessments of 
the ANP are widely disparaging, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the 
point where citizens mistrust and fear the ANP. Among other criticisms are a 
desertion rate far higher than that of the ANA; substantial illiteracy; involvement 
in local factional or ethnic disputes because the ANP works in the communities its 
personnel come from; and widespread use of drugs. It is this view that has led to 
consideration of stepped up efforts to promote local security solutions. 
There are still widespread doubts about their ability to take the lead on 
the increased responsibility. About 35% of the force does not re-enlist each year, 
meaning that about one-third of the force must be recruited to replenish its 
ranks. Many believe that the force was expanded too quickly since 2009 to allow 
for thorough vetting or for recruitment of the most qualified personnel. Incidents 
of ANSF attacks on coalition personnel have increased since early 2011 and 
created increased tensions between the Afghans and their mentors. This 
complicates the transition in cases in which there is less interaction between 
Afghan forces and their mentors. Many units also suffer from a deficiency of 
weaponry, spare parts, and fuel and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in late October 2012 that the Afghan 
government will likely prove incapable of sustaining ANSF installations after 2014, 
mainly because of a lack of skilled maintenance personnel. There is still an 
ongoing problem of absenteeism within the ANSF. 
Some of the deficiency throughout the ANSF is due to illiteracy, which 
prompted NTM-A to increasingly focus on providing literacy training. Over 70% of 
the ANSF now have at least first grade literacy, up from only 14% in 2009. 
The subject of long term sustaining the ANSF after 2014 was a major 
issue at the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago because the Afghan security sector is 
funded almost entirely through international donations. An agreement was 
reached to reduce the total ANSF to 228,500 by 2017, although this level will be 
subject to constant review. This figure reduces the cost of sustaining ANSF to 
US$4.1 billion per year153
                                                          
153 Sustaining the 352,000 force would cost an estimated US$6 billion per year, a figure that some 
donors balked at as too expensive. 
. In 2007 ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions 
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to fund the transportation of equipment donated to and the training of the ANA; 
the mandate was expanded in 2009 to include sustainment costs. In November 
2010 a further expansion was agreed on to support literacy training for the ANA. 
As of 30th September 2012, donor contributions and pledges to the ANA Trust 
Fund total about US$570 million. Another donation program is a “NATO 
Equipment Donation Program,” through which donor countries supply the ANSF 
with equipment. Since 2002, about US$2.9 billion in assistance to the ANSF has 
come from these sources. 
There is also a NATO – Russia Council Helicopter Maintenance Trust 
Fund. Launched in March 2011, this fund provides maintenance and repair 
capacity to the Afghan Air Force helicopter fleet, much of which is Russian-made. 
There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan” 
(LOTFA), run by the UN Development Program (UNDP), which is used to pay the 
salaries of the ANP and other police related functions. From 2002 – 2012, donors 
contributed US$2.3 billion to the Fund. 
The major subunits of the ANSF are the following: 
Afghan National Army (ANA): 
• National HQ – Kabul 
• National Commando Brigade – Kabul 
• 111st Division – Kabul 
• 201st Corps – Kabul  
• 203rd Corps – Gardez  
• 205th Corps – Kandahar  
• 207th Corps – Herat  
• 209th Corps – Mazar-e-Sharif  
• 215th Corps – Lashkar Gah 
Afghan National Police (ANP)  
• Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) 
• Afghan Border Police (ABP)  
• Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) 
• Criminal Investigation Division 
• Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)  
• Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) 
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Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) 
• ANAAC Headquarters – Kabul 
• Kabul Air Wing 
• Kandahar Air Wing 
• Shindand Air Wing (planned) 
• Jalalabad Detachment 
• Mazir e Sharif Detachment 
• Gardez Detachment 
• Herat Detachment 
The failure of several police training efforts led to efforts, beginning in 
2008, to develop local forces to protect their communities.  
• Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (ALP) – The ALP 
initiative was also an adaptation of another program, begun in 
2008, termed the “Afghan Provincial Protection Program” (APPP, 
commonly called “AP3”). These local units are under the control 
of district police chiefs and each fighter is vetted by a local shura 
as well as Afghan intelligence. There are about 17,000 ALP 
operating in over 60 different districts. A total of 137 districts have 
been approved for the program, which is expected to bring the 
target size of the program to about 30,000 by the end of 2015. 
However, the ALP and other similar program were heavily 
criticized due to wide-scale human rights abuses (killings, rapes, 
arbitrary detentions, and land grabs) committed by the recruits. 
• Afghan Public Protection Force. This force is growing, under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Interior, to guard development sites 
and organizations. The force was developed to implement 
president Karzai’s decree No. 62 on 17th August 2010, that private 
security contractor forces are disbanded and their functions 
performed by official Afghan government forces by 20th March 
2012. That deadline was extended to March 2013 because of the 
slow pace of standing up the new protection force, and some 
development organizations continue to use locally hired guard 
forces. At about 11,000 personnel as of October 2012, it has 
begun operations to secure supply convoys. It is intended to grow 
to 30,000 personnel by March 2013, the revised deadline for it to 
assume full responsibilities. Until it reaches full capability, 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
206 
 
embassies and other diplomatic entities can still use private 
security firms.  
The local security programs discussed above appear to reverse the 2002 
– 2007 efforts to disarm local sources of armed force154
                                                          
154 The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) campaign helped to further establish 
the authority of the Afghan central government as 63,000 official military personnel went through the 
DDR program as of June 2005. The DDR program began with a pilot project in October 2003 and 
concluded in June 2006. The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program followed the DDR 
program. The goal of DIAG is to disarm as many as 180,000 illegally armed men in Afghanistan who 
pose a potential hindrance to the reestablishment of state institutions. The DIAG program is supported 
internationally, but primarily administered by the government of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan New 
Beginnings Programme (ANBP), and the government of Japan. The program is funded primarily by the 
Japanese government and implemented by Afghanistan’s national security agency and interior and 
defence ministries. The DIAG program has been completed by the end of 2007. 
. There have sometimes 
been clashes and disputes between ALP and ANSF units, particularly in cases 
where the units are of different ethnicities.  
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CULTURAL ASPECTS 
 
Afghan calendar 
There are two calendars used Afghanistan, both starting in 622 A.D. The 
solar Hijri calendar is the official calendar of the government of Afghanistan, and 
all national holidays and administrative issues are fixed according to the Solar Hijri 
calendar. The first day of the calendar year is also the day of the greatest festival 
of the year in Afghanistan, called Nowruz (21st March). Religious celebrations 
follow the lunar Hijri calendar155
 
.  
Significant festive days 
• Eid al-Adha: Falls on the tenth day of the twelfth month (according to the 
Hijra Calendar). Celebrates the fact that the Prophet Abraham offered his 
son Ismael to God. Instead of accepting Ismael, God provided a lamb as 
the offering. Animals, such as sheep, goats, and camels are sacrificed, 
especially by those who have already performed the hajj. One third of 
the slaughtered animal is used by the family, another third is distributed 
to relatives and the rest is given to the poor. Though contested, it is 
widely believed there is no significant connection between Hajj and Eid 
al-Adha, though they fall within a few days of one another. Hajj is the 
obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca Muslims make at least once in their 
lifetime and is a pillar of Islam.  
• Ashura: Tenth day of the month of Muharram (according to the Hijra 
Calendar). It is a day of mourning, commemorating the death of Hussain, 
grandson of Muhammad, who died in battle defending Islam against the 
corrupt caliph of the day in Karbala (present day southern Iraq). Shia 
                                                          
155 The Islamic calendar, Muslim calendar or Hijri calendar is a lunar calendar consisting of 12 months 
in a year of 354 or 355 days. Being a purely lunar calendar, it is not synchronized with the seasons. 
With an annual drift of 10 or 11 days, the seasonal relation repeats about every 33 Islamic years (every 
32 solar years). The first year was the Islamic year beginning in AD 622 during which the emigration of 
Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, known as the Hijra, occurred. Muslims typically call their calendar 
the Hijri calendar. 
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Muslims mark this event by self-flagellation to demonstrate their grief 
and distribution of a yellow lentil dish and sweets to neighbours.    
• Mount Arafat Day (22nd February Falls on the 2nd day of Hajj, a day when 
pilgrims pray on the Mount Arafat plain (east of Mecca), making 
supplication for forgiveness of sins and drawing closer to Allah. It is 
believed that Mohammad made the last speech of his life this location. 
Muslims who are not present on the plain often spend the day fasting 
and devotion to Allah. 
• Mawlud al-Nabi or Roz-e-Mawlud: The twelfth day of the month of Rabi 
al-Awal (according to Hijra Calendar), this celebration commemorates 
the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. The extent of the festivities, on 
this occasion, is restricted because of the fact that the same day marks 
the death anniversary of the Prophet as well. On this occasion public 
meetings are held in the mosques where religious leaders and scholars 
make speeches about different aspects of the life of the Holy Prophet. 
The stories of the Prophet’s birth, childhood, youth and adult life, his 
character, teachings, sufferings and forgiveness of even his most bitter 
enemies, his fortitude in the face of general opposition, leadership in 
battles, bravery, wisdom, preaching and his final triumph through Allah’s 
mercy over the hearts of people are narrated in detail. Salutations and 
songs in his praise are recited. Affluent Muslims generously donate to 
charity. Feasts are arranged and food is served to guests and the poor.   
• Nowruz (21st March): ("New Day", originally "New Light") is the 
traditional celebration of the ancient Iranian New Year. Nowruz is also 
widely referred to as the Persian New Year. Nowruz is the first day of 
spring. This festival dates back to the time when Zoroastrianism was still 
a powerful religion, long before Islam arrived in Afghanistan. During the 
celebrations, lavish meals are prepared in Afghan homes. Two dishes, 
Samanak and haftmehwah (literally: seven fruits) are specially cooked for 
the occasion. Celebrating this day was forbidden by Taliban.  
• Mujahideen Victory Day (28th April): This commemorates the day when 
Afghan mujahideen overthrew the socialist government in Afghanistan in 
1992. 
• Labour Day (1st May): Also known as the Day of the Worker, it is a 
celebration of worker solidarity. 
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• Jeshen Azadi (19th August): Afghan Independence Day, commemorating 
the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. The British Empire ended 
its political influence in Afghanistan. The most important national 
holiday. Businesses close for three days of celebrations. People wear 
colourful clothes, set off fireworks, dance, and hold parades and 
buzkashi matches (for details see the chapter on Recreation). 
• Eid al-Fitr: The feast of Eid al-Fitr marks the end of Ramadan, the month 
of fasting and falls on the first day of the month of Shawal. Eid al-Fitr 
celebrations usually last for three days and are greatly anticipated. For 
men, congregational prayers are held in mosques, after which families 
visit their friends and relatives.  Celebratory food is prepared and served. 
New clothes, especially for the children, are made and children get 
presents called “Eidi”, usually money.  
 
Cultural Awareness 
 
General rules 
• Afghans are a mixture of tribes, with a mixture of languages and cultures. 
But share a common religion - Islam. Islam provides a way of life and 
moral code to all groups. Besides a common religion, only foreign 
invaders from Alexander the Great to the British in the 19th century, and 
the Soviets in the 20th have united the Afghans. 
• Bringing shame upon a Muslim can have dangerous, and sometimes 
deadly, consequences. It is important to understand actions that can 
shame a Muslim and to avoid those actions wherever possible. For 
example, correcting an Afghan in public can shame an Afghan, as can 
using the left-hand to hand something to an Afghan. 
• Shame, in this culture, is something to be avoided. However, if it 
happens, the first response may be to hide it from view. If this is not 
possible, then the shame must be avenged. The Qur’an states that 
revenge is the only way to eliminate a shame. 
• Afghans way of thinking is totally different from the Western mid-set. It 
can lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretation of different events. 
• Do not underestimate Afghans. In some areas they live in conditions 
similar to 18th century however they life experience created an own 
survivability philosophy.  
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• Afghans are typically friendly and hospitable, but their lives have been 
rife with years of conflict and they can be stern. 
• Perceptions are greatly influenced by a faith that Allah controls 
everything and that everything happens according to His will. This belief 
helps Afghans tolerate extreme hardships. 
• Like other Muslims, most Afghans consider dogs unclean and will be very 
reluctant to touch one. Those Afghans who have anything to do with 
raising animals may have guard dogs for their flocks, but even so, are not 
accustomed to the notion of dogs in the house. An Afghan who has 
touched a dog will want to wash his or her hands, either immediately 
afterwards or most certainly before eating. 
• Muslims do, however, like cats. Mohammed, the founder of Islam, was 
once said to have cut off the hem of his robe rather than disturb the cat 
sleeping on it. 
• While Afghans may engage in discussions relating to religion and politics, 
these subjects can be provocative. To avoid conflict, it would be best to 
avoid such topics. 
• Afghans display pride in their religion, country, ancestry (history), and 
above all, their independence. 
• Afghans’ primary loyalty is to their family, kin group, clan, or tribe, 
through which they express their identity. Their social mores are often 
strict and inflexible; they stress honour and individuals’ responsibility to 
fulfil expected roles. 
• Personal disputes are not solved easily because of the need to protect 
one’s honour.  
• Family honour is affected by personal behaviour, so living according to 
these rigid rules is considered essential. 
• Afghan society is consistent in its attitudes toward the underlying 
principles of gender. Traditional civil society activities in Afghanistan are 
strictly sex-segregated with patent ideological support to male authority 
over women in the public domain. Application of these principles varies 
from group to group; and there is a wide range of standards set for 
accepted female behaviour, as well as differences in male attitudes 
toward correct treatment of women. 
• Courage, and physical courage, is central to the Afghan character. They 
have ability to suffer pain stoically, without fuss, and silently. It is 
deemed unmanly for an Afghan to cry out, or scream, if gravely injured. 
This is inculcated into his character as a child, as a part of his upbringing. 
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• Afghan spirituality leads to suspicion of new technology. An Afghan will 
tell you that new technology and materialism must be balanced against 
family bonds and the potential harm against people. 
• All footwear is removed for prayers. This rule applies for visiting mosque. 
• Be aware that forcing a Muslim's head to touch the ground may make 
him an enemy. Muslims only touch their heads to the ground when 
praying. 
• Soldiers in tanks or trucks should avoid sitting on them in urban areas or 
villages. Afghan males see this as an attempt to look in their women 
quarters which are normally hidden behind a wall. 
 
Customs, courtesies and greetings 
• Greetings vary by region and ethnic groups, but Arabic greetings are 
universally accepted. Greetings in Afghanistan can differ between urban 
and rural settings. Afghans in urban areas are usually familiar with 
Western greetings, and handshaking is common but men must not touch 
a woman in greeting. Placing the right hand on one’s heart is a common 
way of greeting. 
• Although the many ethnic groups in Afghanistan have their own 
greetings and expressions, they all recognize Muslim greetings. Assalam 
alaikum (Peace being upon you) is used to greet at any time of day. The 
traditional reply is Waalaikum assalaam (And peace also upon you). 
• A common Dari greeting is Khubus ti? (How are you?), and the Pashto 
equivalent is Sanga ye? 
• When addressing others in a formal situation, using an academic or 
professional title is essential. 
• A religious leader is called Mullah (giver of knowledge).  
• Socioeconomic status can also determine which title to use (such as 
Khan, meaning “sir”). 
• Some people are respectfully referred to only by titles, for example Haji 
Khan. Usually, however, titles are combined with names. 
• Haji (pilgrim) is reserved for those who have made a pilgrimage to Mecca 
(Saudi Arabia).  
• Friends use given names and nicknames among themselves. 
• A handshake is common among men, who tend to be expressive in 
greeting friends and may pat backs during an embrace, or sometimes 
fully embrace one another with a hug and kiss on the cheek. 
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• Women friends embrace and kiss three times on alternating cheeks. 
Women might also shake hands with other women. 
• A man does not shake hands with or otherwise touch a woman in public, 
although he may greet her verbally in an indirect way. Eye contact 
between men and women should also be avoided. Usually women may 
hold their right hand to their chest as a greeting. 
• Both men and women may greet verbally with their right hand placed 
over their heart. 
• It is impolite to ask an Afghan for his ethnic origin, about his wife, 
daughter or sisters. 
• Whenever possible ensure that your interpreter is of the same ethnicity 
as the party you are dealing with. A non-Afghan contracted interpreter of 
a different ethnicity may be acceptable. 
• When approaching a male/female couple do not look at the female. 
• The left hand is considered unclean in Afghanistan and should not be 
used alone when passing items. 
• Blowing your nose in public is unacceptable. 
• Always ask permission before taking photographs of people. 
 
Talking distances and gestures 
• Western hand gestures and finger pointing should be avoided. 
• Men often work worry beads (tasbe) with their fingers while they 
converse. 
• Male friends link arms or hold hands while walking. 
• Members of the opposite sex do not touch in public. 
• To beckon a person, one motions downward with the palm of the hand 
facing down. 
• To request divine assistance, one holds both hands in front of the chest, 
palms up as if holding a book. 
• Muslim women gaze downward when speaking to men. They may look 
down just during introductions, or even during conversations days 
afterward.  
• The talking distance can be closer by Western standards, pulling back 
may be considered offensive. It is not applicable for conversations 
between males and females. Personal space should be considered when 
working with Afghan women. Getting too close will be interpreted as 
dishonouring a woman.  
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• It is considered inappropriate for a man and a woman to be alone 
together in a room with a closed door. 
• Speaking to a woman in a social context is dishonourable, as well as 
speaking to a woman in the street. 
• Wherever possibly, avoidance of profanity in the presence of Afghans is 
recommended. Many Muslim people can be sensitive to bad language. 
Further, it is essential to avoid any references that Afghans may find 
derogatory.  
• Remember that the Afghan people are not part of the Middle East, nor 
do they consider themselves Arabs. It is their shared Islamic religion, 
which accounts for many of the similarities in culture between 
Afghanistan and other countries that are considered Arab. 
• At all times, it is important to be honest when interacting with the 
Afghan people. Try to avoid blunt refusals when asked to perform a 
favour for an Afghan. Such refusals are considered rude or impolite. A 
response that suggests that an effort will be made (“I’ll see what I can 
do.”) is usually more appropriate. 
• When pointing to something or somebody never use the finger but 
rather use the whole hand.  
 
Jirga and Shura 
• Make sure to arrive at the meeting  and confirm your attendance 
• Get enough information about people, their villages and the nature of 
the Shura prior to meeting date. 
• Arrive on time. 
• Do not plan any other meeting after the Shura and do not leave the 
Shura half-way through. 
• Beware of cultural sensitivities (Greetings, Starting the meeting, etc) 
• Take someone to take notes. 
• Have the right interpreter. Do not assume your interpreter knows 
everything. 
• Do wait to speak when spoken to, if elders are present. 
• Do not take side with one tribe. 
• Do not create false hope. 
• Do not cross the cultural line. 
• Do not criticise tribal elders, ANSF officers and other authorities publicly. 
• Do not impose your thoughts and ideas on Shura Elders. 
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• Focus and pay attention to the subject. The subject is the most important 
thing in their world. Always show interest and concern. 
• Use active listening. Do not interrupt or complete the subject’s speech. 
• Confront inconsistent messages. Match what the subject says with his 
body mannerisms. Make eye contact or use other body language to 
make or reinforce a point. 
• Do not walk away from someone who is speaking to you.  
 
Gifts, favours and taxes 
• It should be noted that the giving of gifts is an important part of the 
Afghan culture. It is a way to showing a respect to someone else. People 
often bring gifts to a house if invited as a guest. When visiting a high 
ranking person in Afghan hierarchy it is expected that you bring a gift. 
• If you are given a gift, plan on giving something in return. Gifts from your 
country or hometown will be treasured while postcards are appropriate. 
Fruit, sweets, or pastries are appropriate and should be wrapped nicely.  
• One should not present the gift, but set it down without calling 
attention. 
• Honour demands “favours”, everyone must offer a “favour” and 
“favours” must always be returned.  
• Cultural acceptance of “favours”:  
 Fisad-i-edori - Paying an official to quicken a process 
 Bakhsheesh - Small gift 
 Sifarish - Recommendation for an appointment 
 Mushkiltarashi - Delay of service unless a favour/bribe is paid 
 Wasita - Payment for invitation of officials 
• Do not accept cigarettes from locals. Exploding cigarettes were used 
against Russian troops. 
• Taxes: 
 Ushr – 10% tax on agricultural products to support local 
mullahs and mosques 
 Zakat – 2.5% wealth tax applied to traders 
 Baspana – assistance tax levied in name of war 
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How to work with someone who you think is corrupt? 
• Try to understand and categorise the level of corruption.  
• Do not blame the person in front of everyone. 
• Do not show to the person that you know about him, but you still keep 
your eyes closed. 
• Always try to build a strong relationship with his superior first before 
reporting the corruption. 
• Sometimes it is impossible to remove the corrupt person – all you can do 
is to mentor them so they can take measures to prevent the corruption. 
• Sometimes you cannot even report the corruption to his superior. 
 
Doing business 
• The concept of time in Afghanistan is not measured as strictly as time in 
western countries. Therefore, even though your Afghan counterparts 
may not arrive to business meetings on time, punctuality will be 
expected of foreigners. 
• The Afghan working week begins on Sunday and ends on Thursday. 
Friday is the Muslim holy day and considered part of the weekend. 
However, it is not uncommon for some businesses to also close on a 
Thursday. 
• Afghanistan is predominantly Muslim and for this reason time must be 
allocated during the working day for prayer. This may interrupt the daily 
business schedule; therefore you should take this into consideration 
when making business appointments. 
• Afghan business culture dictates a strict hierarchical structure where 
leaders separate themselves from the group and power is distributed 
from the top. 
• There is generally only one key decision maker - the most senior person 
in the company. Those in a more subordinate position represent the 
business during meetings but do not have the authority to make 
decisions. 
• In Afghan business etiquette, initial introductions tend to follow an 
informal procedure. First, as a reflection of the importance of hospitality 
in Afghan culture, there is a drink of tea. Then there follows some 
general conversation in which business is not typically mentioned or 
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discussed. This process is vital for establishing trust and getting to know 
your Afghan counterparts on a more personal level. 
• Business relationships in Afghanistan are typically established after 
personal relationships, and time for building trust is considered crucial. 
Afghans are typically warm and friendly, although some have been 
hardened by war. 
• Negotiation is a part of Afghanistan history and it is an inseparable 
element of life. Meetings are usually led by an individual who sets the 
agenda and content, and governs the pace of the meeting. Do not expect 
to open conversation on an important topic immediately upon being 
introduced. Afghans follow a pattern of etiquette where there is first a 
cup of tea, and then some pleasant conversation - conversation in which 
little or no mention is made of business to be discussed. You should not 
refuse tea. 
• Meetings in Afghanistan are used to provide information and make 
decisions rather than share ideas and discussion. Meetings are often 
unstructured, and people will casually walk out or take telephone calls. 
Afghan communication style is indirect, and information may be 
between the lines rather than directly stated. Answers to questions will 
rarely be “no,” even when a negative answer is intended. It is considered 
rude to directly blame someone for failure. Condescension is considered 
an affront. 
• Generally speaking, the Afghan people prefer to get to know the new 
person before entering into full conversation that may lead to 
commitments. This may very well take time - you will find the true pace 
of action to be that of doing things “slowly, slowly.” The passing of time 
indeed varies according to the mood of the moment. 
• Afghans place great emphasis on respect and dignity, and are therefore 
cautious to maintain each other’s honour. For this reason, younger 
colleagues in particular, must address their business counterparts with 
the appropriate title and act in a respectful manner at all times. 
• The negotiation process in Afghanistan is one based on building strong 
relationships and establishing company benefit. Forging a deal with your 
Afghan counterparts will take time and persistence, since Afghans 
generally negotiate using a bartering system that relies on a stronger and 
weaker party being involved. 
• Purchases can often take a substantial amount of time. Patience is 
required in all negotiations.  
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• Also, remember that time must often be allowed for prayer - five times a 
day for the devout Muslim - which may interrupt a scheduled course of 
action. 
• During the negotiation process different kinds of topic could be touched 
e.g. Afghanistan history, country side, family (especially triumph stories). 
Good knowledge of Afghanistan history is recommended for final 
success.  
• In some occasions, such as in a bazaar, negotiation is nearly mandatory.  
This negotiation has its own traditional rules and a quick deal is 
understood as a bad one. Incorrect or refused negotiations can insult 
vendor’s honour. 
• Business cards are uncommon in Afghanistan and are considered 
important if given. If one receives a business card, a comment should be 
made about the person’s credentials. The card should then be placed in a 
holder or someplace respectful. 
• If you are responsible for set up of the meeting, never place an Afghan in 
the place with the door behind him. That shows he is not important 
person. 
 
Diet and dining 
• Footwear should be removed when entering a home. 
• Do wait to be seated by the host when dining in a home. 
• Afghans usually sit on the floor around a mat (“tablecloth”) on which 
food is served in a communal dish. Do not step on or over the tablecloth 
or over other guests, but walk behind them. Always use Islamic 
etiquette. 
• Afghans typically sit with legs crossed, but pointing the soles of the feet 
towards someone else is impolite. 
• Afghans may pray after an occasion such as dinner by holding both hands 
in front of the body with palms facing up. 
• To eat, one uses the fingers of the right hand only or a piece of naan 
(unleavened bread). Never use the left hand to eat; the left hand is 
reserved for what the culture characterizes as unclean tasks156
• Families normally eat together, but if a male guest is present, females eat 
separately. 
. 
                                                          
156 In the Muslim world, the left hand serves a specific purpose – hygiene after using the toilet. 
Afghans will cleanse their hands immediately after. 
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• In many areas, belches are considered an expression of appreciation for 
a meal but do not engage in this. 
• Afghans in rural areas usually eat only breakfast and dinner, but 
sometimes snack between meals. Most Afghans follow the Muslim 
dietary code and refrain from eating pork and drinking alcohol.  
• Diet changes from group to group, although bread, rice and tea are 
dietary staples everywhere. Other major food items include potatoes, 
tomatoes, spinach, carrots, peas, cucumbers, and eggplant. Snacks 
include fresh and dried fruit such as apples, apricots, melons, mulberries, 
oranges, and plums. Nuts are also common, especially almonds, 
pistachios, and walnuts. The Uzbek include many pasta dishes in their 
cuisine. For details see Annex D. 
• Traditional Afghan drink is different types of tea, usually green tea. Tea is 
usually served without milk, and a guest’s cup is constantly refilled. 
Generally alcohol is not a part of dining, but due to foreign influence it 
could be served in very specific cases.  
• As a traditional part of hospitality Afghans can offer you to smoke a 
water pipe after   eating.  
• In some areas Afghans used to smoke marihuana or other psychotropic 
matter. 
 
Figure 33: Afghan cuisine 
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Sense of time, distance, locations  
• Afghans have a very different sense of time than Westerners and are 
frequently late for meetings. 
• Often, the length of time a task will take is of no importance. Afghans are 
primarily concerned with seeing that the task is accomplished. 
• Personal identification card called tazkara is issued when person apply 
for driving license (usually around 18). A Tazkara includes a date of birth 
based on the Muslim calendar.  
• Afghans have a very different sense of geographical distance than 
Westerners and it may happen that the distance will be in reality greater 
than it was communicated. 
• Poor cadastral system, except major cities, non-existing cadastral maps 
of streets and building numbers can influence your orientation.  
• Be aware of different spellings of names or places provided by your 
interpreter.  
• Afghans have a very different sense of estimate than Westerners and it 
could happen that described number of personnel, colour or car type is 
in reality different.  
• Afghans have a very different standard of truth’s perception than 
Westerns. They believe in stories that coming from relevant source 
(relatives, close friends); even if this story sound for Westerns unrealistic.  
 
Ramadan Etiquette 
• Try to avoid the following for your Muslim colleagues: 
 meetings which include lunch 
 meetings extending after 5 p.m. 
 department parties (or social events) during Ramadan. 
• Be understanding that it is the most special month in the Muslim 
calendar. 
• It is common to take vacation during the last week of Ramadan. 
• Eid Day is off, especially for those with family. 
• Greeting colleagues saying: “Ramadan Mubarak” (Blessed Ramadan). 
• During the Month of Ramadan be considerate of and supportive to the 
Muslims around you. 
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Ramadan DOs 
• After every day’s fast, Muslims have an evening meal called Iftar where 
friends, family and loved ones get together and have a feast. Accept an 
invitation if invited and make sure to bring some sweets and flowers. 
Muslims regard this as a sign of friendship. But don’t be offended if the 
host refuses to put your sweets on the table for everyone else since this 
might indicate he has no sweets to offer. 
• Ask after the health and well being of your host but do not inquire about 
his wife in her absence.  Also express your wishes that his family is well. 
• Take your own food when going to work since restaurants will be closed 
during the day. 
 
Ramadan DON’Ts 
• Do not eat, drink or smoke in public during the sacred month of 
Ramadan, since it is against the law in most Muslim countries and is 
viewed as disrespectful and insensitive. Some companies, educational 
facilities and other establishments assign designated places where non-
Muslims can eat, smoke and drink in the day during Ramadan. 
• If you happen to receive Muslim visitors during the day, be careful about 
serving them refreshments. If you happen to find out they are not 
fasting, invite them for a meal at one of your company’s designated 
areas. 
• When invited for an Iftar, do not eat and leave immediately. Hang 
around and enjoy some more food, perhaps coffee or tea, but be alert 
for the call to Isha, the evening prayer, as your host may want to end the 
visit at this time and proceed to have prayers. 
• Since Ramadan is a month of spiritual renewal and piety, among other 
things, women are advised to dress very modestly. 
 
Cross-Cultural Commonalities 
Human beings commonly take for granted that every individual 
throughout the world thinks and act just like them. However different cultures 
have different attitudes, beliefs and values. This lack of intercultural vision makes 
mutual misunderstanding predictable in such cases, when both parties think and 
express themselves in different languages. Moreover, culture shock, which is a 
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common stress reaction that individuals have when they find themselves 
immersed in an unfamiliar culture, can complicate the situation.  
In this situation we must apply the communicative approach with an 
interactive, reciprocal and empathetic attitude towards our partners and find 
cultural intersection or commonalities. 
Cultural intersection situations materialize when that which is foreign to 
us becomes significant to our own cultural reference system, thus establishing a 
reciprocal interaction between both cultures. Therefore, between our own 
cultural values and those that portray the alien culture, an intermediate space is 
created, a space made up of vagueness, novelties and ambiguities that could lead 
to misunderstandings in the communicative interaction. 
 
 
Figure 34: Cultural intersection 
 
In case of limited or no language knowledge the role of interpreter as 
mediator in the intercultural communication is critical for success or failure of 
involved parties’ purposes. 
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Between two different cultures there are quantities of cultural 
intersections. However each one depends on both sides’ personalities involved in 
rapport building. Humbleness and a genuine respect for the new culture will go 
much farther than any predetermined set of cultural guidelines. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Afghanistan has been widely considered an ungovernable country. This is 
mainly the effect of a heterogeneous population with multiethnic composition, 
driven by specific goals even within a specific group. Lacking constrains of a strong 
central government along the time, the numerous existing groups determined a 
large variety of cultural identities, each following its own well-established code of 
conduct.  
The complexity of the Afghan human aspects makes even more difficult 
the cultural adaptation, defined as a process of learning the locals’ culture, 
behaviours and language in an effort to understand and interact successfully with 
them. This process cannot be accomplished over night and requires an important 
effort of collective and individual preparation. However, individuals might still 
experience the “cultural shock” when deployed and their performance and 
decisions might be affected. 
Objectively observing the culture around us and learning from it is 
essential, but it is incomplete because humans are not natural at objective 
observation. Remember that the DOs and DON’Ts approach is situational and it is 
impossible to anticipate all situations and prescribe appropriate responses for 
each possible situation. It tends to overly simplify a complex phenomenon. 
Different age groups; educational levels; socio-economic levels will have different 
behaviours.  
We cannot expect the local population to change their behaviour to suit 
our expectations; but rather we must change our expectations to suit their 
behaviour. When we make a judgment we must remember that it is based on the 
experience of our own culture. An interactive, reciprocal and empathic approach 
can facilitate this cultural adaptation process. 
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ANNEX A 
CULTURAL SUMMARY DOs AND DON’Ts 
 
DOs:  
• Do shake hands with the right hand, firmly but gently in greeting and 
departure. 
• Do learn and use a few Afghan greetings. 
• Do reply to the greeting “Asalaam Alaykum” with “ Waalaykum as 
salaam” 
• Do shake with everyone when you meet or leave, starting with the most 
senior person. 
• Do rise to show respect when an important person enters or leaves a 
room. 
• Do be relaxed and take your time during conversations. 
• Do be courteous, polite and patient. 
• Do politely accept hospitality. 
• Do offer guests non-alcoholic refreshments. 
• Do wash your hands before you touch or pass food or drinks. 
• Do use your right hand when eating, drinking or passing food. 
• Do expect Afghans to ask lots of personal questions as they try to know 
you and work out if they can trust you. 
• Do grow a beard if possible; this helps to establish your position as an 
elder. 
• Do respect that Afghanistan is a strictly Islamic society. 
• Do show great respect to Islamic religious leaders. 
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• Do treat mosques with respect at all times. If ever need to enter one 
remember to always remove your shoes. 
• Do remember that Friday is a holy day.  
• Do appreciate that status always plays in conversations, meetings and 
negotiations. 
• Do identify and deal with the high status individual, he will have 
influence over others. 
• Do return the gesture of placing the right hand over the heart after 
shaking hands.  
• Do try all food offered to acknowledge the hospitality of the host.  
• Do offer a cigarette to everyone in the group.  
• Do recognize the nature of Afghan hospitality.  
• Do expect to spend much of a visit socializing and drinking tea before 
discussing business.  
• Do use applicable professional or academic titles, such as “engineer,” 
“doctor,” and “professor.”  
• Do expect Afghans to have a different sense of time and punctuality.  
• Do give a gift in return for one received.  
• Do sit with your legs under you or tucked away.  
• Do summon people using you whole hand facing down and motioning 
inwards.  
• Do remove your shoes when visiting a home.  
• Do wait to be seated by the host when dining in a home.  
• Do wait to speak when spoken to, if elders are present.  
 
DON’Ts:  
• Don’t use the left hand for physical contact with others, to eat, or to 
make gestures.  
• Don’t sit with the soles of your feet facing someone.  
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• Don’t walk away from someone who is speaking to you.  
• Don’t show a woman attention by addressing, touching, or staring at her.  
• Don’t ask men direct questions about their female relatives.  
• Don’t tell an Afghan he is wrong if he gives incorrect information.  
• Don’t express emotion in public.  
• Don’t expect Afghans to be able to read, especially outside urban 
centres.  
• Don’t wag or point your finger.  
• Don’t wear sunglasses indoors.  
• Don’t offer an Afghan food or drink or publicly consume either during 
Ramadan.  
• Don’t ask an Afghan not to smoke.  
• Don’t use the OK sign or thumbs-up.  
• Don’t summon people using a crooked finger.  
• Don’t confront a Muslim on his religious beliefs.  
• Don’t maintain prolonged eye contact with an Afghan male.  
• Don’t rush or hurry an Afghan.  
• Don’t shame an Afghan in public.  
• Don’t bring a dog into an Afghan’s home.  
• Don’t force a Muslim’s head to touch the ground. 
• Don´t pass wind (fart) in public; it is unacceptable. 
• Don´t blow your nose in public; it is unacceptable. 
• Don´t worry too much about making mistakes, if you are the guest and 
are humble you will be forgiven. 
• Don´t obviously admire something - Afghans may feel that they have to 
give it to you.  
• Don´t expect to start talking business straight away. 
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• Don´t cause anyone to lose face, but be prepared to stand your ground. 
• Don´t offer a Muslim alcohol, pork or any product from a pig, including 
leather products. 
• Don´t touch or move the Qur´an (Muslims’ holy book). 
• Don´t stand in front of, or disturb a Muslim who is praying. 
• Don´t criticise an Afghan in front of others or cause him to lose face. 
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ANNEX B 
BASISCS OF DARI AND PASHTO 
 
 
 
Figure B1: Dari alphabet 
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 Figure B2: Pashto alphabet 
 
Pronunciation guide/tips 
 
Pronunciation in Pashto:  
Gh as Guttural hard g, as "r'' in Parisian French Route e.g. Ghat: Big 
Kh guttural hard h, as "kh" in khan e.g. Khpelwan: Relatives 
Zh as "j" in French jour, e.g. Zher: fast 
T as "t" in French tour, e.g. Toor-Black 
T as "t" in English town, e.g. Ta-kaar-Accident 
D as "d" in French docteur,  e.g. Dround: Havey 
D as "d" in  English doctor, e.g. Dan-gar:Skinny 
Ch as "ch" in English Church, e.g. Ch'er-ta: Where 
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Q Guttural Hard k, e.g. Qaanoon-Rule –Law 
R e.g. Rawral--Bring 
 
Pronunciation in Dari: 
Gh Guttural hard g, e.g.Gham-Geen: Sad 
kh in Scotch in loch = Khaa-l'eq=Creator 
Zh as "j" in French jour, e.g. Zhaala: Hail 
Ch as "ch" in English Church, e.g. Cha-har: Four 
Q Guttural  hard k, e.g. Qaanoon-Rul: Law 
 
Glossary of terms 
 
Askar Soldier Soldat 
Caravanserais Inns Auberge 
Chaykhanas Teahouses Maison de thé 
Ghar Mountain Montagne 
Jaheel/DanD Lake Lac 
Jirga Council Conseil 
Jumaat Mosque Mosquée 
Kéley Village Village 
Koor House Maison 
Mullah Teacher (giver of knowledge) Guide spirituel 
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Pul Bridge Pont 
Rooghtoon/Shefaa/Khaana Hospital Hôpital 
Salak / Láar(a) Road Route 
Sarrak Street Rue 
Shaar City (town) Cité (ville) 
Shah King Roi 
Taliban Student Étudiant 
Tsalorlaari Crossroads Carrefour 
Waadi Valley Vallée 
Wali Code Code 
 
Key phrases  
 
Introductions 
English Pashto Dari 
Do you speak english? 
french? 
T'e P'e Engleesi (Fraansawee)  
Khabara Kaw'ei? 
Ba Engleesi (Fraansawee) 
Sohbat Mekonee? 
I can't speak Pashtun. Z'e Pa Pashtun Khaburai 
Nash'um Kawolai. 
Man B'e Pashto Gap-Za-da 
Na-Mi-Ta-Va-Nam 
I am a soldier. Z'e Yow Askar Y'um Man Askar Hastam 
My name is________ Zèma Noom ….. Dai  Naam-A  Man _____ 
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What is your name? Çè Noommèizhèi  Naam-A Shuma Chee Ast? 
Greetings 
 
Basic questions 
English Pashto Dari 
What? S'e Ch'e 
English Pashto Dari 
Hello! Salaam Alaikum Salaam Alaikum 
Good morning, afternoon, 
Evening! 
Salaam Alaikum Salaam Alaikum 
Response to good morning, 
etc Wa  Alaikum Salaam Wa  Alaikum Salaam 
How are you? Senga Ye’i? Che-toar Has-tain? 
I am fine 
Z'e Sh'e Y'um (Kandahar) 
Z'e kh'e Y'um 
Man khob Hastam 
Goodbye Dè Khudai Pè Amaan Kho-Da Hafaz 
See you next time D'e Khodai P'e Maan Kho-Da Hafaz 
Yes/No Ho/Na Ba Lee/Na 
Alright (OK) Sama Da Do-'Rost-ast 
Is every thing alright? What 
is going on? Khairit Da? Se-Kha-bera Da? Khairit Ast? Ch'e Gup Ast? 
It's OK, isn't it? Da Sama Da Do-Rost Ast 
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English Pashto Dari 
What do you want? S'e Ghwal'ei? Ch'e May-kha-Haid? 
When? S'e Wakht Ch'e Wakht 
Where is ….. Place ? Cheeray Da ………Zaay?      Koaja Ast ……..Monteqa? 
Where? Ch'er'ei Dar Ko-Ja 
Where do you go? Cheir Ta' Zei? Kauja Mayraveed? 
Which one? Koom Yow Ku-Dm 
Who? Sook/ Chaa Ki 
Why? Wal'ei Ch'era 
How? Senga Ch'e Towr 
How much is this? Dè Dèi Baya Çoomra da? Qee-mat   chand ast  
How many? Soo? Chand 
How old are you? T'e So Kal'un Y'ei? Chand Sala Asti ? 
Can I come in? Kawolay Sham Ch'e NaNa Wozam? 
Man Maytaawanam Daakhil 
Shawam? 
 
Directions 
English Pashto Dari 
Up Paas Baala 
Down Laandei Paaeen 
Left Keen Cha'up 
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Right Shai Raast 
Days of the Week 
English Dari Pashto 
Sunday Yak Shanba Yak Shanba 
Monday Do Shanba Do Shanba 
Tuesday S'ei Shamb'ei S'ei Shamb'ei 
Wednesday Chaar Shamb'ei Chaar Shamb'ei 
Thursday Panj Shanb'ei Panj Shanb'ei 
Friday Juma Juma 
Saturday Shanbai Shanbai 
 
Time 
English Dari Pashto 
Sunday Yak Shanba Yak Shanba 
Monday Do Shanba Do Shanba 
Tuesday S'ei Shamb'ei S'ei Shamb'ei 
Wednesday Chaar Shamb'ei Chaar Shamb'ei 
Thursday Panj Shanb'ei Panj Shanb'ei 
Friday Juma Juma 
Saturday Shanbai Shanbai 
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Seasons 
English Pashto Dari 
Winter Zh'eimai Zameestan 
Spring Psarlay Bahaar 
Summer Oolai / Dobai Tabestan 
Fall M'einai Khazan 
 
Weapons and Equipment 
English Pashto Dari 
Armored Personal Carrier Z'er'ehdaar Z'er'ehdaar 
Arsenal Jabha Khaana Jabha Khaana 
Artillery Toopchee Quwwaa/ Toopkhana 
Quwwaa-eToopchee / 
Toopkhana 
Ball Toop Toop 
Bomb Baam Baam 
Car Mootar./Teiz Raftaar Mootar./Teiz Raftaar 
Detonator Chawd'eidoonkee  Enfejaar Dehenda 
Explosives Chawd'eidoonkee Mawaad Mawaad-e Enfejaaree 
Gun Toop Toop 
Helicopter Haleekooptar Haleekooptar 
Jeep Jeep Jeep 
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Knife Cha-Qoo Cha-Qoo 
Knife Kard / Barcha Kard / Barcha 
Landmine Zmakanai Maain Maain Zameeni 
Machine gun Maasheendar Maasheendar 
Military vehicle Askaree Mootar Mootar-e Askaree  
Pistol Tamaancha Tofungcha 
Rocket / Missile Raakit Raakit 
Rocket Launcher Raakit Andaaz Raakit Andaaz 
Shotgun Toopak Taufung 
Tank Taank Taank 
Truck Laarai Laari 
 
Conversations 
English Pashto Dari 
Almost. Taqreeban Taqreeban 
Always Ham'eisha Ya Har K'ela  Ham'eisha 
Are you done? 
Have you finished? 
Tas'ei Khlas Shwai? Shoama Khalas Sho-dead 
Divide this among 
yourselves. 
Daa Pa Khp'ul M'enz K'ei           
Wo 'eishai 
'Een Ra Dar B'ean Khod Taq-
s'eem Konid 
Everywhere. Har Ch'eir Ta Hama Ja 
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English Pashto Dari 
I am cold /I feel cold /it is 
cold 
Z'ema Yakhnee keizhee Ya 
Sala Mei Keizhee Kho-N'uk'Mee-kho-Ram 
I am hot / I feel hot /it is hot Z'ema Garmmee K'eigee Garmmee Kardeem 
I am not sure. Z'e   'Da 'De Na 'Yum                            Man Mut Maen Nestam 
I am surprised / astonished  Z'e Hairaan Y'um                               Man Hairaan Hastam 
I am tired. Z'e Ste' Lai Y'um Mon-da Sho Deam 
I as well/ Me too Z'e Ham Man Ham 
I can. Kawolai Sh'um May-Ta-Va-Nam 
I cannot. Na Sh'um Kawolai Na-May-Ta-Va-Nam 
I don’t like it. Khwakh M'ei Na Da Kho-Sham Na  May-ya-yad 
I don’t think so. 
Z'e  Hamdasei Fekr Na 
Kawum/Ze taasara muwafeq 
neyom. 
Ha-Meen Towr Fekr Na  
Mikonam/ Hamrayat 
muwafeq nestam 
I don't know. Z'e  Na  Poh'ei g'um Man Na Fah-Mam 
I take it. Khwakh M'ei Da/ Daa Akhlom Kho-Sham May-ya-yad/ In Ra Megeeram 
I think so. Z'e   Hamdasei Fekr Kawum Ha-Meen Towr Fekr Mikonam 
I wish / I hope Heela Lar' um Ar'e Zo Daram 
It is so / It is like that. Ham-dasei  Da Ha-Meen Towr Ast 
Not all/ all Tul Na/ Tul Ha-Ma Ne/Ha Ma 
Not always Ham'eisha Ya Har K'ela Na Ham'eisha Na 
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English Pashto Dari 
Not now Oos Na Pas Ta Ha-laa Ne 
Not often/ Often Deir Wakhtona Na / Aksaran Ham'eisha Ne/ Ak-Sa-Run 
Not so much Doomra D'eir Na Een 'Qa-Dar Na 
Nothing. H'eis Shai H'ech Cheez 
Perfect. B'el  Kul  Durusta Da B'el Kul Durust Ast  
Sometimes. K'ela-K'ela Ba-Zai Wokht 
This is good. 
Daa Kh'e Da  
 
Khob-Bast 
This is not good. Daa Kh'e Na Da Khob-N'ei-st  
We are not very happy. Moong D'eir Kushala Na You Ma Khosh-Hal N'ei asteam 
We are very happy. Moong D'eir Khwakh You             Ma Khosh-Hal Hasteam 
What do you do? S'e Kar Kaw'ei? Ch'e Wa-zi-fa Da-ri 
Are you married? Taasee Waada Klai Yai? 'Aa Rossi  Kar-Di 
 
Check Point Activities 
English Pashto Dari 
Stop! Dr'eish Dr'eish 
Stop right there (Plural). Humhalta Wudareizhai. Dar Homan Ja Estad Show 
Stop or I'll shoot you. Wudar'eizha Ka Na D'e wulum Estad Sho Ya Mayzanamat 
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English Pashto Dari 
Hands up! (Singular). Laasoona D'e Jeg Wuneesa! D'ast Ha Baala 
Put your hands on your 
head! (Plural). 
Laasoona Mu P'er Sar 
K'eshizhdai! 
Dast Hay Khod Ra Baalay 
Saarat Begzar! 
Put your hands down! 
(Plural). 
Laasoona De' Mu ' Shkata  
KLai  Daast Hi Tan Ra Paaeen Konid 
Lay on the ground! (Plural). Pe' Zme'ka Wughazeizhai! Prooth 
Get up! (Plural). Paas saizhai! B'eKh'ezeed 
Are you armed?  Wasla larei? Mosala Hasteed? 
Turn in your weapon (Sing.) Wasla De Raaka. Aslaha Khod Ra Tasleem Konen 
Where is the weapon? Sallah Cheirta Da? Sallah Tan Koja Ast? 
Lay your weapon down. 
(Plural). 
Wasla Mu P'er Zm;aka 
K'eshizhdai 
Aslaha Khod Ra Dar Zameen 
B'egzareed 
Show me your national ID 
document. Tazkera D'e Rata Wushaya. 
Tazkera tan Ra Neshan 
Bedeheed 
May I search your car? Ejaaza Da Ch'e Staasoo Mootar Wultawum? 
Ejaaza Ast K'e Mootar 
Shoama Ra Talaashee 
Konam? 
I should search you. 
(Singular). Ze Baayad Taa Wulatawum 
Man Shoama Ra Baayad 
T'alashee Konam. 
We are searching your car. Moonzh Oos Staasoo Mootar Lata woo. 
Maa Mootar Shoama Ra 
Talashee Makoniam. 
Get off the truck. L'e laarai Sakha Shkata Sha. Az Laarai Paeen Shavad 
Open the trunk. Tool Baks Khlaasa Ka. Tool Baks Ra Baz Kun 
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English Pashto Dari 
Open the glove 
compartment. Sewechboord Khlaasa Ka. Sewechboord Ra Baz kun. 
Stay aside / away from the 
truck. La Laarai Na Eesta Sha Az Laarai Dour Shovaid 
Clear the way  
(Plural). 
Laara Khlaasa Klai. Raah Ra Baz Konid 
You cannot stay here 
(Plural). D'elta Paatei Keidai Na Sh'ei 
Dar Eenja Manda Na 
Meetavanid. 
Go now (singular). Oos No Laal Sha Bayad B'eraveed 
Go (Plural). Zai/ Laal  Shai B'eraveed 
Leave this area (Plural). lad'ei Zaaya Eesta Shai Az Eenja P'ass Shaveed 
Go home (Plural). Koor ta Laal Sh'ai Ba Khana Beraveed 
Come here (Singular). Delta Raasha Eenja Baya. 
I know  Z'e Pooh'eig'um Man MayfahMam 
Who is authorized? Saalahyat D'e Chaa P'e Laas Ksh'ei Da? Saalahyat Dar Dast Keest? 
Stand up (Singular). Wulaal Sha / Pa S'eizha Eestad Sho 
Turn (Singular) Taaow Sha Dawr Bekhor 
Go forward (Plural). Wlaandai Laal Shai Peesh Beraveed 
Let's go Zai Ch'e Zoo Bayaid K'e B'eraveem 
Fast Zher Zood 
Slow Wuroo Aahesta 
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English Pashto Dari 
Don't talk (Plural). Khber'ei Makawai Gaap Na Zaneed 
Be quiet (Singular). Chup Sha Chup Bash 
Let us pass. Pr'eizhda Ch'e Teir Shoo Beg Zar Teir Shaveem 
Wait here Dèlta Entezaar Wubaasai In Jaa Entezaar Bashed 
Wait here (Plural). Delta Entzar Wubaasai Dar Eenja Entazar B'ekasheed 
Don't interfere (Singular). T'e Kaar M'elara Modakhela Nakun 
Come and see (Singular). Razai Wugoora Byaeed Sayel Konid 
Come with me (Singular). Maa Sara Raasha. Humrai Man B'eya Aid 
Wait for me. (Singular). Maata Wu Dareizha Braeem Moontazar Basheed 
Don't talk (Plural). Khber'ei Makawai Gaap Na Zaneed 
Be quiet (Singular). Chup Sha Chup Bash 
Give yourselves up. Tasleem Shai. Tasleem Shaveed. 
Don't forget (Singular). Heir D'e Na Shee Faramoosh Na Konid 
Excuse me. I am in a hurry. Bakhshena Ghwalum. Z'e Ajala Larum Babakhsheed Ajala Daram. 
Leave me alone (Singular). Karar M'ei Pr'eizhda Mazahamat Nakun 
Don't do that (Singular). Hagha Kar Mekawa Een Kar Ra Na kun 
The situation is chaotic. Waz'a Naa Ra Maa da Waza Naa Ram Ast 
Resistance is useless. Muqawumat Faaida Na Laree. Muqawumat Faaida Na Daraad 
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English Pashto Dari 
Do you have children? Maashoomaan Larai? 'Ao-lad Darid 
Do you have a pen? Taa Soo Qalam Larai? Shoama Qalam Darid? 
Can you help me? Kawolai Sh'ei Ch'e Maa Sara Kumak Woklai? 
Shoama Mita Wanid Mara 
Kumak Konid 
Where can we find it / him / 
she 
Ch'erta Y'ei Paida Kawolai 
Shoo 
Dar Koja Mita-Vanim Oo-ra 
Payda Kunim 
 
Vocabulary 
English Pashto Dari 
Baby Koochnai Maashoom Tefel 
Bullet Kaartoos Kaartoos 
Brother Wuroor B'eradar 
Businessman Saowdaagar Saowdaagar / Taajeer 
Cook Aashpaz Aashpaz 
Daughter Loor Dokhtar 
Diplomat Deploomaat Deploomat 
Driver Mootarvan Mootarwan 
Enemy Dushman Dushman 
Family Kooranai Khanavada 
Farmer Bazgar Dehqan 
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
250 
 
English Pashto Dari 
Father Plaar Padar 
Friend Dost Dost 
Girl Njlai Dokh-Tar 
Grandfather Neeka Padar Kalaan 
Grandmother Anaa Maadar Kalaan 
Guard / Watchman Paira Daar Paira Daar 
Guerrilla Chereek Chereek 
Huge Looy / Ghat Khily Bozroug 
Journalist KhabareeYaal KhabareeYaal 
Kid / child Maashoom Tafail 
Killer Qaatel Qaatel 
Leader Rahbar Rahbar 
Man SaLai Maard 
Messenger Qaasad Qaasad 
Mother Moor Maadar 
Officer Afsar / Mansabdaar Afsar / Mansabdaar 
Old men Boodaa Boba 
Pilot Peeloot Peeloot 
Police Pooless / Saarandooy Pooless / Saarandooy 
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English Pashto Dari 
POW Aseer Aseer 
Priest Ksheesh Ksheesh 
Prisoner Baandee Baandee 
Refugee Muhaajer Muhaa-Jer 
Relative KhpulWaan Kheesha  Wond 
Security Post Amneyatee Poosta Poosta Amneyatee 
Security Post   Amneyatee Poosta Poosta Amneyatee 
Shooter Daz'ei Kawoonkai Faer Kunaanda 
Sister Khoor Khahaar 
Son Zooy Bacha 
Surgeon Jarraah Jarrah 
Teacher Showonkai / Muallem Muallem 
Terror Turoor Turoor 
Terrorist Turooreest Turooreest 
Thief Ghal Dozd 
Translator / Interpreter Tarjumaan Tarjumaan 
Translator / Interpreter Tarjumaan Tarjumaan 
Uncle Tra / Akaa Ka-kaa 
Uzbek Oozbak Oozbak 
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English Pashto Dari 
Watch Paira Paira 
Women Shuza Zaan 
 
Numbers 
Latin Dari Pashto 
0 sefer sefer 
1 yak Yao 
2 du Dwa 
3 she Dre 
4 chor Salor 
5 panj Pinza 
6 shish Shpag 
7 haft Uwe 
8 hasht Atu 
9 nuh Naha 
10 Las dah 
11 Yaow Lass Yaz-daa 
12 Dow lass Davaz-Daa 
13 Dyaar Lass Seez-daa 
14 Sowaar Lass Chaar-daa 
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Latin Dari Pashto 
15 Penz'e Lass Paanz-daa 
16 Shpa Lass Shaanz-daa 
17 Owwa Lass Haf-daa 
18 At'e Lass Haazh-Daa 
19 No Lass Nooz-Daa 
20 Sh'el Beast 
21 Yaow Weesht Beast to Yak 
30 D'eirsh See 
31 Yaow D'eirsh See wo Yak 
40 Salweesht Chel 
41 Yaow Salweesht Chel O Yak 
50 Penzoos Pan-ja 
51 Yaow Penzoos Pan-Ja O Yak 
60 Shp'eit'e Shast 
61 Yaow Shp'eit'e Shast O Yak 
70 Aowyaa Haaftad 
71 Yaow Aowyaa Haaf-tad O Yak 
80 Atyaa Hash-tad 
81 Yaow Tyaa Hash-tad O Yak 
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Latin Dari Pashto 
90 Nawee Nav-ad 
91 Yaow Nawee Nav-ad O Yak 
100 S'ell Saad 
200 Dowa Sawa Doe Saad 
1,000 Yaow Z'er Hazaar 
10,000 Lass Z'ara Da-Hazaar 
100,000 Sell Zara Saad Hazaar 
1,000,000 Yaow Milioon Yak Milioon 
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ANNEX C 
TRADITIONAL AFGHAN CLOTHING 
 
Traditionally, Afghan dress reflects ethnic diversity and the socio-cultural, 
historical, and geopolitical dynamics of the region. The country and its people are 
positioned at the crossroads between the Arab, Persian, Turkish, and Asian 
empires. Consequently, Afghan dress shows strong aesthetic connections to areas 
contiguous to its borders: the Arab and Islamic Middle East and Persia, the Turkish 
Ottoman Empire, and, to a lesser degree, Mughal India. 
Since the 1920s, Afghanistan's leaders, in an effort to maintain control of 
both human and natural resources, have struggled with the definition of women's 
rights and independence as exemplified in the propriety of dress. Afghan dress 
also reflects other aspects of identity in a variety of inseparable yet interrelated 
ways: gendered and generational status; religious affiliation; rural and urban 
differences; stages of the life cycle; and everyday or special occasions. 
Afghan dress first and foremost distinguishes gender. Women 
customarily wear four items of dress: the pants (tombaan), an overdress 
(parahaan), a head covering (chaadar), and footwear (payzaar)157
Women's tombaan are made of approximately two yards of cotton or 
silk-like rayon or acetate fabric. They are usually solid white, gathered drawstring 
pants with full legs. Frequently the pant cuffs are decorated with white machine- 
or hand-embroidered patterns. The parahaan are typically made from five yards 
of cotton, silk (or silk-like acetate), and plain or satin woven fabrics in bright colors 
(for young women) and darker colors (for older women), usually in tone-on-tone 
or floral patterns. Necklines vary but usually are rounded; occasionally pointed 
collars are added, as are gathered set-in sleeves with fitted or buttoned cuffs. 
. This ensemble 
is referred to as kalaa Afghani, or Afghan women's dress. Men wear tombaan, an 
overshirt (payraan), a hat or cap (kullaa), and footwear or boots. In addition to 
this basic ensemble, Afghan men wear a vest (waaskaat), another hat (pokool), 
and a shawl (shaal or patu) during colder seasons. 
                                                          
157 Some 25 – 30 years ago people in the countryside and remote areas use to wear this kind of shoes 
but with import of cheap Chiness goods it´s not anymore common. 
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Dress skirts are full and gathered at the waist and worn mid-calf length. Chaadars 
are made of similar fabrics— usually rectangular pieces of lightweight cotton or 
silk-like crepe, woven with machine- or hand-embroidered edges. Men's tombaan 
and payraan feature fewer decorative details and are typically in natural-colored 
cotton fabric. Kulla exhibit the most variety in shapes, colors, and embroidered 
patterns. 
Dress also differentiates the age and generational status of the wearer. 
For example, though all females wear pants, overdress, and head and foot 
coverings, aesthetic characteristics vary according to age throughout women's 
lives. More costly materials and surface design embellishments are added to 
women's dowries. The decorative focus is on pants cuffs, dress bodices, and head 
covering borders as female’s age and gain more status when they become 
engaged, marry, and become mothers. These differences are evident to a lesser 
degree in men's dress as well. Shirtsleeves, bodice shirtfronts, and hats are 
embroidered in regional and ethnic patterns by either their betrothed or wife. 
Two items of dress are worth mentioning since they are the most visible 
to non-Afghans and are the most politically recognizable dress that Afghans wear. 
The pokool hat worn by Afghan men is a symbol of the Afghan freedom fighters, 
or the Mujahideen. It is a naturally colored wool hat with the characteristic 
versatile rolled edge. The second distinctive item of dress worn by Afghans is the 
woman's full body covering known as the chaadaree. The chaadaree, constructed 
of nine to ten yards of fabric with an embroidered face piece, conceals the entire 
women's dress ensemble of pants, overdress, and head covering. The original 
chaadaree is of Persian origins but over time became associated with the urban 
dress of middle and upper class Afghan women. The chaadaree has been 
incorrectly attributed as Afghan women's traditional dress; it only became 
mandated women's wear after dress sanctions were imposed by the Taliban in 
1996. During the Taliban government, women appeared in public very rarely and 
when they did they were wearing a chadiri or burka (head-to-toe covering) over 
their clothing. 
In recent years the dress code has changed a lot, some 35 years of 
conflict, civil war, government of Mujahideen and Taliban, their interpretation of 
Wahabi style Islam, militancy and extremism has forced people especially women 
to dress according to wish of rulers. Even today 12 years after the collapse of 
Tali an  re ime woman are afraid to wear what the  want or wish ecause the  
never know who they will meet outside of their houses. In some cases former 
refugees or returnees (women) wear “hijab” Arabic or Iranian style, they have 
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brought the custom of their former host country now to Afghanistan-it does not 
have anything to do  with original Afghan culture or custum. 
The most striking differences between ethnic groups are noted in dress, 
particularly in headgear. Turbans are worm mainly by the Pashtuns and Hazaras. 
They are usually grey or black in colour although white is a sacred colour worn by 
Iman, Haji and Sheiks. Light colours are generally worn by Northern Afghans. 
Pashtuns tend to leave some of the turban cloth hanging down. The shape of 
caps, round, conical or peaked, their material and decoration are distinctive 
indicators between and within many groups. In winter, men cover their heads 
with a flat wool cap, a turban with kolah (turban cap) in a colour and design 
distinctive to the wearer’s ethnicity background or qarakuli sheepskin cap. 
Afghan dress also suggests religious affiliation. The majority of Afghans 
are Muslim, and presumed Islamic prescriptions of propriety and observance 
govern the manner in which items of dress are worn. For example, Islamic 
prescriptions govern the fit, transparency, and drape of dress. In general, the 
everyday dress for both males and females fit loosely so that the contours of the 
body are less noticeable. Prescriptions also determine the patterns embroidered 
on men's shirts and hats and women's pants, over dresses, and head coverings. 
The majority of these embroidered designs are floral, geometric, and abstract 
shapes, presumably because of Islamic prohibitions on representational art and 
aesthetics. 
Afghan dress is also notable for its embroidery. Embroidery styles tend to 
be associated with geographic regions and ethnic groups. Whether from Herat, 
Kandahar, or Kabul, regional associations are made. Styles generally are 
distinguishable by the fiber content of the fabric (plain weave cottons, pile woven 
velvets, or synthetic satin weaves) as well as the kind of thread (cotton, silk or 
gold metallic threads); a variety of embroidery techniques and the complexity of 
their execution; the floral and geometric motifs; and the design placement of the 
embroidery. Three such embroidery styles are the gold stitched embroidery or 
chirma dozi, known for the unique kind of metallic thread and braid used; 
tashamaar dozi, recognizable by the intricate counted stitch technique; and silk 
stitched flower embroidery or gul dozi, distinctive because of the rich use of 
colored threads. 
In the larger cities, particularly Kabul, Western-style clothing is becoming popular, 
for both men and women. In Kabul, many men are clean-shaven. 
Afghan dress observed in the context of daily life and during special 
occasions of secular and religious contexts distinguishes gender and generational, 
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ethnic and regional, and religious identity. Dress serves to unify and maintain a 
sense of Afghan identity not only among Afghans living in Afghanistan, but also as 
Afghans differentiate themselves from other Middle Eastern and Central and 
South Asian populations in the Afghan Diaspora.  
Jewellery in Afghanistan is usually made of gold or silver. Lapis lazuli and garnet 
are abundant in Afghanistan. Tawiz amulets are worn by many people to ward off 
evil. 
 
 
Figure C1: Male head dresses 
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Figure C2: Male dresses 
 
 
Figure C3: Male coats and jacket 
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Figure C4: Buzkashi dresses 
 
 
Figure C5: Scarfs 
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Figure C6: Footwear and Socks 
 
Figure C7: Female head covers and burqas  
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Figure C8: Female formal clothing 
 
 
Figure C9: Female traditional formal dresses 
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Figure C10: Female traditional formal dresses 
 
Figure C11: Female traditional formal dresses 
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ANNEX D 
AFGHAN FOOD 
 
Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
Br
ea
d 
Naan 
 
Flour, Water, Quick 
raising yeast. 
 
Naan with spinach 
 
 
Flour, Water, Quick 
raising yeast, 
Spinach. 
 
Sw
ee
t B
re
ad
 
 
Roht  Flour, Water, Quick 
raising yeast, Sugar, 
Cardamom, Butter, 
Yogurt. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
So
up
 
Shorwa e Ghosht 
 
Beef, Bean, Garlic, 
Tomatoes, Tomato 
pasta, Coriander, 
Spices. 
 
 
M
ea
t d
ish
es
 
Qabuli Pilau Basmati (long grain 
rice), lamb on the 
bone (or chicken), 
carrots, Onion, 
Spices.  
 
M
ea
t d
ish
es
 
 
 
Kufta Kebab  Lamb steak, Onion, 
Spices.  
 
Tender Kebab Lamb steak, Onion, 
Spices. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
M
ea
t d
ish
es
 
Korma Sabzi Beef or Lamb meat, 
Onion, Garlic, 
Spinach, Coriander, 
Spices. 
 
Mourgh  
 
Chicken breasts, 
Garlic, Milk yogurt, 
Lemon, Salt and 
Black pepper. 
 
Afghani Lamb 
with Spinach 
 
Lamb stew meat, 
Onions, Garlic, 
Tomatoes, Spinach, 
Spices, Yogurt, Pine 
nuts. 
 
Kofta Nakhod Meatballs and 
Chick-Peas - Dried 
chick-peas, Beef, 
Onion, Pepper, 
Spices. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
M
ea
t d
ish
es
 
Sambousek Flour, Onion, Leek, 
Beef or Lamb meat, 
Spices.  
 
Boulanee Potatoes, Beef 
meat, Coriander, 
Cilantro, Green 
onions.  
 
Chelo nachodo Chicken & chick-pea 
stew with rice - 
Chicken legs and 
thighs, Dried chick-
peas, Rib celery, 
Carrot, Coriander, 
dill, Lemon juice, 
Rice.  
Khoresht-e Seib 
 
Chicken leg, or Duck 
breast, or Meat 
(Lamb, Veal, Beef), 
Onion, Lime juice, 
Sugar, Spices.  
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
M
ea
t d
ish
es
 
Kaddo Bourani Yogurt, Pumpkins, 
Garlic, Beef, Onion, 
Spices. 
 
Meatballs With 
Noodles Tossed In 
Yogurt 
Beef, Garlic, 
Tomatoes, Yogurt, 
Spices. 
 
Ve
ge
ta
ria
n 
Di
sh
es
 
  
Samoosi Yirakot Fine matzoh meal, 
Egg, Onion, Garlic, 
Potato, Cauliflower, 
Carrot, Green peas, 
Beans, Spices. 
 
Chakha Eggplant Eggplants, Onion, 
Green Pepper, 
Tomatoes, Garlic, 
Yogurt. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
Ve
ge
ta
ria
n 
Di
sh
es
 
 
Vegetable Fritters Flour, Cream of 
tartar, Potatoes, 
Coriander, 
Cauliflower, Lemon 
juice, Spices. 
 
Tamarind 
Potatoes 
Tamarind, Potatoes, 
Onion, Ginger, 
Garlic, Spices, 
Pepper. 
 
Lentil Stuffed 
Peppers 
 
Red Lentil, Green 
Peppers, Ginger, 
Coriander, Onions, 
Spices. 
 
Bouranee Baunjan Eggplant With 
Yoghurt Sauce – 
Eggplant, Onion, 
Green Pepper, 
Tomatoes, Yogurt, 
Garlic. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
Ve
ge
ta
ria
n 
Di
sh
es
 
  
Sabse Borani Spinach leaves, 
Onion, Garlic, 
Yogurt. 
 
Ginger Tamarind 
Eggplant 
Tamarind, Eggplant, 
Garlic, Coriander, 
Cinnamon, Cloves, 
Spices. 
 
Boolawnee Fried Leek Pastries – 
Leek, Spices, Plain 
Flour. 
 
Si
de
 d
is
h 
  
 
Bendee / 
Baamiyah 
Okra, Onion, Garlic, 
Tomatoes, Spices. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
Si
de
 d
is
h 
 
Badenjan Eggplant, Onion, 
Garlic, Tomatoes, 
Spices. 
 
N
oo
dl
e 
Aush 
 
Noodles with 
Pulses, Meat and 
Yoghurt - Flour, 
Spices, Daul nakhud 
(Yellow split peas), 
Beans, Spinach, 
Onion, Lamb or 
Beef, Tomato puree,  
Drained yogurt 
 
Sa
la
ds
 
 
Bonjan Salad Spicy Eggplant Salad 
– Eggplant, Tomato 
Sauce, Spices. 
 
Tomato Salad Tomatoes, 
Cucumber, Red 
Onion, Cilantro, 
Lemon juice, 
Vinegar,Spices. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
 
Tangy Afghan 
Potato Salad with 
Cilantro Dressing 
 
Russet potatoes,  
Scallions, white and 
light green parts 
Cilantro 
White wine vinegar 
Salt  
Ground black 
pepper 
Chickpeas   
  
De
se
rt
s 
 
Asabia el Aroos Brides Fingers - 
Chou dough, 
Almonds or 
Pistachios, Sugar, 
Egg, Lemon. 
 
Baklava Chou dough, 
Cinnamon, Sugar, 
Cardamom, Lemon 
juice, Pistachios. 
 
Kadu Bouranee Sweet Pumpkin - 
Pumpkin or Squash, 
Tomato Sauce, 
Garlic, Sugar, 
Ginger, Coriander, 
Spices, Yogurt, Mint 
leaves. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
De
se
rt
s 
 
Khatai Cookies White Flour, Sugar, 
Cardamom, 
Pistachios  
 
Firnee Milk, Sugar, Corn 
Starch, Cardamom, 
Pistachios, Rose 
water.  
 
Fresh Cherries 
with Savory 
Yogurt 
Yogurt, Garlic, 
Cherries, Mint. 
 
Sundaes: Falooda Afghan Ice Cream – 
Cardamom, 
Rosewater, and 
Vermicelli noodles, 
Afghan cream 
(qaymaq), 
Pistachios. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
De
se
rt
s 
 
Sheer Payra 
Fudge 
Sugar, Milk, Corn 
Syrup, Butter, 
Pistachios, Walnuts. 
 
Gosh Feel Elephant Ear 
Pastries – Eggs, 
Sugar, Milk, Flour, 
Cardamom, 
Pistachios. 
 
Halwaua-e-Aurd-
e-Sujee 
Sugar, Ghee, Coarse 
semolina (farina), 
Pistachios, Almonds, 
Cardamom. 
 
Dr
in
ks
 
Dough Persian Cucumber, 
Yogurt, Mint. 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
Dr
in
ks
 
Chai Green Tea 
 
Sa
uc
es
 &
 R
ub
s 
    
Meat Sauce Yellow Onion, 
Ground Beef, 
Tomato Sauce, 
Garlic, Coriander, 
Spices. 
 
Korma Sauce Yellow Onion, 
Tomato Sauce, 
Spices. 
 
Salad Dressing Cucumber, Yogurt, 
Dry Mint, Apple 
Cider Vinegar, 
Water, Salt 
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Type Name Main ingredients Picture 
Sa
uc
es
 &
 R
ub
s 
Afghan Spice Rub Black peppercorns, 
Ground cardamom, 
Cumin seed, Ground 
coriander, Turmeric 
 
Coriander Sauce Cilantro, Garlic, 
Jalapeno, Walnut 
Lemon juice or  
White vinegar  
Salt, black pepper  
Ground cumin, 
Water.  
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ANNEX E 
AFGHAN ETHNIC GROUPS 
 
PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
DURRANI PANJPAI Alizai      
Ishakzai      
Khugiani Gulbaz      
Khabast      
Kharbun Kharal    
Najbi    
Khyrbun/ 
Karbun 
Karai/Garai Ghundi   
Hamza    
Jaji/Jagi   
Khidar   
Mukar   
Paria   
Tori   
Motik    
Najibi Ali   
Api   
Daulat    
Mando   
Masto   
Sherzad Dopai     
Khodi     
Lughmani     
Mama     
Marki     
Panjpai     
Shadi     
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
DURRANI PANJPAI  Khugiani Wazir 
 
Motik/ 
Motki 
 
Ahmad/ 
Khel 
  
Kanga   
Khojak   
Khozeh 
Khel 
  
Pira Khel   
Piro    
Taraki    
Sarki/  
Sirki 
Agam Khel   
Barak   
Bibo    
Nani Khel   
Rani Khel    
Nurzai Adinzai      
Adozai      
Alizai      
Badizai     
Baharduzai      
Chalakzai      
Ghorizai      
Gurgan      
Jamalzai      
Jiji      
Kurezai      
Mirgian      
Pataz      
Samirzai      
Umarzai     
Sagzai      
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
DURRANI 
 
ZIRAK 
 
Achakzai      
Alikozai Bashozai     
Dadozai     
Daolatzai     
Jaluzai     
Karazai     
Khalozai     
Khanizai     
Kutezai     
Melazai     
Nasozai     
Nausazai     
Sandarzai     
Surkani     
Barakzai Angizai     
Bakilzai      
Gaibizai      
Gurujizai      
Hutmanzai      
Barakzai Khanchazai      
Khirzai      
Khojakhzai      
Khunsezai      
Malikdinzai      
Muhamadzai      
Nasizai      
Nasratzai  Musazai    
Nasratzai     
Shahinchiba
  
   
Sherzai      
Sulimanzai      
Sundarzai      
Umarkhanzai      
Popalzai Sadozai      
HUMINT Centre of Excellence 
 
282 
 
PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
DAULATZAI KHADI and  
BARAT 
Ali Shah 
 
     
Angural       
Jinigar & 
Hassan Khel 
     
Qalandar 
Khel 
     
Sultan Khel      
Taapparal       
Kholdad 
Khel 
Alama Khel      
Mantwal       
Nurwal       
Shinkiwal       
DOTANI 
 
Bana Khel       
Hasan Khel 
Hasan Khel 
Labizai 
Labizai 
Sado Khel Adam Khel    
Kukarai     
Nuso/Khel    
Shakar Khel    
Farid Khel Bazar Khel    
Madar Khel    
Malamand     
Sherdad 
 
   
Hassanzai Mamai     
Gandalai  Nurbi Khel Mazdu Khel   
Khangi Khel   
Mulia Khel Madu Khel    
Paindai     
Pirzal Khel    
Surghwahzai     
Sanda Khel Dadu  Khel    
Jumi Khel    
Nuri Khel    
Umar Khel Badin Khel      
Gurbaz       
Ibrahim  K      
Ranra Khel      
Sankizai      
Usmanzai       
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHILZAI  Bran/ 
Burhan 
Hezab Suleiman  
Khel 
Ahmadzai Abubakar  Ghani Khel   
Hussain 
Khel 
 
Painda Khel  
Shahzada   
Tor Khel  
Alladin Khel Firoz Khel  
Tandan  
Zafran Khel  
Bahram 
Khel 
  
Dandi Khel   
Khojak    
Khurani 
Khel 
  
Maruf Khel Bata Khel  
Gulu Khel  
Jafar Khel  
Lajghari  
Muhammad 
Khel 
 
Shahzada K  
Tangiwal   
Yar Gul Khel  
Zafar Khel  
Mirgutal    
Musa Khel Imran Khel  Akbar Khel 
Albeg Khel  
Balu Khel 
Imran Khel Dadu Khel 
Fateh Khel 
Hanif Khel 
Jalal Khel 
Jamba Khel 
Khanan K 
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHILZAI  Burhan Hezab Suleiman  
Khel  
Ahmadzai Musa Khel Muhammad 
Yar Khel 
Qasim Khel 
Sadi Khel 
Sahib Khel 
Saifuddin K 
Swambi 
Khel 
Talu Khel 
Karim Khel Gul 
Muhammad 
Khel 
Jan Khel 
Sulaiman 
Khel 
Sultan Khel 
Isa Khel Kwajadad 
Khel 
Bahadurwal  
Madu Khel 
Musazai  
Pacho Khel 
Shah Murad 
Masti Khel Bazu Khel 
Mirgul Khel 
Neknam 
Khel 
Nura Khel 
Taru Khel 
Pali Khel  
Jabar Khel Ahmad Khel  
Chilzai   
Mariam 
Khel 
Gul Khel 
Mirza Khel 
Khugiani 
Khel 
Abdulrahman  
Arsala Khel 
Ya Khel Hassan Khel Firoz Khel 
Kamran 
Khel 
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHILZAI  Burhan Hezab Suleiman  
Khel  
Ahmadzai Ya Khel Hassan Khel Saiad Khel 
Salam Khel 
Umar Khel 
Khalil Khel Karu Khel 
Painda Khel 
Taghar 
Wali Khel 
Zandak Khel Adin Khel Dreplarai  
Muhammad 
Afzal 
Sadiq Khel 
Sadu Khel 
Zandak Khel Fateh Khel Bahauddin  
Bakhtar 
Khel 
Ghairat 
Khel 
Saiad Khel 
Astanazai  Liasi Khel   
Babikar 
Khel 
Sak  Edu Khel   
Gada Khel   
Kharoti   
Mir Ali Khel   
Umar Khel   
Uria Khel   
Utkhel   
Utman Khel   
Sherpai  Edu Khel   
Karoti   
Mir Ali Khel   
Umar Khel   
Uria Khel   
Ut Khel   
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHILZAI  Burhan 
 
Hezab 
 
Suleiman K 
 
Chakmani  Babu Khel    
Baghiar    
Darman K    
Hisarak    
Kamzai    
Mada Khel    
Sulaiman 
Khel  
  
Kaisar Khel Adan Khel    
Hasanzai  Adin Khel   
Kala Khel   
Nasu Khel  
Kalandar K    
Mali Khel  Babak Khel Ana Khel 
Lalbeg Khel 
Shah Khel  
Mita Khel  Kenai  
Khwaji Khel  
Spinsarai  
Shatorai  Khankakai  
Taghar   
Utu Khel   
Khojak    
Khwazak     
Minzai     
Piaro Khel     
Samalzai     
Sarpekara     
Stanizai    
Tuta Khel    
Ibrahim Musa Andarh Awood Jala Zai Ali Sher Kh  
Bakhshi Kh  
Gambeer K  
Gandh Khel  
Haroni  
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHILZAI  Ibrahim Musa Andarh Awood Jala Zai Jani khel  
Noor Khan  
Suliman Kh  
Thob Wal  
Koti Khel Habib Khel  
Ibrahim Kh  
Pathan Kh  
Polaad Kh  
Shamshi Kh  
Ghafoori    
Musa Dolat Khel Brahim Zai Dre Plaari 
 Jani khel 
 Karhsoo Kh 
 Katti 
 Laasi Khel 
 Lewaan 
 Matta Khel 
 Merai Wal 
 Meri 
 Nur Sahab 
 Paro khel 
 Qalandar  
 Rustam 
  Shamsi khel 
 Shathori 
 Sher Khan 
Dana Khel Ala Khel 
 Daakar Khel 
 Madhi khel 
 Payi Luths 
 Sgar Wal 
Pir Khel Alo Khel 
 Badwaan 
 Balaani Wal 
 Dalil Khan 
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHILZAI  Ibrahim Musa Andarh Musa Dolat Khel Pir Khel Faqiri 
Hamesh Kh 
Khasti 
Shakhar Zai 
Lgan Khel Acho Khel  
Barakud Din 
Khel 
Aimal khel 
Ghali khel 
Himat Khel 
Naso Khel 
Nazar Khel 
Haider Khel  
Imran Khel  
Parti khel Kamran 
Taghar 
Rashid Khel  
Saabit Khel  
Shaali khel  
Waali Khel Aimah Khel 
Hassan Khel 
Shaanu 
 Sheroo Khel 
Spargi 
Zahab Khel Khwaja Zai 
Mamo Zai 
Musa Khel 
 
 
Sahaak Alo Zai    
Bakhtar  Kh    
Hassan Kh    
Khado Khel    
Yakub Khel    
Yusuf Khel Unknown Gadayi Khel  
Ismail Khel  
Panji Payi  
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHILZAI  Ibrahim Musa Sahaak Yusuf Khel Unknown Awryi Khel  
Tota Khel  
Baadin Khel Abdar Khel   
Kabir Khel   
Khairo Khel Qabad Khel  
Santhi Zai Firat khel 
Khan Khel 
Paigo khel 
Sahab Dad 
Shah Abdul 
Zalo Khel 
Shahbaz K Bosi Khel 
Braham Zai 
Gran Khel 
Malak Din 
Thor Zai 
Qital khel   
Saleh khel   
Zarin Khel   
Feroz Khel Ghor Khel   
Jamal Khel Noor Khan   
Sado Khel  
Shaagal K  
Sheikh 
Noor Khel 
 
Gorbaz Khel Barak Khel   
Gulaan Khel Al Mari   
Dilbar Khel  
Shabki Khel  
Taarak khel  
Harif Khel Gula Khel  
Kanju Khel  
Mewi Khel  
Naa Khel Hasan Khel Ghula Khel  
Lalo Khel  
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHILZAI  
  
Ibrahim Musa Sahaak Naa Khel Lalo Khel Akbar Khel  
Kabir Khel   
Khairo Khel  
Qital Khel  
Saleh Khel  
Zarin Khel  
Saak Khel    
Taswid Khel    
Toran/ 
Turan 
Baabar  Laaghar Yahya Zi    
Shahoo 
 
   
Tahini    
Baaroo Hotak Malak Yar Hussein Zi Ishaq Qutab  
Omar 
Eesak Zi   
Dolat Yar Aeso Zi   
Ma’ruf Zi   
Utman Khel   
Yusuf Kati Zi   
Gadin Zi   
Kundli Zi   
Khadi Zi   
Sidiq Zi   
Omar Zi   
Ghon Ama Zi   
Baye Zi   
Baba Zi   
Sufaid Zi   
Ali Zi   
Yolad    
Nasir Khel  Hassan Khel Malezai Danger Khel    
Ibrahim Kh    
Khwajazai    
Nur Khel    
Stan Khel    
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHILZAI  Toran/ 
Turan 
Nasir Khel  Hassan Khel Malezai Ut Khel Abbas Khel   
Bazu Khel   
Budin Khel   
Faizullah Kh   
Saiad Khel   
Uria Khel   
Mandezai    
Utman Marwat Nasu Khel  Habibzai  
Ush Khel  
Umarzai  Bazid  
Inas  
Masezai    
Tokhi Ahmand Mando Khel    
Popal khel    
Rustam Kh    
Yunus Khel    
Ayo Zai     
Hasan Zai     
Tor Khel     
GHORYA 
KHEL 
 
Chamkani  
 
Arni  Barham      
Camar      
Darya      
Dreplara      
Husein     
Khuki      
Lashkari      
Nasar      
Khani  
 
Gorga      
Jamal      
Madi      
Mamut      
Mustafa      
Shero      
Sultan      
Tola      
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHORYA 
KHEL 
 
Chamkani Khoja  Dari      
Fatah      
Gulsher      
Hakim      
Jalal      
Langar      
Mirza      
Shomi      
Daulatiar  
 
Daud/ 
Daudzai  
 
Ali      
Bazid      
Bhagal      
Bibi      
Mamur      
Mandaki  Babu     
Husen     
Neko     
Mandar      
Tajo      
Yunus      
Yusuf      
Mahmand  
 
Darani  
 
Aba     
Ahmad     
Ama     
Ayub     
Azgar     
Babi     
Buchal     
Dadu     
Darbi     
Ghazi     
Haji     
Halim     
Haraira     
Hasan     
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHORYA 
KHEL 
Daulatiar Mahmand Darani Ibrahim     
Isa     
Jaeli     
Jani beg     
Kala     
Khojar     
Langar     
Makh     
Mandar     
Mando     
Marcha     
Mati     
Musa     
Nasal     
Nekbi     
Nur     
Pandiali     
Rawal     
Sado     
Sak     
Sarbedal     
Suleman     
Taraki     
Umar     
Wali Beg    
Ya’cub    
Khatuni  Baci     
Ali     
Bai     
Bota     
Gandao     
Hado     
Haji     
Isa     
Ismail     
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
GHORYA 
KHEL 
 
Daulatiar 
 
Mahmand 
 
Khatuni 
 
Janga     
Katasar     
Khwajo     
Koko     
Mahyar     
Maryamzi  Abbas    
Aka    
Barak    
Bayan    
Ghori    
Masturazi  Ahmad    
Atara    
Bakhtyar    
Barwid    
Casim    
Daulat    
Hydra    
Kodin    
Kotak    
Maina    
Pash    
Sanjar    
Mita     
Musa     
Rami     
Razar    
Sarah     
Shani     
Sihpah     
Suleman     
Tana     
Umar     
Urya     
Usman     
Yahya     
Yusuf     
Zakarya     
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
KAKAR Abdulazai        
Alizai        
Charmi        
Dhamad        
Hamazarai        
Lalazai        
Kabizai        
Khidarazai        
Kudizai        
Mandu Kh        
Nurzai        
Panazai        
Psein  Kiral       
Zaku       
Sanatial        
Shabozai        
Sini        
Siona        
Suliman Kh       
Tenizai        
Utmankhel        
KHOSTWAL Alisher        
Arun Khel       
Bakir Khel       
Ismail Khel  Aidar Khel       
Barkhan  Kh      
Dadwal       
Dilpari       
Mardi Khel       
Pirs       
Lakkan  Adam Khel       
Ismail Khel       
Kamar Khel       
Kurian       
Machar       
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
KHOSTWAL Lakkan Mali Khel       
Manz       
Saky Khel       
Sarki Khel       
Tsalari       
Zaki Khel      
Mail       
Mandozai  Hasan       
Muhammad       
Mandu        
Matun  Ahmad Khel       
Haji Khan       
Kajuri       
Khojal 
Wazir 
     
Kundi Khel       
Landiwal       
Mangash       
Modi khel       
Patara       
Sodi khel       
Zaghu       
Mula  Saban       
Sabari       
Shamil  Malizai      
Narezai      
Parbah      
Pirs      
Tani  Arevzai      
Dumami      
Khabbi Khel      
Mari Khel      
Sinkai      
Tarawi       
Tarwizai       
Human Aspects in Afghanistan - Handbook 
 
297 
 
PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
MANGAL Karlanri  Kodi  Dalazak      
Orakzai      
Musa Zai     
Mangal  Musa Khel  Hasan khel    
Kharsorhi    
Haibi    
Margay    
Kamal Khel   
Jani Khel     
Hani      
Wardak      
SHINWARI 
 
Alisher Khel 
 
Adi Khel  Kuru Khel      
Usman Khel     
Ash Khel  Alijan 
Nmasi 
    
Kamal 
Nmasi 
    
Shahmad 
Nmasi 
    
De Saruk       
Khali Khel       
Khuga Khel  Alam Khan 
Nmasi 
    
Ashrapai 
Nmasi 
    
Basai Nmasi     
Fatima 
Nmasi 
    
Khwaja Khel       
Kuhai       
Lohargai       
Mirdad Khel  Ganjun 
Nmasi  
    
Tirai Khel      
Otar Khel  Badia 
Nmasi  
    
 Kadir Nmasi     
Otar Khel Nur Gholam     
Pa Khel       
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
SHINWARI 
 
Alisher Khel 
 
Past Khel       
Pekha       
Piro Khel  Mat Khel      
Shudan Kh      
Pirwal Khel       
Piest Khel  Rostam Kh     
Shamu Khel      
Shaikhai 
Khel  
     
Shekmal 
Khel  
Ghani 
Nmasi  
    
Talib Khel     
Manduzai  Hamza Khel  Ahmad Khel      
Maghdud  
Khel  
    
Hasan Khel  Da Oghaz 
Khel  
    
Musi Khel      
Umar Khel      
Ilias Khel  Daulat Khel      
Kotwal      
Kukhi Khel      
Mullagori        
Sangu Khel 
 
Gadu       
Ghani khel  Akan Nmasi      
Baba Nmasi     
Dada Nmasi     
Haidar Khel  Badia 
Nmasi 
    
Bazai Nmasi     
Kachkal 
Khel  
Hazarmia 
Nmasi 
    
Sahib 
Nmasi  
    
Karmo Khel       
Karmu Khel  Azara 
Nmasi 
    
Shah Wali 
Nmasi 
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PASHTUNS 
Supertribe Tribe Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
SHINWARI 
 
Sangu Khel Karmu Khel Walak 
Nmasi 
    
Khani Khel  Janun 
Nmasi 
    
Khwajun 
Nmasi 
    
Malun 
Nmasi 
    
Mai Khel  Ata Khan     
Masha      
Mirjan Khel  Ana Nmasi     
Darbaba 
Nmasi 
    
Wari Nmasi     
Mullagoris  Kamal Khel      
Par Khel      
Tar Khel     
Soulor Ptar Bara Khel      
Kandi Khel      
Kirki Khel      
Mazid Khel      
Zarin Nmasi     
Sipai  Babar Khel  Aka Nmasi     
Ata Nmasi     
Fatima 
Nmasi  
    
Lala Nmasi     
Haidar Khel  Mama Khel      
Nimidar 
 
    
Rahimdad 
Khel  
Aka Khel     
Mamai Khel      
Ya Khel      
Shabul Khel       
Suliman  Kh      
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TAJIK ETHNIC GROUP 
Subgroup Division     
Aimak  Chobaki      
Akil       
Allahyari       
Arbab Zai      
Baraki  Ragan      
Bazi       
Furmuli       
Jagatai       
Jotegh       
Kabuli       
Khamar       
Khoja       
Kohistani       
Larkhabi       
Murghabi  Dara Takhi     
Isparfi      
Isperwani      
Jahi      
Pehlwan       
Sar Dehi      
Sek       
Tabraki       
Tarbulaki       
Urtabulaki       
Yamchi       
Zadagan  Khawanin      
Zuri       
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Abak       
Allakah       
Allaudin       
Bacha Sadi       
Baighazi       
Baiyah       
Barat       
Barbari       
Begal       
Beguji       
Besud/ Behsud  Abdul      
Ata      
Babaka      
Babali      
Baian      
Behbud      
Bul Hussum      
Boorjugye      
Bul Hasan  Jama-i-Ali    
Mir Bacha     
Pir Husain     
Pir Nazar     
Burjagai      
Burjigali      
Chuli      
Dai Mirdad  Bachari 
Ghulam  
Allah Quli   
Bambi     
Chachi     
Chawarchi     
Jambogha     
Sadmarda     
Tolakshah     
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Tutu     
Darghan      
Darvesh      
Daultapai  Dostar     
Mir Bacha     
Nuri     
Tezak     
Ulama     
Dayah      
Dihkhan      
Doulatfa      
Isutonsumur      
Jhalak      
Dih Murdagan     
Dilkan      
Durweish Ali     
Jangzie      
Besud/ Behsud Jirghai  Dosa     
Iskandarai     
Kadakh     
Kul Ali     
Lal Beg    
Jirgahi Usi     
Junglye      
Kambar Ali      
Kaptasan  Kaum-i-
Dehkan 
   
Mumrak     
Nauroz Beg    
Shadi Beg     
Khalik      
Koh-i-Biruni      
Kulritan      
Maksud      
Mazid      
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Mir Bacha      
Mir-i-Ali     
Mizad      
Mumarak      
Naoroz  Jumbud     
Ramuz      
Saoz-iKah Sepai      
Sargal      
Sehkam      
Sheikh      
Shelkhani      
Sokfa      
Sugfa      
Dahla      
Tulighali      
Bolgor       
Bubak       
Chagai  Chahil Ghori      
Chahar Dasta Akzar      
Aladai      
Bed Dara      
Chahar Deh-i-Bebud     
Kuluj      
Param      
Roshan      
Sheri Jan Gul     
Shirin     
Tamaki     
Zardalu     
Chula Kur      
Dahla       
Dai Barka      
Dai Chopo      
Dai Dehqo      
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Dai Kundi Ainak      
Alak      
Babuli      
Baibagha      
Barat      
Bubak      
Chahkuk      
Chahush      
Chora      
daulat Beg     
Doda      
Fihristan      
Haider Beg     
Jami      
Jasha      
Kalanzai      
Burmain      
Chora      
Kaum-i-Ali     
Khudi      
Khushak     
Mamaka      
Mir Hazar      
Neka      
Qaum-I Ali     
Roshan beg     
Saru      
Moshun      
Peristan      
Sargin      
Sarun      
Taristan      
Urdu Sah     
Dai Mardah       
Dai Mirak       
Dai Mirkasha      
Dai Qozi      
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Dai Zangi Bacha Ghulam Bubak     
Gaoshak     
Ghulam Ali     
Ismail     
Kaum-i-Barfi    
Kaum-i-Mirza    
Kaum-i-Yari    
Neka     
Shah Masid     
Waras     
Bubali      
Dai Khundi     
Gedi      
Kamyaba      
Kara-kul     
Kham-i-aba Beg ali    
Gangsu     
Halwakhor     
Kam-i-dah    
Kam-i-mattal    
Kam-i-saburi    
Km-i-sadat    
Kirigu     
Mimgak     
Daltamur      
Damarda       
Darghun       
Dastam       
Dayah       
Dayu       
Deh Zengi       
Di meri       
Di Mirlas       
Dinyari       
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Dosti       
Faoladi  Chingar      
Elibai      
Kara Jangal      
Muhammad      
Zai Golak     
Gadi / Gadai       
Gangsu       
Garhi       
Gavi       
Ghaznichi       
Gudar       
Hasbah  Jiblai      
Ketar      
Khalik      
Wazir      
Zai Wahid     
Jaghatu  Ahmada      
Alishgi/Aishgi     
Aludini      
Baiat      
Farash     
Karasuf      
Karghani      
Karim dad khel      
Khataghan     
Khwaja Miri     
Kimlut      
Laghri      
Shakha     
Jaghuri/Jaghori  Ata  Maska     
Baghuchari      
Bubak      
Damardah      
Gari      
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Gujaristan      
Izri Musqua Baba    
Kalandar      
Malistan      
Tughai Bugha     
Zaoli      
Jaokar       
Kadelan       
Kaghai       
Kala  Surkhabi      
Kala Nao  Bai Baka     
Barankari      
Barat      
Beguja/ begujai      
Bubak      
Dai Zangi  Karianash    
Faristan      
Ihsankaka     
Kadi      
Kah Kah     
Khwaja Hazara     
Kohmari      
Kokdari      
Laghari      
Mamakah      
Mirmarg      
Najak      
Surkhabi      
Tah Tah      
Zaimat      
Kalak       
Kalanzai       
Kalta       
Kamarda       
Kara Mali      
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Karabagh  Aldai      
Kazlak       
Kham-i-Aba Kirigu      
Khatai       
Khozi       
Khubzat       
Khwaja       
Khwaja Sayyd      
Koh-e-Gadi      
Kohistani       
Kolian       
Kubti       
Kundelane       
Kuru       
Lal  She-Pai     
Logai       
Mingak       
Milrale       
Muhammad Khoja Alam      
Amin      
Bahi      
Bahram     
Bandali      
Bubak      
Chalma      
Doka      
Ikhtiar      
Jaffah        
Jamal      
Karachah      
Khapar      
Khazar      
Khushal      
Khwaja      
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Mirak      
Nur Muhammada      
Omee      
Sagadee      
Shatu      
Tamakee Taltamoor      
Tochin      
Nadir       
Najik       
Nakodari       
Nek Pai       
Neka       
Paraganda       
Pas-i-Koh      
Polada /Fuladi  Aji      
Basi      
Besudi      
Butao      
Chakar      
Dahla      
Daulat Khan      
Daulat Pai     
Khesh      
Dayah  Daulat Khan    
Deh Barka    
Haidar      
Haji      
Inal      
Iska      
Jamal      
Kalanzai      
Khoninda      
Khubzat      
Khurdakzai      
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Kimsan-Dangula      
Kimsung      
Malanak      
Mir Adina      
Musat      
Panjpai      
Sadat       
Sadmarda       
Sagpah       
Sahkdar       
Sar Jangali       
Sayyd       
Sayyd Ishan      
Shani       
Shahi       
Sharistani  Tajik      
Sheikh Ali Daolat Pah     
Darghan      
Deh-e Mirag     
Gadai      
Gadhi      
Gaohi/Garhi     
Gawi      
Habash      
Hasht Khoja     
Kaghai      
Kalu      
Karai      
Karam Ali      
Karluck /Kalluk     
Koh-i-Gadi     
Kollak      
Naiman      
Nekpai      
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HAZARA TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan Subclan Infraclan   
Pai-i-Kundi     
Pasira      
Sad Marda     
Sagpa      
Tarmush      
Tatar      
Tili/ Thuli      
Tokhta      
Toth      
Turmush      
Wala      
Shakhdar       
Surkhabi       
Takana  Begal      
Taraghai       
Tli       
Timuri  Afghani      
Beika’i     
Hasani      
Malang  Sir Ahmad    
Odil      
Sabs      
Shir Ahmad      
Turkoman       
Uruzgani  Mir Adina     
Yangur  Mukadam      
Yangur       
Yasumbagha      
Yek Aulang  Sayed      
Zaidnat      
Zamiat      
Zirak  Achakzai      
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BALUCH TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan     
Baji Zai       
Bazi Zai      
Borzai       
Dah Mardah      
Darizai       
Gargeg       
Garm Seli      
Ghallahacha       
Ghurghij       
Gorgeg       
Gorget       
Gurej       
Gurgej       
Hasanzai       
Kabdani       
Kalbali       
Kautani       
Lajai       
Makaki       
Malki       
Mamasani  Kirai      
Mrad khan       
Nahrui       
Nothani         
Pahlwan       
Rakhshani Badini      
Gurgech      
Rakhshani Jamaldini      
Jianzai      
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BALUCH TRIBE 
Subtribe Clan     
Saruni      
Usbakzai      
Reki       
Safarzai       
Sanjarani       
Sargul Zai      
Saruni       
Shadi       
Shahuzai       
Taoki       
Taoli       
Yasinzai  Dura Khel      
Manjar Khel      
Muhammad Umar 
Khel 
    
Qadir Khel      
Tor Khel     
Umar Khel     
Zarozai       
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KIRGHIZ ETHNIC GROUPS 
Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
Teyet/Tait Sari Teyet Qutan Oghlu Alaichi   
Barqi   
Chegeter   
Choghoroq   
Quezil Bash   
Mama Oghlu Alapa   
Nowroz Durbowel  
Tekereng  
Sait Mat   
Shayem   
Haider Oghlu Bori   
Burqa   
Qochqar Choja  
Eshibul  
Mouju  
Qulbul  
Jamanang   
Wotunchi   
Zarif   
Chal Teyet     
Chapan Teyet     
Laqay     
Qara Teyet     
Qarleg     
Yaman     
Kesak / Kasak Qezil Ayagh Baqi  Jan    
Jelma    
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KIRGHIZ ETHNIC GROUPS 
Subtribe Infratribe Superclan Clan Subclan Infraclan 
Meta    
Mirza    
Bustan Mowlawey    
Sar Washel    
Chawugh     
Gherdisha Engerchaq    
Hait Aka    
Jeghjem     
Mama Char     
Mushke     
Qara Sadaq     
Quralay     
Qushqulaq     
Naiman Basterghay     
Bowa     
Ghuran     
Jawun Put     
Jowru     
Jurde     
Ken     
Keyek     
Kok Echke     
Mirza Naiman     
Qepchaq Chela     
Kara Qepchak     
Qulchaq     
Sart Qepchaq     
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NURISTANI ETHNIC GROUPS 
Subtribe Clan Subclan    
Ashkun/Ashkund       
Bashgul Katir  Barmodari      
Charedari      
Jannahdari      
Mutadawadari      
Shakladari      
Shtukdari      
Sowadari      
Chanak       
Dutak       
Gramsana       
Istrat/ Gordesh       
Kalasha  Chima-nishei      
Vai      
Vata      
Kantor  Kaymgal  Atergam     
 Bairkama     
 Pimichgram     
Kastan/ Kashtan       
Kata       
Katir  Kti/ Katawar      
Kullum/ Kulam     
Ramguli/ Gabarik     
Kieth       
Kam/Kom Batardari      
Bilezhdari      
Demidari      
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Kam/Kom Garakdari      
Gutkechdari      
Kanardari      
Lananadari      
Sukdari      
Utahdari      
Waidari      
Kshto       
Madugal/ 
M l 
     
Mumo      
Paintar       
Paj       
Pashgai  
 
     
Peh       
Pendesh      
Presun      
Rahrah      
Sanu      
Tapahkal      
Tregami  Devi     
Gumbeer     
Kaltar     
Vasi       
Wadihu      
Wai/ Waegal Bungalee      
Painter      
Willwal      
Wama      
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TATAR ETHNIC GROUP 
Subgroup Division     
Chagai  Chahil Ghori      
Hai Hubi       
Mekhzari       
Miriji       
Muhammad Khuli       
Zai Batur       
Zai Bi      
Zai Chopan       
Zai Chunika       
Zai Ghola       
Zai Hubi       
Zai Hundu       
Zai Kara       
Zai Mahmad       
Zai Mirzari       
Zai Murtumu      
Zai Nabaki      
Zai Nazar      
Zai Payandabeg      
Zai Qabiz      
Zai qara      
Zai Shakur      
Zai Shola      
Zai Ulusi       
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DISCLAIMER 
The views expressed within this paper are entirely and solely those of 
the contributors and do not necessarily reflect official thinking and 
policy either of the organization they represent or NATO. 
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